Four American Grand Strategies

In the policy debate over potential U.S. grand strategies, there are four basic competing visions. The four competing visions include neo-isolationism, selective engagement, cooperative security, and primacy. Each of the four falls along a spectrum with varying degrees of unilateralism and multilateralism, and differs gradually in their objectives, premises, and instruments for applying U.S. power and insuring American national security.

The first candidate for U.S. grand strategy, as put forth by Posen and Ross, is neo-isolationism (Posen 1997, 7). Neo-isolationism would withdraw American forces from all parts of the world as presently situated, and deploy American forces only to those areas where problems directly influence American national security. It’s basic premise is that America is “strategically immune” (Posen 1997, 10), that is, as a result of America’s geography, America is all but completely impervious to foreign aggression. The only potential aggressors would have to either cross an ocean to launch a campaign, or enter the U.S. by way of Canada, or Mexico. In the unlikely event that Canada or Mexico was of the mind to launch an assault on the U.S., first, the aggressor would have to substantially, even exponentially increase the size and strength of its present military, and if that, then American defenses would likely dismantle an invasion without skipping even a beat. Neo-nationalism utilizes five key elements to insure American national security. A nuclear deterrent capability would be required to prevent a first strike from an aggressor state. Second, air and missile defenses would be maintained to insure air superiority within American airspace. Third, U.S. intelligence capability would be critical to alerting American authorities of any potential threat to U.S. assets and interests. Forth, a strong navy would be necessary to insure against the unlikely probability of an amphibious invasion from abroad. Finally, special operations forces would be necessary to deal directly with threats against U.S. assets abroad (Posen 1997, 7-14).

The second candidate for U.S. grand strategy is selective engagement (Posen 1997, 15). The selective engagement strategy proposes to maintain international security by preventing great power war. The basic premise is that great power wars cause the most destruction, and since America has limited resources and isn’t that interested in policing the world, the prevention of great power war is a great boundary to U.S. involvement. This boundary may be breached however under circumstances deemed sufficient by American policy makers and politicians. Selective engagement follows generally the instrumentality of neo-isolationism. Nuclear deterrent and homeland defense of a certainty necessary, but beyond that, selective engagement requires the conventional forces necessary to dissuade aggression by great powers, and ideally, to carry on military engagement and achieve victory in at least one foreign theater (Posen 1997, 15-21).

The third candidate for U.S. grand strategy is cooperative security (Posen 1997, 21). Cooperative security assumes democratic altruism on the part of the great powers. Its objective, although its adherents admit cooperative security is a “work in progress” (Posen 1997, 25), is an international framework of security treaties which demands international cooperation and assistance in any and all international security dilemmas. The primary responsibility for enforcement of international security falls upon the great powers, with minor support from the multitude of lesser powers. Competition among great powers is assumed minimal. The media, at least according to Posen and Ross, seems to be a key component of cooperative security. The media’s role is to enlighten the otherwise apathetic public regarding the horrifying realities of the world and stimulate it into action. Without the support of the public, cooperative security would be impotent. Other key components cooperative security implementation are a strong homeland defense but also a very capable power of deployment and force projection so as to enable great power military intervention whenever and wherever necessary to successfully police the globe (Posen 1997, 21-30).

The fourth and final candidate for U.S. grand strategy is primacy. Primacy is based on the premise that U.S. supremacy in each aspect of international relations is the best means of insuring peace and security in the world. America’s potential challengers will have neither the means nor the will to make a legitimate contest for power both because America’s might is so vastly superior to everyone else’s and because America is content to provide sufficiently for its allies’ interests that they really have no need to vie for power. Military power is a critical instrument of primacy success. Primacy recommends a modernized military which is equal to or larger than its next (at least) two competitors combined, and the more the better.


Posen, Barry R. and Andrew L. Ross. “Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy.” In America’s Strategic Choices: Revised Edition, edited by Michael E. Brown, Owen R. Cote, Jr., Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, 3-51. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2000.

Potential Challengers to American Primacy

The most obvious competitor presently capable of challenging U.S. primacy is the European Union. The E.U., although not hostile toward the U.S. or its interests, is capable on multiple levels of challenging the strength of the American monolith. More so than all other potential competitors, and possibly those competitors combined, the E.U. has wealth. Wealth is a necessity if a state or group of states wants to be strong in any worthy endeavor. Without sufficient capital, no other aspect of interstate relations can flourish. Insufficient capital will undermine any state's cross border relations but in a competition for the title of global hegemon, a state must be capable of competing monetarily with the one which holds that position.

Monetarily, the E.U. is really the only potential competitor which can come close to challenging the U.S. (Art 2003, 242). Although the E.U. boasted the world's largest GDP in 2008 at $14.94 trillion U.S. dollars (PPP) (the U.S. 2008 GDP was slightly less at $14.44 trillion) (CIA World Factbook), it is far from certain that the entity as a whole is capable of harnessing that GDP in order to make a credible challenge to American global dominance. Inasmuch as the E.U. is a work in progress and seems to be in the process of working out innumerable kinks in its overall existence, there is a great deal of unknown in terms of E.U. capability across the board. Indeed it seems a little premature to even calculate an E.U. GDP since many of its member states’ citizens have yet to identify themselves first as E.U. members rather than their own nationalities.

With the potential to rival the U.S. monetarily, the E.U. is on fertile ground to challenge the U.S. for military supremacy. According to Art, military equality requires little more than a comparable military; comparable in size, ground, sea, and air assets, technological advancement, etc. By this standard, according to Art, no other state actor has the potential to rival American military supremacy over the next few decades but the E.U. Presently the E.U. has 27 member states with 3 negotiating entry (Europa), and a population of 491.5 million (CIA World Factbook). In conjunction with its monetary capacity, the E.U. could probably produce a military to rival that of the U.S. However, the advantage the U.S. has in this regard is that it has been producing superior military capability for two full generations, whereas, other than a piece-meal, patchwork military with units thrown in from various states within the E.U., the E.U. would need many years to produce a uniquely European Union military capable of rivaling that of the U.S. on the battlefield. It is problematic in many ways to believe that the piece-meal strategy of military building would be an efficient and effective answer to American military hegemony (Art 2003, 243).

The other potential rivals for American hegemony would be China and Russia, likely in that order. These two states have unique problems in such an ambition. China's military infrastructure and tradition is seriously lacking in comparison to that of the U.S. China would rely almost entirely on a consistently increasing GDP at a rate of 7 percent per annum to match American might within three decades. Without said increase, China may never obtain parity with the U.S. Russia, on the other hand, has the infrastructure and tradition in place to potentially rival the U.S. as a global power, but that infrastructure and tradition is badly deteriorated and out of date, and it would likely take a few decades to upgrade and retrench that military prowess to enable a competent rivalry with the U.S. In either case, America seems firmly entrenched as the singular global power for at least two decades and probably three (Art 2003, 243-244).

The E.U. and the U.S. have a uniquely intertwined history and culture. As a result, it would be unlikely that the two would ever be at military odds with each other, but rather, should the E.U. develop a comparable military might to that of the U.S., the two would in all probability, dominate the world together in a co-equal partnership, with cooperation much like that seen in NATO. The strength of the E.U. is an asset to America and the strength of America is an asset to the E.U. It would be in America's best interests for the E.U. to develop into a formidable competitor in the modern world.


Art, Robert J. A Grand Strategy for America. Ithica, New York: Cornell University Press. 2003.

Europa: The EU at a Glance. http://europa.eu/abc/european_countries/candidate_countries/index_en.htm. (accessed December 13, 2009)

U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. CIA World Factbook. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ee.html (accessed December 14, 2009).

Europa: The EU at a Glance. http://europa.eu/abc/european_countries/eu_members/index_en.htm (accessed Decmeber 13, 2009).