In the policy debate over potential U.S. grand strategies, there are four basic competing visions. The four competing visions include neo-isolationism, selective engagement, cooperative security, and primacy. Each of the four falls along a spectrum with varying degrees of unilateralism and multilateralism, and differs gradually in their objectives, premises, and instruments for applying U.S. power and insuring American national security.
The first candidate for U.S. grand strategy, as put forth by Posen and Ross, is neo-isolationism (Posen 1997, 7). Neo-isolationism would withdraw American forces from all parts of the world as presently situated, and deploy American forces only to those areas where problems directly influence American national security. It’s basic premise is that America is “strategically immune” (Posen 1997, 10), that is, as a result of America’s geography, America is all but completely impervious to foreign aggression. The only potential aggressors would have to either cross an ocean to launch a campaign, or enter the U.S. by way of Canada, or Mexico. In the unlikely event that Canada or Mexico was of the mind to launch an assault on the U.S., first, the aggressor would have to substantially, even exponentially increase the size and strength of its present military, and if that, then American defenses would likely dismantle an invasion without skipping even a beat. Neo-nationalism utilizes five key elements to insure American national security. A nuclear deterrent capability would be required to prevent a first strike from an aggressor state. Second, air and missile defenses would be maintained to insure air superiority within American airspace. Third, U.S. intelligence capability would be critical to alerting American authorities of any potential threat to U.S. assets and interests. Forth, a strong navy would be necessary to insure against the unlikely probability of an amphibious invasion from abroad. Finally, special operations forces would be necessary to deal directly with threats against U.S. assets abroad (Posen 1997, 7-14).
The second candidate for U.S. grand strategy is selective engagement (Posen 1997, 15). The selective engagement strategy proposes to maintain international security by preventing great power war. The basic premise is that great power wars cause the most destruction, and since America has limited resources and isn’t that interested in policing the world, the prevention of great power war is a great boundary to U.S. involvement. This boundary may be breached however under circumstances deemed sufficient by American policy makers and politicians. Selective engagement follows generally the instrumentality of neo-isolationism. Nuclear deterrent and homeland defense of a certainty necessary, but beyond that, selective engagement requires the conventional forces necessary to dissuade aggression by great powers, and ideally, to carry on military engagement and achieve victory in at least one foreign theater (Posen 1997, 15-21).
The third candidate for U.S. grand strategy is cooperative security (Posen 1997, 21). Cooperative security assumes democratic altruism on the part of the great powers. Its objective, although its adherents admit cooperative security is a “work in progress” (Posen 1997, 25), is an international framework of security treaties which demands international cooperation and assistance in any and all international security dilemmas. The primary responsibility for enforcement of international security falls upon the great powers, with minor support from the multitude of lesser powers. Competition among great powers is assumed minimal. The media, at least according to Posen and Ross, seems to be a key component of cooperative security. The media’s role is to enlighten the otherwise apathetic public regarding the horrifying realities of the world and stimulate it into action. Without the support of the public, cooperative security would be impotent. Other key components cooperative security implementation are a strong homeland defense but also a very capable power of deployment and force projection so as to enable great power military intervention whenever and wherever necessary to successfully police the globe (Posen 1997, 21-30).
The fourth and final candidate for U.S. grand strategy is primacy. Primacy is based on the premise that U.S. supremacy in each aspect of international relations is the best means of insuring peace and security in the world. America’s potential challengers will have neither the means nor the will to make a legitimate contest for power both because America’s might is so vastly superior to everyone else’s and because America is content to provide sufficiently for its allies’ interests that they really have no need to vie for power. Military power is a critical instrument of primacy success. Primacy recommends a modernized military which is equal to or larger than its next (at least) two competitors combined, and the more the better.
Posen, Barry R. and Andrew L. Ross. “Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy.” In America’s Strategic Choices: Revised Edition, edited by Michael E. Brown, Owen R. Cote, Jr., Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, 3-51. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2000.
Showing posts with label selective engagement. Show all posts
Showing posts with label selective engagement. Show all posts
Monday, February 8, 2010
Choosing America's Grand Strategy
When considering the priority of national security decisions through the scope of various national security strategies, the U.S. considers four basic elements. Those elements in order of importance seem to be; first, feasibility; second, need; third, cost; forth, value. A final element, which seems to be overarching of all these elements, and yet, not particularly belonging to the group is that of sovereignty. These elements don’t necessarily pertain to the level of threat under consideration as much as they pertain to selection of strategy, and in turn, implementation of policy. Each element plays its own critical role in how American national security strategy is identified.
Of the several national security strategies discussed by U.S. policy makers, no single policy tends to have a certain probability of success in all policy dilemmas. Determining the feasibility of each strategy is critical when debating and shaping U.S. national security grand strategy. As stated by Robert J. Art, some strategies are simply not feasible, while others tend to be feasible only under certain circumstances, still others tend to make sense under a great many circumstances (Art 2003, 84). The strategy of dominion for example is prohibitive in many ways. Dominion is extremely costly in monetary terms as well as in resources, too costly to be rational; it is extremely provocative to allies, enemies, and neutral states alike; and it is extremely irrational in a modern world where nuclear weapons are such a major consideration in international politics (states with nuclear weapons are not easily manipulated) (Art 2003, 89). Selective engagement, on the other hand, is extremely feasible in many instances because it encourages multilateralism which dissipates the costs and international consequences of action. Determining feasibility is important in determining which strategies will work with which potential set of circumstance.
Policy makers must consider needs in American national security strategy in terms of specific problems with which the nation is faced, as well as the general objectives and interests of those policy makers. Some strategies, when localized, can have a better effect on specific problems than other strategies. In the early 1990s, Saddam Hussein posed a specific problem for the United States. A viable and feasible strategy in this circumstance was to implement a containment strategy to prevent Hussein from further threatening his neighbors and undermining regional stability. In this case, the need was specifically addressed by a strategy not particularly suited to other areas of international conflict such as regional confrontation or inner-state humanitarian scenarios. Another clear example is the containment of the Soviet Union in the cold war when the U.S. government opted to establish road blocks to Soviet domination and communist expansion. I each case a need was identified and an adequate strategy matched to that need.
Of course no assessment of national security strategy can be made without a thorough analysis of the costs. As mentioned, the strategy of dominion is very costly, while the strategy of isolationism is relatively inexpensive. This aspect must be considered on the basis of cost/benefit analysis. Isolationism could prove more costly over the long term than other strategies but clearly has a cost advantage in the short term, as inaction is usually less costly than containment or engagement of any kind. Long term however, it may be more cost effective to engage rather than to sit out. In the case of Afghanistan in 2001/2002, a clear threat existed which may have been more costly to ignore than to engage. Although the costs have been extensive, over the long term it is likely to be more cost effective to confront the threat in Afghanistan now than to remain isolated. However, to engage in the present conflict between Congo and Rwanda and the multiple facets of insurgency, ethnic strife, and interstate confrontation going on in that region would likely be much more costly for America in both short and long term than just remaining aloof and letting the thing run its course.
Value works in conjunction with cost. If an engagement has limited value but tremendous cost, such as the conflict in Congo/Rwanda, engagement by America would be irrational. However, engagement in Afghanistan to prevent the proliferation of Islamic extremism may be quite costly but have tremendous value to American national security, the American people, and America's allies. The value of a strategy is of great importance to policy makers when considering potential strategy options.
Although it doesn't pertain directly to strategies such as dominion and isolationism, primarily because those are unilateral in nature, the issue of sovereignty is quite important when considering plausible strategy options. Especially in the cases of collective and cooperative security, a nation's sovereignty may be at stake if it is limited in either its self defense options or its ability to act in its own best interests as the result of its incorporation into an international security agreement. In the case of great powers more specifically, such involvement would be detrimental to a state's own self preservation.
Art, Robert J. A Grand Strategy for America. Ithica, New York: Cornell University Press. 2003.
Of the several national security strategies discussed by U.S. policy makers, no single policy tends to have a certain probability of success in all policy dilemmas. Determining the feasibility of each strategy is critical when debating and shaping U.S. national security grand strategy. As stated by Robert J. Art, some strategies are simply not feasible, while others tend to be feasible only under certain circumstances, still others tend to make sense under a great many circumstances (Art 2003, 84). The strategy of dominion for example is prohibitive in many ways. Dominion is extremely costly in monetary terms as well as in resources, too costly to be rational; it is extremely provocative to allies, enemies, and neutral states alike; and it is extremely irrational in a modern world where nuclear weapons are such a major consideration in international politics (states with nuclear weapons are not easily manipulated) (Art 2003, 89). Selective engagement, on the other hand, is extremely feasible in many instances because it encourages multilateralism which dissipates the costs and international consequences of action. Determining feasibility is important in determining which strategies will work with which potential set of circumstance.
Policy makers must consider needs in American national security strategy in terms of specific problems with which the nation is faced, as well as the general objectives and interests of those policy makers. Some strategies, when localized, can have a better effect on specific problems than other strategies. In the early 1990s, Saddam Hussein posed a specific problem for the United States. A viable and feasible strategy in this circumstance was to implement a containment strategy to prevent Hussein from further threatening his neighbors and undermining regional stability. In this case, the need was specifically addressed by a strategy not particularly suited to other areas of international conflict such as regional confrontation or inner-state humanitarian scenarios. Another clear example is the containment of the Soviet Union in the cold war when the U.S. government opted to establish road blocks to Soviet domination and communist expansion. I each case a need was identified and an adequate strategy matched to that need.
Of course no assessment of national security strategy can be made without a thorough analysis of the costs. As mentioned, the strategy of dominion is very costly, while the strategy of isolationism is relatively inexpensive. This aspect must be considered on the basis of cost/benefit analysis. Isolationism could prove more costly over the long term than other strategies but clearly has a cost advantage in the short term, as inaction is usually less costly than containment or engagement of any kind. Long term however, it may be more cost effective to engage rather than to sit out. In the case of Afghanistan in 2001/2002, a clear threat existed which may have been more costly to ignore than to engage. Although the costs have been extensive, over the long term it is likely to be more cost effective to confront the threat in Afghanistan now than to remain isolated. However, to engage in the present conflict between Congo and Rwanda and the multiple facets of insurgency, ethnic strife, and interstate confrontation going on in that region would likely be much more costly for America in both short and long term than just remaining aloof and letting the thing run its course.
Value works in conjunction with cost. If an engagement has limited value but tremendous cost, such as the conflict in Congo/Rwanda, engagement by America would be irrational. However, engagement in Afghanistan to prevent the proliferation of Islamic extremism may be quite costly but have tremendous value to American national security, the American people, and America's allies. The value of a strategy is of great importance to policy makers when considering potential strategy options.
Although it doesn't pertain directly to strategies such as dominion and isolationism, primarily because those are unilateral in nature, the issue of sovereignty is quite important when considering plausible strategy options. Especially in the cases of collective and cooperative security, a nation's sovereignty may be at stake if it is limited in either its self defense options or its ability to act in its own best interests as the result of its incorporation into an international security agreement. In the case of great powers more specifically, such involvement would be detrimental to a state's own self preservation.
Art, Robert J. A Grand Strategy for America. Ithica, New York: Cornell University Press. 2003.
Saturday, February 6, 2010
Restraint & Selective Engagement
In terms of National Security Strategy, restraint and selective engagement are by no means polar opposites. On a scale between total isolationism and total engagement, each has found a means of moderation. On the one hand, restraint considers itself a rational means of taking advantage of the benefits of isolationism, yet without the irrationality of it. On the other hand, engagement is just that, selective. It suggests the educated selection of the battles to be fought, rather than fighting them all.
Each strategy has basic glaring similarities; they both consider the foremost objective of American national security to be protection of the American homeland and general protection of American constitutional democracy, freedoms, assets, economy, and so forth. They diverge, however, in terms of how best to accomplish that objective.
The restraint argument focuses largely on the allocation of finite resources. There is a certain end to American resources and those resources are better spent at home than abroad. The argument suggests that American resources sent abroad are resources which, first, are being used to subsidize the defense of America's allies, allies which in most instances can afford to subsidize their own defense; second are enabling America's allies to divert their own defense spending to other avenues; and third, are causing an unfair competition scenario for American companies overseas. Every dollar America spends to protect Europe or East Asia, is a dollar those places don't have to spend to protect themselves, enabling them to allocate their own resources to other endeavors, such as subsidizing automobile and electronics manufacturers which directly compete with American firms for the same consumer spending.
The selective engagement strategy seems to circumvent this argument by countering that if Europe and East Asia were left to vie for their own defense, regional arms races may ensue. Perhaps Germany would compete with France for regional military dominance, the UK with Germany, etc. If left to their own devices, those areas could digress into their old habits of old world politicking, jostling for power, dirty dealing, war making etc. With the United States playing the major power broker in these regions, the lesser powers are left to focus their energies, and their resources, on other, less lethal endeavors.
The restraint strategy asserts that the U.S. spends many times what its nearest competitor does on defense expenditures and that a good share of those dollars would be better spent on domestic issues such as infrastructure, education, and social programs (America's nearest competitor in terms of gross defense spending is China. In 2008 the U.S. spent $607 Billion while China spent $84.9 Billion (CIA World Factbook)). The assertion is that America's defense edge is significant and that once a certain threshold is reached, America's return on its defense investment is minimal. After all, for what purpose should a superpower have need to spend seven times what its nearest competitor spends to insure its security? Especially when that competitor can't even dream of matching the technological edge of the American defense apparatus, and America has a unique and distinct advantage in terms of its geography, being surrounded on two sides by water and the other two by relatively benign, yet friendly neighbors.
Selective engagement counters this argument by stating that security comes at a cost, and economic productivity, both American and otherwise, requires security. The maintenance of U.S. military presence overseas insures the status quo. Peace prevails because everyone is happy to let the Americans maintain the defenses. If America withdraws, a power vacuum follows and arms races and power struggles ensue.
The national security strategies of restraint and selective engagement are moderate forms of their extreme selves; total isolationism and total engagement. Each has rational arguments in its favor, and each has flaws.
Gholz, Eugene, Daryl G. Press, and Harvey M. Sapolsky. “Come Home, America: The Strategy of Restraint in the Face of Temptation.” In America’s Strategic Choices: Revised Edition, edited by Michael E. Brown, Owen R. Cote, Jr., Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, 55-98. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2000.
Art, Robert J. “Geopolitics Updated: The Strategy of Selective Engagement.” In America’s Strategic Choices: Revised Edition, edited by Michael E. Brown, Owen R. Cote, Jr., Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, 141-178. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2000.
U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. CIA World Factbook. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/ (accessed December 18, 2009).
Each strategy has basic glaring similarities; they both consider the foremost objective of American national security to be protection of the American homeland and general protection of American constitutional democracy, freedoms, assets, economy, and so forth. They diverge, however, in terms of how best to accomplish that objective.
The restraint argument focuses largely on the allocation of finite resources. There is a certain end to American resources and those resources are better spent at home than abroad. The argument suggests that American resources sent abroad are resources which, first, are being used to subsidize the defense of America's allies, allies which in most instances can afford to subsidize their own defense; second are enabling America's allies to divert their own defense spending to other avenues; and third, are causing an unfair competition scenario for American companies overseas. Every dollar America spends to protect Europe or East Asia, is a dollar those places don't have to spend to protect themselves, enabling them to allocate their own resources to other endeavors, such as subsidizing automobile and electronics manufacturers which directly compete with American firms for the same consumer spending.
The selective engagement strategy seems to circumvent this argument by countering that if Europe and East Asia were left to vie for their own defense, regional arms races may ensue. Perhaps Germany would compete with France for regional military dominance, the UK with Germany, etc. If left to their own devices, those areas could digress into their old habits of old world politicking, jostling for power, dirty dealing, war making etc. With the United States playing the major power broker in these regions, the lesser powers are left to focus their energies, and their resources, on other, less lethal endeavors.
The restraint strategy asserts that the U.S. spends many times what its nearest competitor does on defense expenditures and that a good share of those dollars would be better spent on domestic issues such as infrastructure, education, and social programs (America's nearest competitor in terms of gross defense spending is China. In 2008 the U.S. spent $607 Billion while China spent $84.9 Billion (CIA World Factbook)). The assertion is that America's defense edge is significant and that once a certain threshold is reached, America's return on its defense investment is minimal. After all, for what purpose should a superpower have need to spend seven times what its nearest competitor spends to insure its security? Especially when that competitor can't even dream of matching the technological edge of the American defense apparatus, and America has a unique and distinct advantage in terms of its geography, being surrounded on two sides by water and the other two by relatively benign, yet friendly neighbors.
Selective engagement counters this argument by stating that security comes at a cost, and economic productivity, both American and otherwise, requires security. The maintenance of U.S. military presence overseas insures the status quo. Peace prevails because everyone is happy to let the Americans maintain the defenses. If America withdraws, a power vacuum follows and arms races and power struggles ensue.
The national security strategies of restraint and selective engagement are moderate forms of their extreme selves; total isolationism and total engagement. Each has rational arguments in its favor, and each has flaws.
Gholz, Eugene, Daryl G. Press, and Harvey M. Sapolsky. “Come Home, America: The Strategy of Restraint in the Face of Temptation.” In America’s Strategic Choices: Revised Edition, edited by Michael E. Brown, Owen R. Cote, Jr., Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, 55-98. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2000.
Art, Robert J. “Geopolitics Updated: The Strategy of Selective Engagement.” In America’s Strategic Choices: Revised Edition, edited by Michael E. Brown, Owen R. Cote, Jr., Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, 141-178. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2000.
U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. CIA World Factbook. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/ (accessed December 18, 2009).
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