When considering the priority of national security decisions through the scope of various national security strategies, the U.S. considers four basic elements. Those elements in order of importance seem to be; first, feasibility; second, need; third, cost; forth, value. A final element, which seems to be overarching of all these elements, and yet, not particularly belonging to the group is that of sovereignty. These elements don’t necessarily pertain to the level of threat under consideration as much as they pertain to selection of strategy, and in turn, implementation of policy. Each element plays its own critical role in how American national security strategy is identified.
Of the several national security strategies discussed by U.S. policy makers, no single policy tends to have a certain probability of success in all policy dilemmas. Determining the feasibility of each strategy is critical when debating and shaping U.S. national security grand strategy. As stated by Robert J. Art, some strategies are simply not feasible, while others tend to be feasible only under certain circumstances, still others tend to make sense under a great many circumstances (Art 2003, 84). The strategy of dominion for example is prohibitive in many ways. Dominion is extremely costly in monetary terms as well as in resources, too costly to be rational; it is extremely provocative to allies, enemies, and neutral states alike; and it is extremely irrational in a modern world where nuclear weapons are such a major consideration in international politics (states with nuclear weapons are not easily manipulated) (Art 2003, 89). Selective engagement, on the other hand, is extremely feasible in many instances because it encourages multilateralism which dissipates the costs and international consequences of action. Determining feasibility is important in determining which strategies will work with which potential set of circumstance.
Policy makers must consider needs in American national security strategy in terms of specific problems with which the nation is faced, as well as the general objectives and interests of those policy makers. Some strategies, when localized, can have a better effect on specific problems than other strategies. In the early 1990s, Saddam Hussein posed a specific problem for the United States. A viable and feasible strategy in this circumstance was to implement a containment strategy to prevent Hussein from further threatening his neighbors and undermining regional stability. In this case, the need was specifically addressed by a strategy not particularly suited to other areas of international conflict such as regional confrontation or inner-state humanitarian scenarios. Another clear example is the containment of the Soviet Union in the cold war when the U.S. government opted to establish road blocks to Soviet domination and communist expansion. I each case a need was identified and an adequate strategy matched to that need.
Of course no assessment of national security strategy can be made without a thorough analysis of the costs. As mentioned, the strategy of dominion is very costly, while the strategy of isolationism is relatively inexpensive. This aspect must be considered on the basis of cost/benefit analysis. Isolationism could prove more costly over the long term than other strategies but clearly has a cost advantage in the short term, as inaction is usually less costly than containment or engagement of any kind. Long term however, it may be more cost effective to engage rather than to sit out. In the case of Afghanistan in 2001/2002, a clear threat existed which may have been more costly to ignore than to engage. Although the costs have been extensive, over the long term it is likely to be more cost effective to confront the threat in Afghanistan now than to remain isolated. However, to engage in the present conflict between Congo and Rwanda and the multiple facets of insurgency, ethnic strife, and interstate confrontation going on in that region would likely be much more costly for America in both short and long term than just remaining aloof and letting the thing run its course.
Value works in conjunction with cost. If an engagement has limited value but tremendous cost, such as the conflict in Congo/Rwanda, engagement by America would be irrational. However, engagement in Afghanistan to prevent the proliferation of Islamic extremism may be quite costly but have tremendous value to American national security, the American people, and America's allies. The value of a strategy is of great importance to policy makers when considering potential strategy options.
Although it doesn't pertain directly to strategies such as dominion and isolationism, primarily because those are unilateral in nature, the issue of sovereignty is quite important when considering plausible strategy options. Especially in the cases of collective and cooperative security, a nation's sovereignty may be at stake if it is limited in either its self defense options or its ability to act in its own best interests as the result of its incorporation into an international security agreement. In the case of great powers more specifically, such involvement would be detrimental to a state's own self preservation.
Art, Robert J. A Grand Strategy for America. Ithica, New York: Cornell University Press. 2003.
Showing posts with label national security strategy. Show all posts
Showing posts with label national security strategy. Show all posts
Monday, February 8, 2010
Saturday, February 6, 2010
Stability in a Unipolar World
Arguably the most important national security interest of the United States is to preserve the continuity of the homeland. Preservation of this element alone is probably sufficient to sustain the existence of the United States as an entity indefinitely. The importance of a unipolar American influence on this aspect of U.S. national security is minimal. Assuming the United States doesn't lose so much of its political, military, and economic might that it overnight disintegrates into oblivion, this element alone will likely be sufficient to preserve the United States as a nation for decades to come. The greatest threat to this aspect of its national security would come from within before any outside overt threats were able to materialize against it enough to rock it from its foundation. The polarity of the world will likely have little effect on America's perseverance as a nation.
Other various interests of American national security are not as clear-cut but a few aspects of American power and the polarity of the world will relate directly to them. The first is America's ability to prosper economically. As the world currently exists, America is prosperous in some part because it has been able to access foreign markets for its goods and services. The unipolarity of the world has a direct impact on how readily American goods and services transit across international borders. It is clearly in America's business interests to enable the exportation of its goods and services. As a monolith in the world, American influence can be used to expand present markets and to introduce American goods to new markets. NAFTA is a good example of the result of this influence. Other states typically desire access to American markets as much as American businesses desire access to foreign markets. This interconnectivity is tied to American unipolar influence.
A second aspect of American national security which may be directly affected by America’s unipolar stature is access to energy. America's economy is highly energy dependent. Without cheap and accessible energy supplies, America's economy would at best slow dramatically. Interruption of just a small percentage of America's foreign energy supply could have a terrible impact on America's quality of life and the functionality as a whole of the entire economy. In one popular present day scenario, if Iran was to impede shipping by laying maritime mines across the strait of Hormuz, a detrimental shift in the cost of living could occur which could potentially cripple the American economy. America's unparalleled military might could have an impact on the prevention or mitigation of such a scenario.
On the other hand, as the world's largest economy, the world's most powerful military, the world's most influential single state actor, enmity and animosity could easily be drawn simply as a cost of doing business. America is the most visible global influence and is easily targeted as the culprit and scapegoat of many problems in the world, even though it may not have anything to do with those problems. It is often easier to cast blame on someone else than to accept blame one's self and America is a very large target in this regard. America will also draw animosity just as a result of being big. The grandiosity of America's place in the world, simply as a consequence of its stature, will draw animosity where there might otherwise have been none.
The stability of the unipolar world will have an impact on all those aspects of national security mentioned above, but certainly isn’t limited to those. The stature of America in the world will ultimately have an impact on every aspect of American national security, no matter its significance. The only possible way to avert the impact, whether positive or negative, of America’s unipolar stature, would be to cease from being what it is. This clearly is not in the interests of America nor its people.
Wohlforth, William C. “The Stability of a Unipolar World.” In America’s Strategic Choices: Revised Edition, edited by Michael E. Brown, Owen R. Cote, Jr., Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, 273-309. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2000.
Mastanduno, Michael. “Preserving the Unipolar Moment: Realist Theories and U.S. Grand Strategy after the Cold War.” In America’s Strategic Choices: Revised Edition, edited by Michael E. Brown, Owen R. Cote, Jr., Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, 310-350. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2000.
Other various interests of American national security are not as clear-cut but a few aspects of American power and the polarity of the world will relate directly to them. The first is America's ability to prosper economically. As the world currently exists, America is prosperous in some part because it has been able to access foreign markets for its goods and services. The unipolarity of the world has a direct impact on how readily American goods and services transit across international borders. It is clearly in America's business interests to enable the exportation of its goods and services. As a monolith in the world, American influence can be used to expand present markets and to introduce American goods to new markets. NAFTA is a good example of the result of this influence. Other states typically desire access to American markets as much as American businesses desire access to foreign markets. This interconnectivity is tied to American unipolar influence.
A second aspect of American national security which may be directly affected by America’s unipolar stature is access to energy. America's economy is highly energy dependent. Without cheap and accessible energy supplies, America's economy would at best slow dramatically. Interruption of just a small percentage of America's foreign energy supply could have a terrible impact on America's quality of life and the functionality as a whole of the entire economy. In one popular present day scenario, if Iran was to impede shipping by laying maritime mines across the strait of Hormuz, a detrimental shift in the cost of living could occur which could potentially cripple the American economy. America's unparalleled military might could have an impact on the prevention or mitigation of such a scenario.
On the other hand, as the world's largest economy, the world's most powerful military, the world's most influential single state actor, enmity and animosity could easily be drawn simply as a cost of doing business. America is the most visible global influence and is easily targeted as the culprit and scapegoat of many problems in the world, even though it may not have anything to do with those problems. It is often easier to cast blame on someone else than to accept blame one's self and America is a very large target in this regard. America will also draw animosity just as a result of being big. The grandiosity of America's place in the world, simply as a consequence of its stature, will draw animosity where there might otherwise have been none.
The stability of the unipolar world will have an impact on all those aspects of national security mentioned above, but certainly isn’t limited to those. The stature of America in the world will ultimately have an impact on every aspect of American national security, no matter its significance. The only possible way to avert the impact, whether positive or negative, of America’s unipolar stature, would be to cease from being what it is. This clearly is not in the interests of America nor its people.
Wohlforth, William C. “The Stability of a Unipolar World.” In America’s Strategic Choices: Revised Edition, edited by Michael E. Brown, Owen R. Cote, Jr., Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, 273-309. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2000.
Mastanduno, Michael. “Preserving the Unipolar Moment: Realist Theories and U.S. Grand Strategy after the Cold War.” In America’s Strategic Choices: Revised Edition, edited by Michael E. Brown, Owen R. Cote, Jr., Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, 310-350. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2000.
Cooperative, Collective, and Concert Security
Collective security entails a theory of everyone against the aggressor. It comes into play when there is an aggressive action on the part of a state against another state and includes action by all other states to mitigate the aggression of the aggressor. The theory of collective security covers a range of potential options along the continuum ranging from a true collective security arrangement to a concert of collectivity. It is founded on the principle of preponderance of force which suggests that no state would act aggressively if the certain result would be its own demise. The preponderance of force promises ultimate superiority of the force responding to the aggressor. Only in the case of a suicidal state would the preponderance of force be insufficient to dissuade an aggressor state from acting malevolently.
A true collective security arrangement is the true “everyone against the aggressor” philosophy and includes an official agreement on the part of “all” the states. The agreement includes language which would legally bind all the states to react decisively to a show of aggression by any other state. This philosophy runs counter to the balance of power philosophy which is founded on state to state defense competition to dissuade aggression. Each state is responsible to produce sufficient defense deterrent to convince its neighbors that aggression would be self-destructive. A collective security arrangement insures that the aggressor will fail in his aggression, assuming that the collective in total is stronger than the aggressor.
A concert is a case in which a league of great power states contrive a treaty (not necessarily a legally binding one) to insure the stability and security of the whole. The great power states agree amongst themselves to come to the aid of a victimized state, but only after deliberation, or as the result of some predetermined arrangement. A concert is not necessarily binding on the great power states and each stated could choose to act or remain neutral. The combined power of the great power states would ideally be sufficient to counter the potential for an aggressor state to act aggressively. If the great power states, however, had insufficient grounds to react to aggression, said aggression would likely not be deterred. Therefore, only in cases in which the great power states had skin in the game would they be inclined to act on behalf of a weaker state.
Cooperation, in contrast to collective security, chooses a less formal means of reacting to aggressive states. It opts for a process of selectively engaging rogue states based on broad multilateral, recognition of the threat, multilateral planning, and multilateral execution. Each case is individually considered based on cost-benefit analysis. This is the process used in engaging Saddam Hussein following his 1990 invasion of Kuwait. The international community came together, considered the costs and benefits, and chose to act decisively to expel Saddam Hussein’s minions from the weaker state. As with collective security, reaction ideally includes a preponderance of force which enables a quick and decisive victory. Cooperation seeks the legitimacy of a broad coalition of international approval but is not based necessarily on a preconceived written agreement. It relies essentially on the cooperation of states to achieve universally beneficial results. Universality is the key in this sense. If universal benefit is not readily perceived, cooperation among nations is difficult. Cooperation assumes the willing participation of numerous states, without which, the proposed endeavor is likely to lose its credibility.
The aforementioned theories of national and international security fall into the realm of multilateralism. Each implies the necessity of states to seek international backing to one degree or another. Each recognizes the importance and strength of a coalition by which to accomplish stability and strength in the international community, and each seems to recognize the potential danger in unilateralism.
Nolan, Janne E. “Cooperative Security in the United States.” In America’s Strategic Choices: Revised Edition, edited by Michael E. Brown, Owen R. Cote, Jr., Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, 179-217. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2000.
Kupchan, Charles A., and Clifford A. Kupchan. “Concerts, Collective Security, and the Future of Europe.” In America’s Strategic Choices: Revised Edition, edited by Michael E. Brown, Owen R. Cote, Jr., Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, 218-265. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2000.
Kupchan, Charles A., and Clifford A. Kupchan. “Concerts, Collective Security, and the Future of Europe: A Retrospective.” In America’s Strategic Choices: Revised Edition, edited by Michael E. Brown, Owen R. Cote, Jr., Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, 266-272. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2000.
A true collective security arrangement is the true “everyone against the aggressor” philosophy and includes an official agreement on the part of “all” the states. The agreement includes language which would legally bind all the states to react decisively to a show of aggression by any other state. This philosophy runs counter to the balance of power philosophy which is founded on state to state defense competition to dissuade aggression. Each state is responsible to produce sufficient defense deterrent to convince its neighbors that aggression would be self-destructive. A collective security arrangement insures that the aggressor will fail in his aggression, assuming that the collective in total is stronger than the aggressor.
A concert is a case in which a league of great power states contrive a treaty (not necessarily a legally binding one) to insure the stability and security of the whole. The great power states agree amongst themselves to come to the aid of a victimized state, but only after deliberation, or as the result of some predetermined arrangement. A concert is not necessarily binding on the great power states and each stated could choose to act or remain neutral. The combined power of the great power states would ideally be sufficient to counter the potential for an aggressor state to act aggressively. If the great power states, however, had insufficient grounds to react to aggression, said aggression would likely not be deterred. Therefore, only in cases in which the great power states had skin in the game would they be inclined to act on behalf of a weaker state.
Cooperation, in contrast to collective security, chooses a less formal means of reacting to aggressive states. It opts for a process of selectively engaging rogue states based on broad multilateral, recognition of the threat, multilateral planning, and multilateral execution. Each case is individually considered based on cost-benefit analysis. This is the process used in engaging Saddam Hussein following his 1990 invasion of Kuwait. The international community came together, considered the costs and benefits, and chose to act decisively to expel Saddam Hussein’s minions from the weaker state. As with collective security, reaction ideally includes a preponderance of force which enables a quick and decisive victory. Cooperation seeks the legitimacy of a broad coalition of international approval but is not based necessarily on a preconceived written agreement. It relies essentially on the cooperation of states to achieve universally beneficial results. Universality is the key in this sense. If universal benefit is not readily perceived, cooperation among nations is difficult. Cooperation assumes the willing participation of numerous states, without which, the proposed endeavor is likely to lose its credibility.
The aforementioned theories of national and international security fall into the realm of multilateralism. Each implies the necessity of states to seek international backing to one degree or another. Each recognizes the importance and strength of a coalition by which to accomplish stability and strength in the international community, and each seems to recognize the potential danger in unilateralism.
Nolan, Janne E. “Cooperative Security in the United States.” In America’s Strategic Choices: Revised Edition, edited by Michael E. Brown, Owen R. Cote, Jr., Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, 179-217. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2000.
Kupchan, Charles A., and Clifford A. Kupchan. “Concerts, Collective Security, and the Future of Europe.” In America’s Strategic Choices: Revised Edition, edited by Michael E. Brown, Owen R. Cote, Jr., Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, 218-265. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2000.
Kupchan, Charles A., and Clifford A. Kupchan. “Concerts, Collective Security, and the Future of Europe: A Retrospective.” In America’s Strategic Choices: Revised Edition, edited by Michael E. Brown, Owen R. Cote, Jr., Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, 266-272. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2000.
Preponderance vs. [Offshore] Balancing
The national security strategy of Preponderance has been at play for the duration of the Cold War and has carried over as a remnant of the containment doctrine since the conclusion of the Cold War. Preponderance is the belief that American interests are best served by a unipolar world. Components of Preponderance include three major elements; first, American preeminence must be maintained; second, challenges to American preeminence must be prevented; third, international interdependence must be encouraged.
The strategy of offshore balancing is quite the opposite of preponderance. Offshore balancing accepts that rivals to American preeminence will arise and that those may eventually take the place of America as the world's hegemon. This is largely accepted and even to be anticipated. Interdependence in the Balancing sphere is not something to be sought after per se, but is more a byproduct of acceptable international exchange. Offshore balancing is a rather isolationist idea by which a large percentage of American overseas military assets would be redeployed to the continental United States.
The preponderance argument suggests that the world (America and her allies) has been made safe over the last six decades as a result of American preeminence. The argument points to Europe and states that numerous great power wars were waged prior to 1950, but once America was permanently engaged there, there has been relative peace on that continent. Therefore, a continued strategy which seeks American hegemony in the world would continue to assure peace in the world. The insistence is that the one is the result of the other. Offshore balancing states that there is nothing to prove this correlation, and that by America continuing to engage in Europe, East Asia, and the Middle East the same way it has for the last six decades, it perpetuates a national security doctrine which is outdated and in need of revision.
The balancing argument states that America wastes resources by continuing to assert its unipolar pipe-dream, and that ultimately it will have to face the fact that great powers come and go and its glory is fleeting. This argument insists that although America won't always be the one great power in the world, it will be a great power in the world for a long time to come, and this is where the balancing aspect comes into play. Balancing reasonably asserts that although the world will not always be unipolar, and that other powers will eventually have great sway in world politics, America will always be a power of great authority, and will always be able to influence world politics in a direction which will be beneficial for American national security.
Preponderance insists that the most effective way to insure continued peace and stability, and the prosperity that results, is to insure economic and security interdependence among every possible nation. This notion is based on the belief that nations will not go to war against other nations with which they have heavy economic ties. There is also an element of interdependence based on America's overarching strategy of defending its close allies. Those allies are dependent on America for defense and, in most cases, are perfectly willing to continue to allow America to shoulder that burden. As long as nations are interdependent, they will be much less likely to go to war with each other. The argument also suggests that as long as America stays engaged in this passive role, though quite costly, it will prevent the much more costly result of having to intervene from the outside in the event of a great power war.
The cost of this strategy is the greatest element of contention to offshore balancing. The costs of insuring good behavior amongst America's allies overseas could be better spend domestically. The balancing argument insists that those nations should be able to get along without the American monolith standing between them. If they are still unable, as they always had been until 1950, the balancing strategy would allow them to fight their wars at their own expense with the ever present condition that when those wars become detrimental to American national security, America will intervene to tip the balance in its own favor.
Layne, Christopher. “From Preponderance to Offshore Balancing: America’s Future Grand Strategy.” In America’s Strategic Choices: Revised Edition, edited by Michael E. Brown, Owen R. Cote, Jr., Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, 99-140. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2000.
The strategy of offshore balancing is quite the opposite of preponderance. Offshore balancing accepts that rivals to American preeminence will arise and that those may eventually take the place of America as the world's hegemon. This is largely accepted and even to be anticipated. Interdependence in the Balancing sphere is not something to be sought after per se, but is more a byproduct of acceptable international exchange. Offshore balancing is a rather isolationist idea by which a large percentage of American overseas military assets would be redeployed to the continental United States.
The preponderance argument suggests that the world (America and her allies) has been made safe over the last six decades as a result of American preeminence. The argument points to Europe and states that numerous great power wars were waged prior to 1950, but once America was permanently engaged there, there has been relative peace on that continent. Therefore, a continued strategy which seeks American hegemony in the world would continue to assure peace in the world. The insistence is that the one is the result of the other. Offshore balancing states that there is nothing to prove this correlation, and that by America continuing to engage in Europe, East Asia, and the Middle East the same way it has for the last six decades, it perpetuates a national security doctrine which is outdated and in need of revision.
The balancing argument states that America wastes resources by continuing to assert its unipolar pipe-dream, and that ultimately it will have to face the fact that great powers come and go and its glory is fleeting. This argument insists that although America won't always be the one great power in the world, it will be a great power in the world for a long time to come, and this is where the balancing aspect comes into play. Balancing reasonably asserts that although the world will not always be unipolar, and that other powers will eventually have great sway in world politics, America will always be a power of great authority, and will always be able to influence world politics in a direction which will be beneficial for American national security.
Preponderance insists that the most effective way to insure continued peace and stability, and the prosperity that results, is to insure economic and security interdependence among every possible nation. This notion is based on the belief that nations will not go to war against other nations with which they have heavy economic ties. There is also an element of interdependence based on America's overarching strategy of defending its close allies. Those allies are dependent on America for defense and, in most cases, are perfectly willing to continue to allow America to shoulder that burden. As long as nations are interdependent, they will be much less likely to go to war with each other. The argument also suggests that as long as America stays engaged in this passive role, though quite costly, it will prevent the much more costly result of having to intervene from the outside in the event of a great power war.
The cost of this strategy is the greatest element of contention to offshore balancing. The costs of insuring good behavior amongst America's allies overseas could be better spend domestically. The balancing argument insists that those nations should be able to get along without the American monolith standing between them. If they are still unable, as they always had been until 1950, the balancing strategy would allow them to fight their wars at their own expense with the ever present condition that when those wars become detrimental to American national security, America will intervene to tip the balance in its own favor.
Layne, Christopher. “From Preponderance to Offshore Balancing: America’s Future Grand Strategy.” In America’s Strategic Choices: Revised Edition, edited by Michael E. Brown, Owen R. Cote, Jr., Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, 99-140. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2000.
Restraint & Selective Engagement
In terms of National Security Strategy, restraint and selective engagement are by no means polar opposites. On a scale between total isolationism and total engagement, each has found a means of moderation. On the one hand, restraint considers itself a rational means of taking advantage of the benefits of isolationism, yet without the irrationality of it. On the other hand, engagement is just that, selective. It suggests the educated selection of the battles to be fought, rather than fighting them all.
Each strategy has basic glaring similarities; they both consider the foremost objective of American national security to be protection of the American homeland and general protection of American constitutional democracy, freedoms, assets, economy, and so forth. They diverge, however, in terms of how best to accomplish that objective.
The restraint argument focuses largely on the allocation of finite resources. There is a certain end to American resources and those resources are better spent at home than abroad. The argument suggests that American resources sent abroad are resources which, first, are being used to subsidize the defense of America's allies, allies which in most instances can afford to subsidize their own defense; second are enabling America's allies to divert their own defense spending to other avenues; and third, are causing an unfair competition scenario for American companies overseas. Every dollar America spends to protect Europe or East Asia, is a dollar those places don't have to spend to protect themselves, enabling them to allocate their own resources to other endeavors, such as subsidizing automobile and electronics manufacturers which directly compete with American firms for the same consumer spending.
The selective engagement strategy seems to circumvent this argument by countering that if Europe and East Asia were left to vie for their own defense, regional arms races may ensue. Perhaps Germany would compete with France for regional military dominance, the UK with Germany, etc. If left to their own devices, those areas could digress into their old habits of old world politicking, jostling for power, dirty dealing, war making etc. With the United States playing the major power broker in these regions, the lesser powers are left to focus their energies, and their resources, on other, less lethal endeavors.
The restraint strategy asserts that the U.S. spends many times what its nearest competitor does on defense expenditures and that a good share of those dollars would be better spent on domestic issues such as infrastructure, education, and social programs (America's nearest competitor in terms of gross defense spending is China. In 2008 the U.S. spent $607 Billion while China spent $84.9 Billion (CIA World Factbook)). The assertion is that America's defense edge is significant and that once a certain threshold is reached, America's return on its defense investment is minimal. After all, for what purpose should a superpower have need to spend seven times what its nearest competitor spends to insure its security? Especially when that competitor can't even dream of matching the technological edge of the American defense apparatus, and America has a unique and distinct advantage in terms of its geography, being surrounded on two sides by water and the other two by relatively benign, yet friendly neighbors.
Selective engagement counters this argument by stating that security comes at a cost, and economic productivity, both American and otherwise, requires security. The maintenance of U.S. military presence overseas insures the status quo. Peace prevails because everyone is happy to let the Americans maintain the defenses. If America withdraws, a power vacuum follows and arms races and power struggles ensue.
The national security strategies of restraint and selective engagement are moderate forms of their extreme selves; total isolationism and total engagement. Each has rational arguments in its favor, and each has flaws.
Gholz, Eugene, Daryl G. Press, and Harvey M. Sapolsky. “Come Home, America: The Strategy of Restraint in the Face of Temptation.” In America’s Strategic Choices: Revised Edition, edited by Michael E. Brown, Owen R. Cote, Jr., Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, 55-98. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2000.
Art, Robert J. “Geopolitics Updated: The Strategy of Selective Engagement.” In America’s Strategic Choices: Revised Edition, edited by Michael E. Brown, Owen R. Cote, Jr., Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, 141-178. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2000.
U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. CIA World Factbook. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/ (accessed December 18, 2009).
Each strategy has basic glaring similarities; they both consider the foremost objective of American national security to be protection of the American homeland and general protection of American constitutional democracy, freedoms, assets, economy, and so forth. They diverge, however, in terms of how best to accomplish that objective.
The restraint argument focuses largely on the allocation of finite resources. There is a certain end to American resources and those resources are better spent at home than abroad. The argument suggests that American resources sent abroad are resources which, first, are being used to subsidize the defense of America's allies, allies which in most instances can afford to subsidize their own defense; second are enabling America's allies to divert their own defense spending to other avenues; and third, are causing an unfair competition scenario for American companies overseas. Every dollar America spends to protect Europe or East Asia, is a dollar those places don't have to spend to protect themselves, enabling them to allocate their own resources to other endeavors, such as subsidizing automobile and electronics manufacturers which directly compete with American firms for the same consumer spending.
The selective engagement strategy seems to circumvent this argument by countering that if Europe and East Asia were left to vie for their own defense, regional arms races may ensue. Perhaps Germany would compete with France for regional military dominance, the UK with Germany, etc. If left to their own devices, those areas could digress into their old habits of old world politicking, jostling for power, dirty dealing, war making etc. With the United States playing the major power broker in these regions, the lesser powers are left to focus their energies, and their resources, on other, less lethal endeavors.
The restraint strategy asserts that the U.S. spends many times what its nearest competitor does on defense expenditures and that a good share of those dollars would be better spent on domestic issues such as infrastructure, education, and social programs (America's nearest competitor in terms of gross defense spending is China. In 2008 the U.S. spent $607 Billion while China spent $84.9 Billion (CIA World Factbook)). The assertion is that America's defense edge is significant and that once a certain threshold is reached, America's return on its defense investment is minimal. After all, for what purpose should a superpower have need to spend seven times what its nearest competitor spends to insure its security? Especially when that competitor can't even dream of matching the technological edge of the American defense apparatus, and America has a unique and distinct advantage in terms of its geography, being surrounded on two sides by water and the other two by relatively benign, yet friendly neighbors.
Selective engagement counters this argument by stating that security comes at a cost, and economic productivity, both American and otherwise, requires security. The maintenance of U.S. military presence overseas insures the status quo. Peace prevails because everyone is happy to let the Americans maintain the defenses. If America withdraws, a power vacuum follows and arms races and power struggles ensue.
The national security strategies of restraint and selective engagement are moderate forms of their extreme selves; total isolationism and total engagement. Each has rational arguments in its favor, and each has flaws.
Gholz, Eugene, Daryl G. Press, and Harvey M. Sapolsky. “Come Home, America: The Strategy of Restraint in the Face of Temptation.” In America’s Strategic Choices: Revised Edition, edited by Michael E. Brown, Owen R. Cote, Jr., Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, 55-98. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2000.
Art, Robert J. “Geopolitics Updated: The Strategy of Selective Engagement.” In America’s Strategic Choices: Revised Edition, edited by Michael E. Brown, Owen R. Cote, Jr., Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, 141-178. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2000.
U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. CIA World Factbook. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/ (accessed December 18, 2009).
Tuesday, December 1, 2009
National Security Policy - Clinton vs. Bush
As President Bill Clinton took office the principle adversary of the United States for nearly half a century crumbled. Clinton stated soon thereafter that the United States found itself in a unique position, suggesting that with the dissolution of the Soviet Union, America would be able to put aside the rivalry of the cold war and focus on the betterment of the general human condition. His suggested intent was to improve economies, bear down on civil rights abuses, decrease greenhouse gas emissions, and generally be more neighborly to America’s global neighbors. In a word, Clinton’s national security strategy involved engagement, engagement of every nation that wanted to engage.
Unfortunately his strategy seemed to included a whole lot of engaging and not a whole lot of acting. In case after case, Clinton refused to take risks. It was easy for him to deploy American troops to far off areas, launch tomahawk missiles and engage in outraged rhetoric, but when America’s security demanded real forceful response, when America’s security was imperiled by outside threats, his response was to cut military spending and expect America’s defenses to do more work on less pay.
Terrorist attacks and numerous engagements of American military personnel dotted the Clinton Administration’s time in office. The first World Trade Center bombing, Khobar Towers, Kenya/Tanzania embassy bombings and the USS Cole highlight the rising strategic imperative terrorism posed to the United States. Interstate conflicts of Clinton’s tenure include Bosnia, Haiti, Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as numerous African engagements from Liberia to Tanzania. The defining moment of Clinton’s national security strategy of engagement came, I believe, when shortly after taking office, on October 3-4, 1993, American military personnel attempted to capture Mohamed Farrah Aidid, a Somali warlord in the capital, Mogadishu. Defining because it set the pattern for future potential American military confrontations throughout Clinton’s presidency, that of inaction. Clinton ordered the withdrawal of American troops within days of the incident. Although American troops were frequently deployed throughout his presidency, Clinton thereafter shied away from committing American troops to combat but more than a dozen times sent American forces to police the globe. Clinton too heavily engaged in the left wing philosophy that pacifism and appeasement are rational means of confronting legitimate threats to America’s national security.
When George W. Bush took office he set about increasing support for America’s military (albeit not by much) and assembling a national security strategy that took on very definite threats rather than cavorting in vagaries as a means of evading problematic issues. Those threats included rogue states, Weapons of Mass Destruction and terrorism, with heavy emphasis on ballistic missile defense. Bush initially believed America’s greatest threat would come from rogue sovereign states such as Iran, Iraq, and North Korea. His BMD plans suggest he thought the threat of a ballistic missile attack was America’s gravest threat. Perhaps he believed there was no grave threat and BMD was a rational focal point for national security direction. Although Bush included terrorism in his national security assessments, he certainly didn’t give it the attention it probably deserved (it’s easy to say that in hindsight).
Terrorism has been a problem for the United States for decades and the number of attacks against American interests worldwide since the 1970s is quite notable. Ronald Regan saw dozens of terrorist attacks in his time in office, from both drug cartels and Islamic extremists, Clinton experienced the same, and George W. Bush should have had the foresight to realize that unconventional and asymmetric warfare would likely be a major source of international strife in the new millennium. While Clinton may be scorned for his flighty and noncommittal approach to national security, dabbling in numerous engagements around the world, George W. Bush, upon transition, may be seen as incognito when it comes to the reality of the threats he faced. The actual risk posed by some rogue state was probably quite minimal, especially regarding ballistic missiles, but if he had learned from the Clinton administration, he would have realized that small but heated conflicts crossing religious and cultural lines were the most persistent and notorious of the conflicts faced by past presidents.
Bush came around quickly following September 11, 2001 and although he didn’t entirely abandon his previously held positions regarding rogue states and BMD, he redirected the course of American national security to more effectively counter the threats posed by Islamic extremism and terrorism generally. He took the battle to the extremists rather than waiting for the battle to come to the homeland. He set about “winning hearts and minds” and more fully engaged civilizations in order to root out the ideologies that feed extremism.
The difference between the Clinton administration’s national security strategy as it played out, and the Bush administration’s was moderate. The difference between the national security strategy of the first 8 months of the Bush administration, and the strategy that followed was much more pronounced.
Unfortunately his strategy seemed to included a whole lot of engaging and not a whole lot of acting. In case after case, Clinton refused to take risks. It was easy for him to deploy American troops to far off areas, launch tomahawk missiles and engage in outraged rhetoric, but when America’s security demanded real forceful response, when America’s security was imperiled by outside threats, his response was to cut military spending and expect America’s defenses to do more work on less pay.
Terrorist attacks and numerous engagements of American military personnel dotted the Clinton Administration’s time in office. The first World Trade Center bombing, Khobar Towers, Kenya/Tanzania embassy bombings and the USS Cole highlight the rising strategic imperative terrorism posed to the United States. Interstate conflicts of Clinton’s tenure include Bosnia, Haiti, Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as numerous African engagements from Liberia to Tanzania. The defining moment of Clinton’s national security strategy of engagement came, I believe, when shortly after taking office, on October 3-4, 1993, American military personnel attempted to capture Mohamed Farrah Aidid, a Somali warlord in the capital, Mogadishu. Defining because it set the pattern for future potential American military confrontations throughout Clinton’s presidency, that of inaction. Clinton ordered the withdrawal of American troops within days of the incident. Although American troops were frequently deployed throughout his presidency, Clinton thereafter shied away from committing American troops to combat but more than a dozen times sent American forces to police the globe. Clinton too heavily engaged in the left wing philosophy that pacifism and appeasement are rational means of confronting legitimate threats to America’s national security.
When George W. Bush took office he set about increasing support for America’s military (albeit not by much) and assembling a national security strategy that took on very definite threats rather than cavorting in vagaries as a means of evading problematic issues. Those threats included rogue states, Weapons of Mass Destruction and terrorism, with heavy emphasis on ballistic missile defense. Bush initially believed America’s greatest threat would come from rogue sovereign states such as Iran, Iraq, and North Korea. His BMD plans suggest he thought the threat of a ballistic missile attack was America’s gravest threat. Perhaps he believed there was no grave threat and BMD was a rational focal point for national security direction. Although Bush included terrorism in his national security assessments, he certainly didn’t give it the attention it probably deserved (it’s easy to say that in hindsight).
Terrorism has been a problem for the United States for decades and the number of attacks against American interests worldwide since the 1970s is quite notable. Ronald Regan saw dozens of terrorist attacks in his time in office, from both drug cartels and Islamic extremists, Clinton experienced the same, and George W. Bush should have had the foresight to realize that unconventional and asymmetric warfare would likely be a major source of international strife in the new millennium. While Clinton may be scorned for his flighty and noncommittal approach to national security, dabbling in numerous engagements around the world, George W. Bush, upon transition, may be seen as incognito when it comes to the reality of the threats he faced. The actual risk posed by some rogue state was probably quite minimal, especially regarding ballistic missiles, but if he had learned from the Clinton administration, he would have realized that small but heated conflicts crossing religious and cultural lines were the most persistent and notorious of the conflicts faced by past presidents.
Bush came around quickly following September 11, 2001 and although he didn’t entirely abandon his previously held positions regarding rogue states and BMD, he redirected the course of American national security to more effectively counter the threats posed by Islamic extremism and terrorism generally. He took the battle to the extremists rather than waiting for the battle to come to the homeland. He set about “winning hearts and minds” and more fully engaged civilizations in order to root out the ideologies that feed extremism.
The difference between the Clinton administration’s national security strategy as it played out, and the Bush administration’s was moderate. The difference between the national security strategy of the first 8 months of the Bush administration, and the strategy that followed was much more pronounced.
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