Choosing America's Grand Strategy

When considering the priority of national security decisions through the scope of various national security strategies, the U.S. considers four basic elements. Those elements in order of importance seem to be; first, feasibility; second, need; third, cost; forth, value. A final element, which seems to be overarching of all these elements, and yet, not particularly belonging to the group is that of sovereignty. These elements don’t necessarily pertain to the level of threat under consideration as much as they pertain to selection of strategy, and in turn, implementation of policy. Each element plays its own critical role in how American national security strategy is identified.

Of the several national security strategies discussed by U.S. policy makers, no single policy tends to have a certain probability of success in all policy dilemmas. Determining the feasibility of each strategy is critical when debating and shaping U.S. national security grand strategy. As stated by Robert J. Art, some strategies are simply not feasible, while others tend to be feasible only under certain circumstances, still others tend to make sense under a great many circumstances (Art 2003, 84). The strategy of dominion for example is prohibitive in many ways. Dominion is extremely costly in monetary terms as well as in resources, too costly to be rational; it is extremely provocative to allies, enemies, and neutral states alike; and it is extremely irrational in a modern world where nuclear weapons are such a major consideration in international politics (states with nuclear weapons are not easily manipulated) (Art 2003, 89). Selective engagement, on the other hand, is extremely feasible in many instances because it encourages multilateralism which dissipates the costs and international consequences of action. Determining feasibility is important in determining which strategies will work with which potential set of circumstance.

Policy makers must consider needs in American national security strategy in terms of specific problems with which the nation is faced, as well as the general objectives and interests of those policy makers. Some strategies, when localized, can have a better effect on specific problems than other strategies. In the early 1990s, Saddam Hussein posed a specific problem for the United States. A viable and feasible strategy in this circumstance was to implement a containment strategy to prevent Hussein from further threatening his neighbors and undermining regional stability. In this case, the need was specifically addressed by a strategy not particularly suited to other areas of international conflict such as regional confrontation or inner-state humanitarian scenarios. Another clear example is the containment of the Soviet Union in the cold war when the U.S. government opted to establish road blocks to Soviet domination and communist expansion. I each case a need was identified and an adequate strategy matched to that need.

Of course no assessment of national security strategy can be made without a thorough analysis of the costs. As mentioned, the strategy of dominion is very costly, while the strategy of isolationism is relatively inexpensive. This aspect must be considered on the basis of cost/benefit analysis. Isolationism could prove more costly over the long term than other strategies but clearly has a cost advantage in the short term, as inaction is usually less costly than containment or engagement of any kind. Long term however, it may be more cost effective to engage rather than to sit out. In the case of Afghanistan in 2001/2002, a clear threat existed which may have been more costly to ignore than to engage. Although the costs have been extensive, over the long term it is likely to be more cost effective to confront the threat in Afghanistan now than to remain isolated. However, to engage in the present conflict between Congo and Rwanda and the multiple facets of insurgency, ethnic strife, and interstate confrontation going on in that region would likely be much more costly for America in both short and long term than just remaining aloof and letting the thing run its course.

Value works in conjunction with cost. If an engagement has limited value but tremendous cost, such as the conflict in Congo/Rwanda, engagement by America would be irrational. However, engagement in Afghanistan to prevent the proliferation of Islamic extremism may be quite costly but have tremendous value to American national security, the American people, and America's allies. The value of a strategy is of great importance to policy makers when considering potential strategy options.

Although it doesn't pertain directly to strategies such as dominion and isolationism, primarily because those are unilateral in nature, the issue of sovereignty is quite important when considering plausible strategy options. Especially in the cases of collective and cooperative security, a nation's sovereignty may be at stake if it is limited in either its self defense options or its ability to act in its own best interests as the result of its incorporation into an international security agreement. In the case of great powers more specifically, such involvement would be detrimental to a state's own self preservation.

Art, Robert J. A Grand Strategy for America. Ithica, New York: Cornell University Press. 2003.

White Man's Burden: AFRICA

Two weeks ago the Ethiopian Army invaded Somalia on the eastern coast of Africa (who knew where either of these two places were?). Certainly when one mentions Somalia the immediate thought will be of the Hollywood production “Blackhawk Down”. Of course, who knew that for the last few decades Somalia has been without a functional government and has basically been in a prolonged state of anarchy? Ethiopia, the primarily Christian neighbor to the north, determined it to be in its own national security interests to invade Somalia. Backed by a force of Somalis, dubbed the Somali Army and supposedly a remnant of the virtually nonexistent Somali government, Ethiopia quickly put down the Union of Islamic Courts. The UIC is the element of insurrection that had taken control and established some semblance of order in Somalia. This order, based on Sharia or Islamic Law (as was the order in Afghanistan under the Taliban prior to the U.S. invasion in 2002), seemed more troublesome to the Ethiopian government than did the anarchy that prevailed previously.

The Democratic Republic of Congo, independent from French rule since 1960, has in the past 4 decades experienced several government overthrows, political assassinations, civil wars, rigged elections, more violent civil unrest, and over the last few months has survived an insurgency instigated by a prominent Army General named Laurent Nkunda. Today the government negotiated a peace accord in which his militia will be integrated into the Congo’s army and he will be granted asylum in some foreign country. Who Knew? Even the people at CNN don’t even know. In fact, today CNN’s leading Africa headline reads, “Rebels kill, eat endangered gorillas.” How juvenile is that when there is so much more going on in Africa?

An estimate I saw recently said that by 2010 there will be 18 million orphans in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) as a direct result of the spread of AIDS, and a decade from now there will be 42 million AIDS orphans in SSA. 2 percent of the population of the African continent will be orphans by 2010 as a direct result of AIDS, by 2016 more than 4 percent. Right now the number of known AIDS cases worldwide is about 40 million, the number in SSA is 26 million. The number seems to be leveling off but only because of a high rate of death among sufferers. Four countries in SSA are known to have at least 20 percent infection rates among adults; including Swaziland with an adult infection rate of 33.4 percent (1 in 3 adults is currently infected with HIV/AIDS). Only 1 in 10 AIDS cases in SSA are currently treated with antiretroviral drugs.

Rwanda, Sudan, Ivory Coast, Sierra Leone, Burundi, Liberia; civil wars, military coups and overthrows, assassinations, invasions, genocides, AIDS, corruption and abuse of power; in a nutshell Africa is a basket case. In my view this is largely because of the still prevalent, although publicly shunned concept, “White Man’s Burden”. In other words, “why should we white folks care about the barbaric and less intelligent Negros in Africa?” Even today, Africa is being raped of its natural resources (diamonds, oil, tobacco and cotton among them) by the west and being victimized by innumerable corrupt influences from outside.

Over the next few decades, and as this and future generations of young Africans mature and become the future leaders in Africa, Africa will become the world’s greatest nightmare if the civil(ized) and thinking people in the west don’t sit up and take notice.