Accountability of Russia's Nuclear Arsenal

The arsenal of nuclear weapons belonging to the Russian Federation has been a topic of concern to the United States and the west since the fall of the Soviet empire. The economic collapse that took place in the 1990s is largely to blame for the deteriorating and perceived unreliability of the systems and facilities used to house and protect this vast arsenal. The economic element accounts for international concern about the personnel responsible for the handling and maintenance of the stockpile as well. With the era of global terror ahead of us and the era of nuclear annihilation seemingly behind us, the decayed and corrupt system in which the old Soviet stockpile of nuclear weapons is entrusted seems at best, vulnerable, at worse, disastrous.

The impact of the economic depression of the 1990s on the Russian Federation’s stockpile of nuclear weapons is near incalculable. Although extensive and comprehensive measures are and always have been taken to keep the arsenal secure and out of the wrong hands, the facilities in which these weapons are housed are several decades old and in decrepit condition in most cases. The entity charged with the storage and protection of this nuclear arsenal is known as the 12th Main Directorate. This directorate has been under funded since the Soviet collapse and its facilities have accordingly gone without repair and upgrading. I spent a few years in Russia in the mid 1990s and I can picture the old and dilapidated concrete structures with rusted steel reinforcements showing through cracked and crumbling exteriors. I recall seeing an old Soviet military facility in Romania where the fencing intended to keep people out was decayed and patchy and the only thing it might have been successful at keeping out may have been an American tourist who was too fearful of the Soviet stereotype to venture inside (I’m also envisioning some old babushka sweeping snow off the porch of this nuclear storage facility with a homemade broom).

The accountability, security, and physical protection systems in place are likewise decades old and the 12th Main has consistently lacked funds to purchase, install and manage state of the art, or even second hand, computerized accountability and security systems. A former commander of the 12th Main boasted in the late 1990s that the security systems in place had been perfected over several decades and that there has never been a significant breach in security nor major accident with nuclear weapons under the 12th Main’s watch. First, that the systems are several decades old is serious cause for concern, and second, with a perfect record over a several decade span, the odds are against them.

Another issue dealing with the security systems is the economic impact of years of destitution suffered by the bulk of the Russian army. From where would they draw the personnel to man and manage these systems if not from the ranks of this destitute soldiery. 30,000 personnel are necessary to do the job under the present circumstances. The odds of a hand full of bad eggs among those 30,000 is tremendous and the reward for successfully acquiring a single nuclear warhead, or even the fissile material necessary to make a nuclear devise, is equally as great. No doubt someone could retire to some French villa and live out his life in relative luxury after successful completion of such a task.

Even if the Russian Federation suddenly came into some exorbitant amount of money to upgrade and completely modernize the storage facilities and security systems, plus compensate those 30,000 troops sufficiently to dissuade them from wanting to risk certain death for trying to steal a nuclear warhead, the infrastructure for transportation, protection while in transit, and temporary storage of the arsenal is certainly as old, decrepit and vulnerable as the permanent facilities and systems currently in use. The rail lines, rail cars, trucks and other vehicles, procedures, routes, etc., are by no means sophisticated and the material would be exponentially more vulnerable to outside interference in the process of relocation and temporary storage than it would be by leaving it in those dilapidated storage bunkers. That’s not even mentioning the increased risk of accident by putting a dozen nuclear warheads on an old rail car, on old rail lines, using old equipment, guarding it with destitute soldiers using old firearms. The recipe for disaster is clear.

The Russian Federation, although now much better off than it was 10 years ago, is still in comparative dire economic straits and likely lacking the resources and the will to fully secure those thousands of nuclear warheads. The United States has in the past provided assistance in this regard and may continue do so but the probability of U.S. resources going to buy some Russian general a retirement home on the Black Sea or a yacht in the Mediterranean is very high. The problem then goes unsolved but the necessity is still very great if the interests of the West are to be protected. Much more attention ought to be paid to the Russian nuclear stockpile and its circumstances in order to insure the security of the this vast nuclear arsenal.

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