Realism and Grand Strategy

The realist's view of grand strategy is a consequence of their perception of the dog-eat-dog nature of power. Their view of the world coincides with the obvious hostility that exists in the world. In realist politics, those with the gold (or power, or both) make the rules. When it comes to national security policy and American grand strategy, it is assumed that since America has the gold and the power, America makes the rules. Historically, and even in many parts of the world today, this policy would invite corruption, violence, and utter misery for the human population which fell victim to those with the gold and the power. However, America has tended (with exceptions of course) to be a benevolent superpower, not particularly keen on flexing its muscle and shoving people around to get its way. This is made somewhat apparent by the isolationist philosophy which so permeates American thinking. It is quite likely that there has never been a state which had more power, which was so hesitant to use it to either subjugate its enemies or to enable conquest or expansionist objectives, as the United States of America has been over the decades since World War II.

This being the case, realists tend to see the world in very hostile terms, kill or be killed. Realists see the different grand strategy options in terms of raw power. They may likely ask, “Which of these strategies is more/less likely to invite the various states to take advantage of America’s weaknesses?” The potential for the evil nature of humankind to dominate is fundamental to realism and strategy is seen in this light. The realist view is that if America weakens her defenses, there will be some evil despot ready and willing to take advantage. At the same time, if America disengages internationally, it is assumed that the power vacuum left in America’s wake will be filled with some power monger or another.

Cooperative security, in realist world terms, is a recipe for disaster. The premise that America will place its full and complete trust in and rely entirely on international organizations and the international community as a whole for its own stability and security is naïve at best, and outrageously foolish at worst. Cooperative security has as its ultimate goal, the collectivization of the globe and the design of making every state interdependent on every other state for their collective security. Realists would argue that the moment America surrenders its right to pursue its own interests, is the moment America’s security is forfeit. The idealist notion that if everyone cooperates and gets along, everyone will benefit is a non reality to a realist because as soon as the cooperative begins to believe in and can finally realize its communal utopia, the one individual or state with Stalinist, alpha-dominant tendencies and the power to exercise those, will rise to the top and make a Stalinist state out of all those who foolishly let down their guard. Russia in the 1930s is a perfect example. The Soviet state was set up on the naïve notion that if everyone cooperates, works together, everyone will benefit, the working class will become the strength of society, the state will cease to exist (we have Karl Marx to thank for that) and utopia will follow. We know how that went.

The other grand strategy options are much more realistic in nature. Neo-isolationism, selective engagement, and primacy all assume the presence of an ongoing and persistent threat. No matter the perceived benign nature of the circumstances, a threat will always arise which will require force to eliminate. These strategies assume that America will maintain the elements of power necessary to insure its dominance in the world, to some degree or another. The nature of this concept can be seen in the relative calm which followed the ending of the Cold War. Peace and harmony seemed to permeate international relations, at least as far as the great powers were concerned, and as far as a comfortable public was concerned. Then, in the absence of conflict, the threat of Islamic extremism emerged to fill the void of conflict, and to again demonstrate that utopia, as dreamed of by idealist thinkers, although perhaps not impossible, is at least a distant, and at this point, naïve notion.

Realism in national security and in terms of grand strategy theory demands the maintenance of power, in order to protect America in the presence of threats of any kind. Realism views power as a necessity, without which, America will be victimized by power mongers and become a liability to its people. Power and strength are not an option to realists. The only option exists in how that power and strength are put to use.

Four American Grand Strategies

In the policy debate over potential U.S. grand strategies, there are four basic competing visions. The four competing visions include neo-isolationism, selective engagement, cooperative security, and primacy. Each of the four falls along a spectrum with varying degrees of unilateralism and multilateralism, and differs gradually in their objectives, premises, and instruments for applying U.S. power and insuring American national security.

The first candidate for U.S. grand strategy, as put forth by Posen and Ross, is neo-isolationism (Posen 1997, 7). Neo-isolationism would withdraw American forces from all parts of the world as presently situated, and deploy American forces only to those areas where problems directly influence American national security. It’s basic premise is that America is “strategically immune” (Posen 1997, 10), that is, as a result of America’s geography, America is all but completely impervious to foreign aggression. The only potential aggressors would have to either cross an ocean to launch a campaign, or enter the U.S. by way of Canada, or Mexico. In the unlikely event that Canada or Mexico was of the mind to launch an assault on the U.S., first, the aggressor would have to substantially, even exponentially increase the size and strength of its present military, and if that, then American defenses would likely dismantle an invasion without skipping even a beat. Neo-nationalism utilizes five key elements to insure American national security. A nuclear deterrent capability would be required to prevent a first strike from an aggressor state. Second, air and missile defenses would be maintained to insure air superiority within American airspace. Third, U.S. intelligence capability would be critical to alerting American authorities of any potential threat to U.S. assets and interests. Forth, a strong navy would be necessary to insure against the unlikely probability of an amphibious invasion from abroad. Finally, special operations forces would be necessary to deal directly with threats against U.S. assets abroad (Posen 1997, 7-14).

The second candidate for U.S. grand strategy is selective engagement (Posen 1997, 15). The selective engagement strategy proposes to maintain international security by preventing great power war. The basic premise is that great power wars cause the most destruction, and since America has limited resources and isn’t that interested in policing the world, the prevention of great power war is a great boundary to U.S. involvement. This boundary may be breached however under circumstances deemed sufficient by American policy makers and politicians. Selective engagement follows generally the instrumentality of neo-isolationism. Nuclear deterrent and homeland defense of a certainty necessary, but beyond that, selective engagement requires the conventional forces necessary to dissuade aggression by great powers, and ideally, to carry on military engagement and achieve victory in at least one foreign theater (Posen 1997, 15-21).

The third candidate for U.S. grand strategy is cooperative security (Posen 1997, 21). Cooperative security assumes democratic altruism on the part of the great powers. Its objective, although its adherents admit cooperative security is a “work in progress” (Posen 1997, 25), is an international framework of security treaties which demands international cooperation and assistance in any and all international security dilemmas. The primary responsibility for enforcement of international security falls upon the great powers, with minor support from the multitude of lesser powers. Competition among great powers is assumed minimal. The media, at least according to Posen and Ross, seems to be a key component of cooperative security. The media’s role is to enlighten the otherwise apathetic public regarding the horrifying realities of the world and stimulate it into action. Without the support of the public, cooperative security would be impotent. Other key components cooperative security implementation are a strong homeland defense but also a very capable power of deployment and force projection so as to enable great power military intervention whenever and wherever necessary to successfully police the globe (Posen 1997, 21-30).

The fourth and final candidate for U.S. grand strategy is primacy. Primacy is based on the premise that U.S. supremacy in each aspect of international relations is the best means of insuring peace and security in the world. America’s potential challengers will have neither the means nor the will to make a legitimate contest for power both because America’s might is so vastly superior to everyone else’s and because America is content to provide sufficiently for its allies’ interests that they really have no need to vie for power. Military power is a critical instrument of primacy success. Primacy recommends a modernized military which is equal to or larger than its next (at least) two competitors combined, and the more the better.


Posen, Barry R. and Andrew L. Ross. “Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy.” In America’s Strategic Choices: Revised Edition, edited by Michael E. Brown, Owen R. Cote, Jr., Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, 3-51. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2000.