The realist's view of grand strategy is a consequence of their perception of the dog-eat-dog nature of power. Their view of the world coincides with the obvious hostility that exists in the world. In realist politics, those with the gold (or power, or both) make the rules. When it comes to national security policy and American grand strategy, it is assumed that since America has the gold and the power, America makes the rules. Historically, and even in many parts of the world today, this policy would invite corruption, violence, and utter misery for the human population which fell victim to those with the gold and the power. However, America has tended (with exceptions of course) to be a benevolent superpower, not particularly keen on flexing its muscle and shoving people around to get its way. This is made somewhat apparent by the isolationist philosophy which so permeates American thinking. It is quite likely that there has never been a state which had more power, which was so hesitant to use it to either subjugate its enemies or to enable conquest or expansionist objectives, as the United States of America has been over the decades since World War II.
This being the case, realists tend to see the world in very hostile terms, kill or be killed. Realists see the different grand strategy options in terms of raw power. They may likely ask, “Which of these strategies is more/less likely to invite the various states to take advantage of America’s weaknesses?” The potential for the evil nature of humankind to dominate is fundamental to realism and strategy is seen in this light. The realist view is that if America weakens her defenses, there will be some evil despot ready and willing to take advantage. At the same time, if America disengages internationally, it is assumed that the power vacuum left in America’s wake will be filled with some power monger or another.
Cooperative security, in realist world terms, is a recipe for disaster. The premise that America will place its full and complete trust in and rely entirely on international organizations and the international community as a whole for its own stability and security is naïve at best, and outrageously foolish at worst. Cooperative security has as its ultimate goal, the collectivization of the globe and the design of making every state interdependent on every other state for their collective security. Realists would argue that the moment America surrenders its right to pursue its own interests, is the moment America’s security is forfeit. The idealist notion that if everyone cooperates and gets along, everyone will benefit is a non reality to a realist because as soon as the cooperative begins to believe in and can finally realize its communal utopia, the one individual or state with Stalinist, alpha-dominant tendencies and the power to exercise those, will rise to the top and make a Stalinist state out of all those who foolishly let down their guard. Russia in the 1930s is a perfect example. The Soviet state was set up on the naïve notion that if everyone cooperates, works together, everyone will benefit, the working class will become the strength of society, the state will cease to exist (we have Karl Marx to thank for that) and utopia will follow. We know how that went.
The other grand strategy options are much more realistic in nature. Neo-isolationism, selective engagement, and primacy all assume the presence of an ongoing and persistent threat. No matter the perceived benign nature of the circumstances, a threat will always arise which will require force to eliminate. These strategies assume that America will maintain the elements of power necessary to insure its dominance in the world, to some degree or another. The nature of this concept can be seen in the relative calm which followed the ending of the Cold War. Peace and harmony seemed to permeate international relations, at least as far as the great powers were concerned, and as far as a comfortable public was concerned. Then, in the absence of conflict, the threat of Islamic extremism emerged to fill the void of conflict, and to again demonstrate that utopia, as dreamed of by idealist thinkers, although perhaps not impossible, is at least a distant, and at this point, naïve notion.
Realism in national security and in terms of grand strategy theory demands the maintenance of power, in order to protect America in the presence of threats of any kind. Realism views power as a necessity, without which, America will be victimized by power mongers and become a liability to its people. Power and strength are not an option to realists. The only option exists in how that power and strength are put to use.
Showing posts with label isolationism. Show all posts
Showing posts with label isolationism. Show all posts
Monday, February 8, 2010
Choosing America's Grand Strategy
When considering the priority of national security decisions through the scope of various national security strategies, the U.S. considers four basic elements. Those elements in order of importance seem to be; first, feasibility; second, need; third, cost; forth, value. A final element, which seems to be overarching of all these elements, and yet, not particularly belonging to the group is that of sovereignty. These elements don’t necessarily pertain to the level of threat under consideration as much as they pertain to selection of strategy, and in turn, implementation of policy. Each element plays its own critical role in how American national security strategy is identified.
Of the several national security strategies discussed by U.S. policy makers, no single policy tends to have a certain probability of success in all policy dilemmas. Determining the feasibility of each strategy is critical when debating and shaping U.S. national security grand strategy. As stated by Robert J. Art, some strategies are simply not feasible, while others tend to be feasible only under certain circumstances, still others tend to make sense under a great many circumstances (Art 2003, 84). The strategy of dominion for example is prohibitive in many ways. Dominion is extremely costly in monetary terms as well as in resources, too costly to be rational; it is extremely provocative to allies, enemies, and neutral states alike; and it is extremely irrational in a modern world where nuclear weapons are such a major consideration in international politics (states with nuclear weapons are not easily manipulated) (Art 2003, 89). Selective engagement, on the other hand, is extremely feasible in many instances because it encourages multilateralism which dissipates the costs and international consequences of action. Determining feasibility is important in determining which strategies will work with which potential set of circumstance.
Policy makers must consider needs in American national security strategy in terms of specific problems with which the nation is faced, as well as the general objectives and interests of those policy makers. Some strategies, when localized, can have a better effect on specific problems than other strategies. In the early 1990s, Saddam Hussein posed a specific problem for the United States. A viable and feasible strategy in this circumstance was to implement a containment strategy to prevent Hussein from further threatening his neighbors and undermining regional stability. In this case, the need was specifically addressed by a strategy not particularly suited to other areas of international conflict such as regional confrontation or inner-state humanitarian scenarios. Another clear example is the containment of the Soviet Union in the cold war when the U.S. government opted to establish road blocks to Soviet domination and communist expansion. I each case a need was identified and an adequate strategy matched to that need.
Of course no assessment of national security strategy can be made without a thorough analysis of the costs. As mentioned, the strategy of dominion is very costly, while the strategy of isolationism is relatively inexpensive. This aspect must be considered on the basis of cost/benefit analysis. Isolationism could prove more costly over the long term than other strategies but clearly has a cost advantage in the short term, as inaction is usually less costly than containment or engagement of any kind. Long term however, it may be more cost effective to engage rather than to sit out. In the case of Afghanistan in 2001/2002, a clear threat existed which may have been more costly to ignore than to engage. Although the costs have been extensive, over the long term it is likely to be more cost effective to confront the threat in Afghanistan now than to remain isolated. However, to engage in the present conflict between Congo and Rwanda and the multiple facets of insurgency, ethnic strife, and interstate confrontation going on in that region would likely be much more costly for America in both short and long term than just remaining aloof and letting the thing run its course.
Value works in conjunction with cost. If an engagement has limited value but tremendous cost, such as the conflict in Congo/Rwanda, engagement by America would be irrational. However, engagement in Afghanistan to prevent the proliferation of Islamic extremism may be quite costly but have tremendous value to American national security, the American people, and America's allies. The value of a strategy is of great importance to policy makers when considering potential strategy options.
Although it doesn't pertain directly to strategies such as dominion and isolationism, primarily because those are unilateral in nature, the issue of sovereignty is quite important when considering plausible strategy options. Especially in the cases of collective and cooperative security, a nation's sovereignty may be at stake if it is limited in either its self defense options or its ability to act in its own best interests as the result of its incorporation into an international security agreement. In the case of great powers more specifically, such involvement would be detrimental to a state's own self preservation.
Art, Robert J. A Grand Strategy for America. Ithica, New York: Cornell University Press. 2003.
Of the several national security strategies discussed by U.S. policy makers, no single policy tends to have a certain probability of success in all policy dilemmas. Determining the feasibility of each strategy is critical when debating and shaping U.S. national security grand strategy. As stated by Robert J. Art, some strategies are simply not feasible, while others tend to be feasible only under certain circumstances, still others tend to make sense under a great many circumstances (Art 2003, 84). The strategy of dominion for example is prohibitive in many ways. Dominion is extremely costly in monetary terms as well as in resources, too costly to be rational; it is extremely provocative to allies, enemies, and neutral states alike; and it is extremely irrational in a modern world where nuclear weapons are such a major consideration in international politics (states with nuclear weapons are not easily manipulated) (Art 2003, 89). Selective engagement, on the other hand, is extremely feasible in many instances because it encourages multilateralism which dissipates the costs and international consequences of action. Determining feasibility is important in determining which strategies will work with which potential set of circumstance.
Policy makers must consider needs in American national security strategy in terms of specific problems with which the nation is faced, as well as the general objectives and interests of those policy makers. Some strategies, when localized, can have a better effect on specific problems than other strategies. In the early 1990s, Saddam Hussein posed a specific problem for the United States. A viable and feasible strategy in this circumstance was to implement a containment strategy to prevent Hussein from further threatening his neighbors and undermining regional stability. In this case, the need was specifically addressed by a strategy not particularly suited to other areas of international conflict such as regional confrontation or inner-state humanitarian scenarios. Another clear example is the containment of the Soviet Union in the cold war when the U.S. government opted to establish road blocks to Soviet domination and communist expansion. I each case a need was identified and an adequate strategy matched to that need.
Of course no assessment of national security strategy can be made without a thorough analysis of the costs. As mentioned, the strategy of dominion is very costly, while the strategy of isolationism is relatively inexpensive. This aspect must be considered on the basis of cost/benefit analysis. Isolationism could prove more costly over the long term than other strategies but clearly has a cost advantage in the short term, as inaction is usually less costly than containment or engagement of any kind. Long term however, it may be more cost effective to engage rather than to sit out. In the case of Afghanistan in 2001/2002, a clear threat existed which may have been more costly to ignore than to engage. Although the costs have been extensive, over the long term it is likely to be more cost effective to confront the threat in Afghanistan now than to remain isolated. However, to engage in the present conflict between Congo and Rwanda and the multiple facets of insurgency, ethnic strife, and interstate confrontation going on in that region would likely be much more costly for America in both short and long term than just remaining aloof and letting the thing run its course.
Value works in conjunction with cost. If an engagement has limited value but tremendous cost, such as the conflict in Congo/Rwanda, engagement by America would be irrational. However, engagement in Afghanistan to prevent the proliferation of Islamic extremism may be quite costly but have tremendous value to American national security, the American people, and America's allies. The value of a strategy is of great importance to policy makers when considering potential strategy options.
Although it doesn't pertain directly to strategies such as dominion and isolationism, primarily because those are unilateral in nature, the issue of sovereignty is quite important when considering plausible strategy options. Especially in the cases of collective and cooperative security, a nation's sovereignty may be at stake if it is limited in either its self defense options or its ability to act in its own best interests as the result of its incorporation into an international security agreement. In the case of great powers more specifically, such involvement would be detrimental to a state's own self preservation.
Art, Robert J. A Grand Strategy for America. Ithica, New York: Cornell University Press. 2003.
Wednesday, December 2, 2009
Public Opinion and the Military
Use of American military forces abroad has always been a contentious issue. In question more broadly has been the conflict between two ideologies, Isolationism and Globalism (or internationalism; or interventionism). The debate between the two in America goes back to its genesis; the debate over whether America should keep to its own borders, or if its interests require, that it exert its influence abroad.
At the outset of the Second World War in Europe, American public opinion was largely opposed to the committal of US forces to that theater. The opinion was largely, “Let the Europeans deal with their own mess!” After all, America had intervened in World War One and the Europeans clearly hadn’t learned their lesson. Roosevelt had wanted to commit American forces to the European theater long before the Japanese Attack on Pearl Harbor and it was American public opinion that prevented him. He needed the Japanese awakening to persuade the American public that American intervention in Europe was necessary. It was public opinion, ultimately, that brought the United States of America into the Second World War.
America’s engagement in Vietnam largely ended as a result of tremendous public pressure, or negative public opinion. Over the decade long war, the Vietnam conflict garnered increasing public criticism. In this instance, Isolationism had grown in the arena of foreign policy as a result of the Second World War and the Korean conflict. As Vietnam dragged on, American public opinion grew until finally, under U.S. President Gerald Ford, American troops were completely withdrawn from Vietnam in 1975. The conflict rested upon the premise that democracy’s mortal enemy was communism, and that democracy, in order to prevail on the global stage, needed to stem the tide of communist expansionism. The American public didn’t see things quite in that light. In large part because of the media, American public opinion turned so strongly against Vietnam that Washington finally conceded and removed the last remaining American troops in April, 1975.
In 1993, American forces had been committed to Somalia as part of a UN aid program to protect and distribute relief aid to starving Somalis. The country was run largely by warlords and was in basic anarchy. The American commander in that theater authorized a raid aimed at abducting Mohamed Farrah Aidid, a leading warlord and strongman in Mogadishu, along with several of his top lieutenants. The raid succeeded in part, but failed to net Aidid, and resulted in the deaths of several American soldiers. The media, as in Vietnam, couldn’t get enough of the carnage of war, and succeeded in driving public opinion in opposition to the American presence in Somalia. Many Americans saw Somalia as a lawless, godless region and believed American troops had no place in such a god-forsaken part of the world. It didn’t take long for President Bill Clinton to withdraw American forces.
More recently, with waning public support for “Operation Iraqi Freedom”, President Barack Obama promised in his election campaign that he would withdraw American troops from Iraq. The American public, at least in some part, had begun to desert the Iraq war and see it as another Vietnam. Obama viewed his election, as do all American presidents, as a “referendum” on the former president’s policies, and immediately set out to withdraw American troops from Iraq. Although public opinion is in no way as galvanized against the Iraq war as it was against Vietnam, the people have spoken, and public opinion has again been a part in shaping American policy.
Public opinion will always shape the ebb and flow of the use of military force as well as American policy generally. The nature of a democracy demands it. If public opinion ceased to be a factor in such aspects of government, America would cease to be a democracy.
At the outset of the Second World War in Europe, American public opinion was largely opposed to the committal of US forces to that theater. The opinion was largely, “Let the Europeans deal with their own mess!” After all, America had intervened in World War One and the Europeans clearly hadn’t learned their lesson. Roosevelt had wanted to commit American forces to the European theater long before the Japanese Attack on Pearl Harbor and it was American public opinion that prevented him. He needed the Japanese awakening to persuade the American public that American intervention in Europe was necessary. It was public opinion, ultimately, that brought the United States of America into the Second World War.
America’s engagement in Vietnam largely ended as a result of tremendous public pressure, or negative public opinion. Over the decade long war, the Vietnam conflict garnered increasing public criticism. In this instance, Isolationism had grown in the arena of foreign policy as a result of the Second World War and the Korean conflict. As Vietnam dragged on, American public opinion grew until finally, under U.S. President Gerald Ford, American troops were completely withdrawn from Vietnam in 1975. The conflict rested upon the premise that democracy’s mortal enemy was communism, and that democracy, in order to prevail on the global stage, needed to stem the tide of communist expansionism. The American public didn’t see things quite in that light. In large part because of the media, American public opinion turned so strongly against Vietnam that Washington finally conceded and removed the last remaining American troops in April, 1975.
In 1993, American forces had been committed to Somalia as part of a UN aid program to protect and distribute relief aid to starving Somalis. The country was run largely by warlords and was in basic anarchy. The American commander in that theater authorized a raid aimed at abducting Mohamed Farrah Aidid, a leading warlord and strongman in Mogadishu, along with several of his top lieutenants. The raid succeeded in part, but failed to net Aidid, and resulted in the deaths of several American soldiers. The media, as in Vietnam, couldn’t get enough of the carnage of war, and succeeded in driving public opinion in opposition to the American presence in Somalia. Many Americans saw Somalia as a lawless, godless region and believed American troops had no place in such a god-forsaken part of the world. It didn’t take long for President Bill Clinton to withdraw American forces.
More recently, with waning public support for “Operation Iraqi Freedom”, President Barack Obama promised in his election campaign that he would withdraw American troops from Iraq. The American public, at least in some part, had begun to desert the Iraq war and see it as another Vietnam. Obama viewed his election, as do all American presidents, as a “referendum” on the former president’s policies, and immediately set out to withdraw American troops from Iraq. Although public opinion is in no way as galvanized against the Iraq war as it was against Vietnam, the people have spoken, and public opinion has again been a part in shaping American policy.
Public opinion will always shape the ebb and flow of the use of military force as well as American policy generally. The nature of a democracy demands it. If public opinion ceased to be a factor in such aspects of government, America would cease to be a democracy.
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