Approval of any major action taken by the United Nations must be given by the UN Security Council. Unfortunately, any of the five permanent members of the Security Council have the ability to veto any course of action voted upon by the council. As a result, the bureaucracy within the council virtually neuters its ability to take quick, decisive action. Article II basically states that no member state can take any action within or against any other state without the approval of the UN.
In some cases, member states have been compelled to circumvent the UN and its bureaucracy laden structure in order to accomplish meaningful humanitarian missions. A perfect example is the war in Kosovo in 1999. The UN Security Council (Russia and China) blocked any attempt by the other powers to prevent a repetition of the 1995 Bosnia genocide. Once again, the Christian Serbs were setting out to cleanse the former Yugoslavia by getting rid of the Muslim Albanian Kosovars. Following the botched attempt by the UN at “Peacekeeping” in Bosnia, the western powers on the UN Security Council flanked the UN by engaging in Kosovo by way of NATO, the consequential trans-Atlantic military alliance.
The gamut of problems which fall under the umbrella of humanitarian crisis is extensive, ranging from mere food aid for disaster relief, to military intervention to prevent or halt genocide. The military end of the gamut is the more controversial within the UN and has a tendency to cause strife between member states.
The moral dilemma between engaging in a humanitarian crisis and ignoring it is more complex than could be covered in multiple volumes. However, the west, due to its adherence to a “superior moral compass”, has typically engaged or considered engaging in various types of humanitarian crises in order to prevent or lessen the damage caused thereby. The totalitarian history of the west’s Asian counterparts seems to lean Russia and China away from humanitarian causes.
In democratic societies, the danger of intervening is that the citizenry is typically not very keen on seeing body bags come home in exchange for humanitarian benefit in some far off land. Inasmuch as the people hold the ultimate power in a democracy, elected officials are likely more willing to listen to popular opinion and therefore less likely to take risks which would have little political value.
The dilemma lies in the moral compass. It’s obvious that it would be morally commendable to intervene in some humanitarian crisis if the cost was zero, and most Americans would probably agree. But when the perceived costs of that intervention exceed its perceived value to the public, even if the costs might be well worth the outcome to a benefitted group, officials are likely to steer away from committing to it. The advantage to elected officials in a UN intervention, rather than a unilateral one, is that they can take credit if it goes well, but shrug it off on the UN if it doesn’t. If things had gone badly wrong in Kosovo, President Clinton would have heard about it in a bad way.
A major complication with circumventing the UN, as in the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, is that other states, member and non-member alike, may then use that action as justification and precedent in performing their own unilateral action. Russia may easily have used that very case when it invaded Georgia in 2008. This principle applies to humanitarian intervention as easily as military endeavors. China could easily invade a neighbor on humanitarian grounds using the precedent established by NATO in Kosovo. The advantage NATO has in this instance is that NATO is a broad coalition of numerous nations. The problem is that unilateral action undermines the international order established within the UN. If states rampantly disregard the principles of the UN, it might as well not exist.
Showing posts with label Bill Clinton. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Bill Clinton. Show all posts
Wednesday, December 2, 2009
Public Opinion and the Military
Use of American military forces abroad has always been a contentious issue. In question more broadly has been the conflict between two ideologies, Isolationism and Globalism (or internationalism; or interventionism). The debate between the two in America goes back to its genesis; the debate over whether America should keep to its own borders, or if its interests require, that it exert its influence abroad.
At the outset of the Second World War in Europe, American public opinion was largely opposed to the committal of US forces to that theater. The opinion was largely, “Let the Europeans deal with their own mess!” After all, America had intervened in World War One and the Europeans clearly hadn’t learned their lesson. Roosevelt had wanted to commit American forces to the European theater long before the Japanese Attack on Pearl Harbor and it was American public opinion that prevented him. He needed the Japanese awakening to persuade the American public that American intervention in Europe was necessary. It was public opinion, ultimately, that brought the United States of America into the Second World War.
America’s engagement in Vietnam largely ended as a result of tremendous public pressure, or negative public opinion. Over the decade long war, the Vietnam conflict garnered increasing public criticism. In this instance, Isolationism had grown in the arena of foreign policy as a result of the Second World War and the Korean conflict. As Vietnam dragged on, American public opinion grew until finally, under U.S. President Gerald Ford, American troops were completely withdrawn from Vietnam in 1975. The conflict rested upon the premise that democracy’s mortal enemy was communism, and that democracy, in order to prevail on the global stage, needed to stem the tide of communist expansionism. The American public didn’t see things quite in that light. In large part because of the media, American public opinion turned so strongly against Vietnam that Washington finally conceded and removed the last remaining American troops in April, 1975.
In 1993, American forces had been committed to Somalia as part of a UN aid program to protect and distribute relief aid to starving Somalis. The country was run largely by warlords and was in basic anarchy. The American commander in that theater authorized a raid aimed at abducting Mohamed Farrah Aidid, a leading warlord and strongman in Mogadishu, along with several of his top lieutenants. The raid succeeded in part, but failed to net Aidid, and resulted in the deaths of several American soldiers. The media, as in Vietnam, couldn’t get enough of the carnage of war, and succeeded in driving public opinion in opposition to the American presence in Somalia. Many Americans saw Somalia as a lawless, godless region and believed American troops had no place in such a god-forsaken part of the world. It didn’t take long for President Bill Clinton to withdraw American forces.
More recently, with waning public support for “Operation Iraqi Freedom”, President Barack Obama promised in his election campaign that he would withdraw American troops from Iraq. The American public, at least in some part, had begun to desert the Iraq war and see it as another Vietnam. Obama viewed his election, as do all American presidents, as a “referendum” on the former president’s policies, and immediately set out to withdraw American troops from Iraq. Although public opinion is in no way as galvanized against the Iraq war as it was against Vietnam, the people have spoken, and public opinion has again been a part in shaping American policy.
Public opinion will always shape the ebb and flow of the use of military force as well as American policy generally. The nature of a democracy demands it. If public opinion ceased to be a factor in such aspects of government, America would cease to be a democracy.
At the outset of the Second World War in Europe, American public opinion was largely opposed to the committal of US forces to that theater. The opinion was largely, “Let the Europeans deal with their own mess!” After all, America had intervened in World War One and the Europeans clearly hadn’t learned their lesson. Roosevelt had wanted to commit American forces to the European theater long before the Japanese Attack on Pearl Harbor and it was American public opinion that prevented him. He needed the Japanese awakening to persuade the American public that American intervention in Europe was necessary. It was public opinion, ultimately, that brought the United States of America into the Second World War.
America’s engagement in Vietnam largely ended as a result of tremendous public pressure, or negative public opinion. Over the decade long war, the Vietnam conflict garnered increasing public criticism. In this instance, Isolationism had grown in the arena of foreign policy as a result of the Second World War and the Korean conflict. As Vietnam dragged on, American public opinion grew until finally, under U.S. President Gerald Ford, American troops were completely withdrawn from Vietnam in 1975. The conflict rested upon the premise that democracy’s mortal enemy was communism, and that democracy, in order to prevail on the global stage, needed to stem the tide of communist expansionism. The American public didn’t see things quite in that light. In large part because of the media, American public opinion turned so strongly against Vietnam that Washington finally conceded and removed the last remaining American troops in April, 1975.
In 1993, American forces had been committed to Somalia as part of a UN aid program to protect and distribute relief aid to starving Somalis. The country was run largely by warlords and was in basic anarchy. The American commander in that theater authorized a raid aimed at abducting Mohamed Farrah Aidid, a leading warlord and strongman in Mogadishu, along with several of his top lieutenants. The raid succeeded in part, but failed to net Aidid, and resulted in the deaths of several American soldiers. The media, as in Vietnam, couldn’t get enough of the carnage of war, and succeeded in driving public opinion in opposition to the American presence in Somalia. Many Americans saw Somalia as a lawless, godless region and believed American troops had no place in such a god-forsaken part of the world. It didn’t take long for President Bill Clinton to withdraw American forces.
More recently, with waning public support for “Operation Iraqi Freedom”, President Barack Obama promised in his election campaign that he would withdraw American troops from Iraq. The American public, at least in some part, had begun to desert the Iraq war and see it as another Vietnam. Obama viewed his election, as do all American presidents, as a “referendum” on the former president’s policies, and immediately set out to withdraw American troops from Iraq. Although public opinion is in no way as galvanized against the Iraq war as it was against Vietnam, the people have spoken, and public opinion has again been a part in shaping American policy.
Public opinion will always shape the ebb and flow of the use of military force as well as American policy generally. The nature of a democracy demands it. If public opinion ceased to be a factor in such aspects of government, America would cease to be a democracy.
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