The realist's view of grand strategy is a consequence of their perception of the dog-eat-dog nature of power. Their view of the world coincides with the obvious hostility that exists in the world. In realist politics, those with the gold (or power, or both) make the rules. When it comes to national security policy and American grand strategy, it is assumed that since America has the gold and the power, America makes the rules. Historically, and even in many parts of the world today, this policy would invite corruption, violence, and utter misery for the human population which fell victim to those with the gold and the power. However, America has tended (with exceptions of course) to be a benevolent superpower, not particularly keen on flexing its muscle and shoving people around to get its way. This is made somewhat apparent by the isolationist philosophy which so permeates American thinking. It is quite likely that there has never been a state which had more power, which was so hesitant to use it to either subjugate its enemies or to enable conquest or expansionist objectives, as the United States of America has been over the decades since World War II.
This being the case, realists tend to see the world in very hostile terms, kill or be killed. Realists see the different grand strategy options in terms of raw power. They may likely ask, “Which of these strategies is more/less likely to invite the various states to take advantage of America’s weaknesses?” The potential for the evil nature of humankind to dominate is fundamental to realism and strategy is seen in this light. The realist view is that if America weakens her defenses, there will be some evil despot ready and willing to take advantage. At the same time, if America disengages internationally, it is assumed that the power vacuum left in America’s wake will be filled with some power monger or another.
Cooperative security, in realist world terms, is a recipe for disaster. The premise that America will place its full and complete trust in and rely entirely on international organizations and the international community as a whole for its own stability and security is naïve at best, and outrageously foolish at worst. Cooperative security has as its ultimate goal, the collectivization of the globe and the design of making every state interdependent on every other state for their collective security. Realists would argue that the moment America surrenders its right to pursue its own interests, is the moment America’s security is forfeit. The idealist notion that if everyone cooperates and gets along, everyone will benefit is a non reality to a realist because as soon as the cooperative begins to believe in and can finally realize its communal utopia, the one individual or state with Stalinist, alpha-dominant tendencies and the power to exercise those, will rise to the top and make a Stalinist state out of all those who foolishly let down their guard. Russia in the 1930s is a perfect example. The Soviet state was set up on the naïve notion that if everyone cooperates, works together, everyone will benefit, the working class will become the strength of society, the state will cease to exist (we have Karl Marx to thank for that) and utopia will follow. We know how that went.
The other grand strategy options are much more realistic in nature. Neo-isolationism, selective engagement, and primacy all assume the presence of an ongoing and persistent threat. No matter the perceived benign nature of the circumstances, a threat will always arise which will require force to eliminate. These strategies assume that America will maintain the elements of power necessary to insure its dominance in the world, to some degree or another. The nature of this concept can be seen in the relative calm which followed the ending of the Cold War. Peace and harmony seemed to permeate international relations, at least as far as the great powers were concerned, and as far as a comfortable public was concerned. Then, in the absence of conflict, the threat of Islamic extremism emerged to fill the void of conflict, and to again demonstrate that utopia, as dreamed of by idealist thinkers, although perhaps not impossible, is at least a distant, and at this point, naïve notion.
Realism in national security and in terms of grand strategy theory demands the maintenance of power, in order to protect America in the presence of threats of any kind. Realism views power as a necessity, without which, America will be victimized by power mongers and become a liability to its people. Power and strength are not an option to realists. The only option exists in how that power and strength are put to use.
Showing posts with label international relations. Show all posts
Showing posts with label international relations. Show all posts
Monday, February 8, 2010
Four American Grand Strategies
In the policy debate over potential U.S. grand strategies, there are four basic competing visions. The four competing visions include neo-isolationism, selective engagement, cooperative security, and primacy. Each of the four falls along a spectrum with varying degrees of unilateralism and multilateralism, and differs gradually in their objectives, premises, and instruments for applying U.S. power and insuring American national security.
The first candidate for U.S. grand strategy, as put forth by Posen and Ross, is neo-isolationism (Posen 1997, 7). Neo-isolationism would withdraw American forces from all parts of the world as presently situated, and deploy American forces only to those areas where problems directly influence American national security. It’s basic premise is that America is “strategically immune” (Posen 1997, 10), that is, as a result of America’s geography, America is all but completely impervious to foreign aggression. The only potential aggressors would have to either cross an ocean to launch a campaign, or enter the U.S. by way of Canada, or Mexico. In the unlikely event that Canada or Mexico was of the mind to launch an assault on the U.S., first, the aggressor would have to substantially, even exponentially increase the size and strength of its present military, and if that, then American defenses would likely dismantle an invasion without skipping even a beat. Neo-nationalism utilizes five key elements to insure American national security. A nuclear deterrent capability would be required to prevent a first strike from an aggressor state. Second, air and missile defenses would be maintained to insure air superiority within American airspace. Third, U.S. intelligence capability would be critical to alerting American authorities of any potential threat to U.S. assets and interests. Forth, a strong navy would be necessary to insure against the unlikely probability of an amphibious invasion from abroad. Finally, special operations forces would be necessary to deal directly with threats against U.S. assets abroad (Posen 1997, 7-14).
The second candidate for U.S. grand strategy is selective engagement (Posen 1997, 15). The selective engagement strategy proposes to maintain international security by preventing great power war. The basic premise is that great power wars cause the most destruction, and since America has limited resources and isn’t that interested in policing the world, the prevention of great power war is a great boundary to U.S. involvement. This boundary may be breached however under circumstances deemed sufficient by American policy makers and politicians. Selective engagement follows generally the instrumentality of neo-isolationism. Nuclear deterrent and homeland defense of a certainty necessary, but beyond that, selective engagement requires the conventional forces necessary to dissuade aggression by great powers, and ideally, to carry on military engagement and achieve victory in at least one foreign theater (Posen 1997, 15-21).
The third candidate for U.S. grand strategy is cooperative security (Posen 1997, 21). Cooperative security assumes democratic altruism on the part of the great powers. Its objective, although its adherents admit cooperative security is a “work in progress” (Posen 1997, 25), is an international framework of security treaties which demands international cooperation and assistance in any and all international security dilemmas. The primary responsibility for enforcement of international security falls upon the great powers, with minor support from the multitude of lesser powers. Competition among great powers is assumed minimal. The media, at least according to Posen and Ross, seems to be a key component of cooperative security. The media’s role is to enlighten the otherwise apathetic public regarding the horrifying realities of the world and stimulate it into action. Without the support of the public, cooperative security would be impotent. Other key components cooperative security implementation are a strong homeland defense but also a very capable power of deployment and force projection so as to enable great power military intervention whenever and wherever necessary to successfully police the globe (Posen 1997, 21-30).
The fourth and final candidate for U.S. grand strategy is primacy. Primacy is based on the premise that U.S. supremacy in each aspect of international relations is the best means of insuring peace and security in the world. America’s potential challengers will have neither the means nor the will to make a legitimate contest for power both because America’s might is so vastly superior to everyone else’s and because America is content to provide sufficiently for its allies’ interests that they really have no need to vie for power. Military power is a critical instrument of primacy success. Primacy recommends a modernized military which is equal to or larger than its next (at least) two competitors combined, and the more the better.
Posen, Barry R. and Andrew L. Ross. “Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy.” In America’s Strategic Choices: Revised Edition, edited by Michael E. Brown, Owen R. Cote, Jr., Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, 3-51. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2000.
The first candidate for U.S. grand strategy, as put forth by Posen and Ross, is neo-isolationism (Posen 1997, 7). Neo-isolationism would withdraw American forces from all parts of the world as presently situated, and deploy American forces only to those areas where problems directly influence American national security. It’s basic premise is that America is “strategically immune” (Posen 1997, 10), that is, as a result of America’s geography, America is all but completely impervious to foreign aggression. The only potential aggressors would have to either cross an ocean to launch a campaign, or enter the U.S. by way of Canada, or Mexico. In the unlikely event that Canada or Mexico was of the mind to launch an assault on the U.S., first, the aggressor would have to substantially, even exponentially increase the size and strength of its present military, and if that, then American defenses would likely dismantle an invasion without skipping even a beat. Neo-nationalism utilizes five key elements to insure American national security. A nuclear deterrent capability would be required to prevent a first strike from an aggressor state. Second, air and missile defenses would be maintained to insure air superiority within American airspace. Third, U.S. intelligence capability would be critical to alerting American authorities of any potential threat to U.S. assets and interests. Forth, a strong navy would be necessary to insure against the unlikely probability of an amphibious invasion from abroad. Finally, special operations forces would be necessary to deal directly with threats against U.S. assets abroad (Posen 1997, 7-14).
The second candidate for U.S. grand strategy is selective engagement (Posen 1997, 15). The selective engagement strategy proposes to maintain international security by preventing great power war. The basic premise is that great power wars cause the most destruction, and since America has limited resources and isn’t that interested in policing the world, the prevention of great power war is a great boundary to U.S. involvement. This boundary may be breached however under circumstances deemed sufficient by American policy makers and politicians. Selective engagement follows generally the instrumentality of neo-isolationism. Nuclear deterrent and homeland defense of a certainty necessary, but beyond that, selective engagement requires the conventional forces necessary to dissuade aggression by great powers, and ideally, to carry on military engagement and achieve victory in at least one foreign theater (Posen 1997, 15-21).
The third candidate for U.S. grand strategy is cooperative security (Posen 1997, 21). Cooperative security assumes democratic altruism on the part of the great powers. Its objective, although its adherents admit cooperative security is a “work in progress” (Posen 1997, 25), is an international framework of security treaties which demands international cooperation and assistance in any and all international security dilemmas. The primary responsibility for enforcement of international security falls upon the great powers, with minor support from the multitude of lesser powers. Competition among great powers is assumed minimal. The media, at least according to Posen and Ross, seems to be a key component of cooperative security. The media’s role is to enlighten the otherwise apathetic public regarding the horrifying realities of the world and stimulate it into action. Without the support of the public, cooperative security would be impotent. Other key components cooperative security implementation are a strong homeland defense but also a very capable power of deployment and force projection so as to enable great power military intervention whenever and wherever necessary to successfully police the globe (Posen 1997, 21-30).
The fourth and final candidate for U.S. grand strategy is primacy. Primacy is based on the premise that U.S. supremacy in each aspect of international relations is the best means of insuring peace and security in the world. America’s potential challengers will have neither the means nor the will to make a legitimate contest for power both because America’s might is so vastly superior to everyone else’s and because America is content to provide sufficiently for its allies’ interests that they really have no need to vie for power. Military power is a critical instrument of primacy success. Primacy recommends a modernized military which is equal to or larger than its next (at least) two competitors combined, and the more the better.
Posen, Barry R. and Andrew L. Ross. “Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy.” In America’s Strategic Choices: Revised Edition, edited by Michael E. Brown, Owen R. Cote, Jr., Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, 3-51. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2000.
Monday, December 18, 2006
The Fight Against Nuclear Arms Proliferation
In the past decade, numerous states have acquired nuclear weapons capability, most recently of course, North Korea, Pakistan and India. Others remain at the forefront of international attention for their efforts to obtain Nuclear Weapons. Iran, for example persistently defies international pressure to abandon its pursuit of Nuclear weapons, and indeed, provokes the west with bellicose talk of wiping Israel off the map and enveloping the western world in the veil of Islam.
Since the fall of the Soviet empire, nuclear proliferation has been a top priority of each successive U.S. presidential administration, as well as most other nations’ executives, the UN, NATO, etc. Nuclear proliferation is no new phenomenon to the world community. Clearly nothing short of military action can persuade a sovereign state to give up its right to possess nuclear weapons (Iraq), but even in Iraq, where Iraq was certainly prevented from obtaining nuclear weapons, the end goal was probably not sufficient justification for the hornet’s nest that followed (in all probability Iraq wasn’t even close to possessing nuclear weapons, or even biological or chemical weapons). Past U.S. administrations have negotiated with “rogue states” and done everything short of bending over to persuade these states to give up their nuclear ambitions. Pakistan and India were handed their nuclear weapons programs on a silver platter when, under the auspice of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, they were given the capability to develop their weapons programs by the means of seemingly benign nuclear power capability gifted to them from the west.
North Korea, as I am writing this short treatise, is demanding the nations involved in the six party talks (Russia, China, Japan, U.S., South Korea) provide NK with nuclear power as a contingency for its elimination of its weapons program. This approach is obviously not an option (Pakistan/India), nor is it an option for the other five to give in to the demands of a felon state like NK. The repercussions of NK’s pursuit and eventual acquisition of nuclear weapons would be felt globally. Even now, Japan is expanding its military capability at a rate unprecedented since the close of the Second World War. Indeed, Japan has in the last few days upgraded its relatively inconsequential defense agency to a full cabinet level ministry in reaction to the obvious threat perceived from across the Sea of Japan. The threat is clearly felt on the opposite side of the Pacific with talk of NK’s long range missile capability. South Korea is perhaps the most affected with its shared hundred mile long border. It is well known that the military force encamped along that border is merely a delaying tactic to slow the advancing forces should NK decide to invade the south. Ideally, the delay would last just long enough for reinforcements to arrive.
With NK and other rogue states in hot pursuit of nuclear weapons, what is to be done? We can’t invade, negotiation is folly, appeasement is even more costly in the long run, so what other options are there?
An economics professor I had while at BYU insisted that world trade is the safest route to assuring peace. Although I don’t entirely disagree with this notion, it seems to me that if it were the foolproof case, the First World War would have been averted since even until now the world hasn’t reached the level of international economic cooperation that it enjoyed prior to WWI. The Persian Gulf War would have been avoided since nearly every country in the world traded for oil with both Iraq and Kuwait. Trade and commerce is evidently a significant motivation by itself for two or more countries to go to war. From the big dog’s perspective, sure, there are no good reasons to go to war with your trading partners, but from the little dog’s perspective (as is the case with NK) belligerence and confrontation are rational means of securing one’s interests. Not to mention if a small country is led by a madman like Hitler, Stalin, Pol Pot, or Kim Jung Il. Who is to say to that madman what is rational and what is not?
Another professor I had at BYU insisted that Democracy is the means by which the world of the future will avoid war. His reason for so insisting was that if people are given the choice, they’ll always choose peace over war. This inference is based solely on the assumption that the people care enough to educate themselves about the issues and not be swayed by every wind of doctrine and propaganda put forth by evil designing power brokers. Clearly this inference doesn’t apply to the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003. George W. Bush used media campaigns and propaganda to influence the ignorant in the United States to favor the invasion and only several years later did we learn for certain that the evidence used and fed like candy to the Hollywood worshiping American public for an impetus for war, was mostly bogus and highly inflated, largely fabricated to provide the American public with the anti-Iraq fervor necessary to fuel a full scale ground war. The American public is so spellbound by the free-speech Hollywood propagandists that it no longer recognizes fact from fiction nor the implications of war other than that it is glorious and exciting. No, democracy is not the be all and end all answer to world peace.
Although only a mediocre president, John F. Kennedy once stated, “It is an unfortunate fact that we can secure peace only by preparing for war.” It is indeed a fact that America must, in conjunction with those other necessary aspects, i.e. economic cooperation and the peaceful spread of democracy, perpetually prepare for war to secure its own peace. Regimes with nuclear weapons capability will only increase in number and the more the U.S. and the UN fight against those regimes which actively seek nuclear technology, the more those regimes will fight tooth and nail to get it.
Perhaps the answer is a balanced attack on several fronts, diplomatic, military, economic, and by the means and use of information, to slow the process in order to insure America’s successful preparation for the inevitable eventual reality that hostile rogue states will obtain nuclear weapons. The U.S. comparative advantage is technology. We ought to be using the technology that we have to insure a secure future for our grandchildren and their grandchildren. Let NK, Cuba, Iran, and all the others remain in the stone age if they so choose, but let us make positive preparation for an eventual confrontation (and God willing our preparations will never prove necessary) by leaving those states with outdated and impotent weapons. Let us press into the future, striving for peace while preparing for war.
Since the fall of the Soviet empire, nuclear proliferation has been a top priority of each successive U.S. presidential administration, as well as most other nations’ executives, the UN, NATO, etc. Nuclear proliferation is no new phenomenon to the world community. Clearly nothing short of military action can persuade a sovereign state to give up its right to possess nuclear weapons (Iraq), but even in Iraq, where Iraq was certainly prevented from obtaining nuclear weapons, the end goal was probably not sufficient justification for the hornet’s nest that followed (in all probability Iraq wasn’t even close to possessing nuclear weapons, or even biological or chemical weapons). Past U.S. administrations have negotiated with “rogue states” and done everything short of bending over to persuade these states to give up their nuclear ambitions. Pakistan and India were handed their nuclear weapons programs on a silver platter when, under the auspice of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, they were given the capability to develop their weapons programs by the means of seemingly benign nuclear power capability gifted to them from the west.
North Korea, as I am writing this short treatise, is demanding the nations involved in the six party talks (Russia, China, Japan, U.S., South Korea) provide NK with nuclear power as a contingency for its elimination of its weapons program. This approach is obviously not an option (Pakistan/India), nor is it an option for the other five to give in to the demands of a felon state like NK. The repercussions of NK’s pursuit and eventual acquisition of nuclear weapons would be felt globally. Even now, Japan is expanding its military capability at a rate unprecedented since the close of the Second World War. Indeed, Japan has in the last few days upgraded its relatively inconsequential defense agency to a full cabinet level ministry in reaction to the obvious threat perceived from across the Sea of Japan. The threat is clearly felt on the opposite side of the Pacific with talk of NK’s long range missile capability. South Korea is perhaps the most affected with its shared hundred mile long border. It is well known that the military force encamped along that border is merely a delaying tactic to slow the advancing forces should NK decide to invade the south. Ideally, the delay would last just long enough for reinforcements to arrive.
With NK and other rogue states in hot pursuit of nuclear weapons, what is to be done? We can’t invade, negotiation is folly, appeasement is even more costly in the long run, so what other options are there?
An economics professor I had while at BYU insisted that world trade is the safest route to assuring peace. Although I don’t entirely disagree with this notion, it seems to me that if it were the foolproof case, the First World War would have been averted since even until now the world hasn’t reached the level of international economic cooperation that it enjoyed prior to WWI. The Persian Gulf War would have been avoided since nearly every country in the world traded for oil with both Iraq and Kuwait. Trade and commerce is evidently a significant motivation by itself for two or more countries to go to war. From the big dog’s perspective, sure, there are no good reasons to go to war with your trading partners, but from the little dog’s perspective (as is the case with NK) belligerence and confrontation are rational means of securing one’s interests. Not to mention if a small country is led by a madman like Hitler, Stalin, Pol Pot, or Kim Jung Il. Who is to say to that madman what is rational and what is not?
Another professor I had at BYU insisted that Democracy is the means by which the world of the future will avoid war. His reason for so insisting was that if people are given the choice, they’ll always choose peace over war. This inference is based solely on the assumption that the people care enough to educate themselves about the issues and not be swayed by every wind of doctrine and propaganda put forth by evil designing power brokers. Clearly this inference doesn’t apply to the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003. George W. Bush used media campaigns and propaganda to influence the ignorant in the United States to favor the invasion and only several years later did we learn for certain that the evidence used and fed like candy to the Hollywood worshiping American public for an impetus for war, was mostly bogus and highly inflated, largely fabricated to provide the American public with the anti-Iraq fervor necessary to fuel a full scale ground war. The American public is so spellbound by the free-speech Hollywood propagandists that it no longer recognizes fact from fiction nor the implications of war other than that it is glorious and exciting. No, democracy is not the be all and end all answer to world peace.
Although only a mediocre president, John F. Kennedy once stated, “It is an unfortunate fact that we can secure peace only by preparing for war.” It is indeed a fact that America must, in conjunction with those other necessary aspects, i.e. economic cooperation and the peaceful spread of democracy, perpetually prepare for war to secure its own peace. Regimes with nuclear weapons capability will only increase in number and the more the U.S. and the UN fight against those regimes which actively seek nuclear technology, the more those regimes will fight tooth and nail to get it.
Perhaps the answer is a balanced attack on several fronts, diplomatic, military, economic, and by the means and use of information, to slow the process in order to insure America’s successful preparation for the inevitable eventual reality that hostile rogue states will obtain nuclear weapons. The U.S. comparative advantage is technology. We ought to be using the technology that we have to insure a secure future for our grandchildren and their grandchildren. Let NK, Cuba, Iran, and all the others remain in the stone age if they so choose, but let us make positive preparation for an eventual confrontation (and God willing our preparations will never prove necessary) by leaving those states with outdated and impotent weapons. Let us press into the future, striving for peace while preparing for war.
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