The realist's view of grand strategy is a consequence of their perception of the dog-eat-dog nature of power. Their view of the world coincides with the obvious hostility that exists in the world. In realist politics, those with the gold (or power, or both) make the rules. When it comes to national security policy and American grand strategy, it is assumed that since America has the gold and the power, America makes the rules. Historically, and even in many parts of the world today, this policy would invite corruption, violence, and utter misery for the human population which fell victim to those with the gold and the power. However, America has tended (with exceptions of course) to be a benevolent superpower, not particularly keen on flexing its muscle and shoving people around to get its way. This is made somewhat apparent by the isolationist philosophy which so permeates American thinking. It is quite likely that there has never been a state which had more power, which was so hesitant to use it to either subjugate its enemies or to enable conquest or expansionist objectives, as the United States of America has been over the decades since World War II.
This being the case, realists tend to see the world in very hostile terms, kill or be killed. Realists see the different grand strategy options in terms of raw power. They may likely ask, “Which of these strategies is more/less likely to invite the various states to take advantage of America’s weaknesses?” The potential for the evil nature of humankind to dominate is fundamental to realism and strategy is seen in this light. The realist view is that if America weakens her defenses, there will be some evil despot ready and willing to take advantage. At the same time, if America disengages internationally, it is assumed that the power vacuum left in America’s wake will be filled with some power monger or another.
Cooperative security, in realist world terms, is a recipe for disaster. The premise that America will place its full and complete trust in and rely entirely on international organizations and the international community as a whole for its own stability and security is naïve at best, and outrageously foolish at worst. Cooperative security has as its ultimate goal, the collectivization of the globe and the design of making every state interdependent on every other state for their collective security. Realists would argue that the moment America surrenders its right to pursue its own interests, is the moment America’s security is forfeit. The idealist notion that if everyone cooperates and gets along, everyone will benefit is a non reality to a realist because as soon as the cooperative begins to believe in and can finally realize its communal utopia, the one individual or state with Stalinist, alpha-dominant tendencies and the power to exercise those, will rise to the top and make a Stalinist state out of all those who foolishly let down their guard. Russia in the 1930s is a perfect example. The Soviet state was set up on the naïve notion that if everyone cooperates, works together, everyone will benefit, the working class will become the strength of society, the state will cease to exist (we have Karl Marx to thank for that) and utopia will follow. We know how that went.
The other grand strategy options are much more realistic in nature. Neo-isolationism, selective engagement, and primacy all assume the presence of an ongoing and persistent threat. No matter the perceived benign nature of the circumstances, a threat will always arise which will require force to eliminate. These strategies assume that America will maintain the elements of power necessary to insure its dominance in the world, to some degree or another. The nature of this concept can be seen in the relative calm which followed the ending of the Cold War. Peace and harmony seemed to permeate international relations, at least as far as the great powers were concerned, and as far as a comfortable public was concerned. Then, in the absence of conflict, the threat of Islamic extremism emerged to fill the void of conflict, and to again demonstrate that utopia, as dreamed of by idealist thinkers, although perhaps not impossible, is at least a distant, and at this point, naïve notion.
Realism in national security and in terms of grand strategy theory demands the maintenance of power, in order to protect America in the presence of threats of any kind. Realism views power as a necessity, without which, America will be victimized by power mongers and become a liability to its people. Power and strength are not an option to realists. The only option exists in how that power and strength are put to use.
Monday, February 8, 2010
Four American Grand Strategies
In the policy debate over potential U.S. grand strategies, there are four basic competing visions. The four competing visions include neo-isolationism, selective engagement, cooperative security, and primacy. Each of the four falls along a spectrum with varying degrees of unilateralism and multilateralism, and differs gradually in their objectives, premises, and instruments for applying U.S. power and insuring American national security.
The first candidate for U.S. grand strategy, as put forth by Posen and Ross, is neo-isolationism (Posen 1997, 7). Neo-isolationism would withdraw American forces from all parts of the world as presently situated, and deploy American forces only to those areas where problems directly influence American national security. It’s basic premise is that America is “strategically immune” (Posen 1997, 10), that is, as a result of America’s geography, America is all but completely impervious to foreign aggression. The only potential aggressors would have to either cross an ocean to launch a campaign, or enter the U.S. by way of Canada, or Mexico. In the unlikely event that Canada or Mexico was of the mind to launch an assault on the U.S., first, the aggressor would have to substantially, even exponentially increase the size and strength of its present military, and if that, then American defenses would likely dismantle an invasion without skipping even a beat. Neo-nationalism utilizes five key elements to insure American national security. A nuclear deterrent capability would be required to prevent a first strike from an aggressor state. Second, air and missile defenses would be maintained to insure air superiority within American airspace. Third, U.S. intelligence capability would be critical to alerting American authorities of any potential threat to U.S. assets and interests. Forth, a strong navy would be necessary to insure against the unlikely probability of an amphibious invasion from abroad. Finally, special operations forces would be necessary to deal directly with threats against U.S. assets abroad (Posen 1997, 7-14).
The second candidate for U.S. grand strategy is selective engagement (Posen 1997, 15). The selective engagement strategy proposes to maintain international security by preventing great power war. The basic premise is that great power wars cause the most destruction, and since America has limited resources and isn’t that interested in policing the world, the prevention of great power war is a great boundary to U.S. involvement. This boundary may be breached however under circumstances deemed sufficient by American policy makers and politicians. Selective engagement follows generally the instrumentality of neo-isolationism. Nuclear deterrent and homeland defense of a certainty necessary, but beyond that, selective engagement requires the conventional forces necessary to dissuade aggression by great powers, and ideally, to carry on military engagement and achieve victory in at least one foreign theater (Posen 1997, 15-21).
The third candidate for U.S. grand strategy is cooperative security (Posen 1997, 21). Cooperative security assumes democratic altruism on the part of the great powers. Its objective, although its adherents admit cooperative security is a “work in progress” (Posen 1997, 25), is an international framework of security treaties which demands international cooperation and assistance in any and all international security dilemmas. The primary responsibility for enforcement of international security falls upon the great powers, with minor support from the multitude of lesser powers. Competition among great powers is assumed minimal. The media, at least according to Posen and Ross, seems to be a key component of cooperative security. The media’s role is to enlighten the otherwise apathetic public regarding the horrifying realities of the world and stimulate it into action. Without the support of the public, cooperative security would be impotent. Other key components cooperative security implementation are a strong homeland defense but also a very capable power of deployment and force projection so as to enable great power military intervention whenever and wherever necessary to successfully police the globe (Posen 1997, 21-30).
The fourth and final candidate for U.S. grand strategy is primacy. Primacy is based on the premise that U.S. supremacy in each aspect of international relations is the best means of insuring peace and security in the world. America’s potential challengers will have neither the means nor the will to make a legitimate contest for power both because America’s might is so vastly superior to everyone else’s and because America is content to provide sufficiently for its allies’ interests that they really have no need to vie for power. Military power is a critical instrument of primacy success. Primacy recommends a modernized military which is equal to or larger than its next (at least) two competitors combined, and the more the better.
Posen, Barry R. and Andrew L. Ross. “Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy.” In America’s Strategic Choices: Revised Edition, edited by Michael E. Brown, Owen R. Cote, Jr., Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, 3-51. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2000.
The first candidate for U.S. grand strategy, as put forth by Posen and Ross, is neo-isolationism (Posen 1997, 7). Neo-isolationism would withdraw American forces from all parts of the world as presently situated, and deploy American forces only to those areas where problems directly influence American national security. It’s basic premise is that America is “strategically immune” (Posen 1997, 10), that is, as a result of America’s geography, America is all but completely impervious to foreign aggression. The only potential aggressors would have to either cross an ocean to launch a campaign, or enter the U.S. by way of Canada, or Mexico. In the unlikely event that Canada or Mexico was of the mind to launch an assault on the U.S., first, the aggressor would have to substantially, even exponentially increase the size and strength of its present military, and if that, then American defenses would likely dismantle an invasion without skipping even a beat. Neo-nationalism utilizes five key elements to insure American national security. A nuclear deterrent capability would be required to prevent a first strike from an aggressor state. Second, air and missile defenses would be maintained to insure air superiority within American airspace. Third, U.S. intelligence capability would be critical to alerting American authorities of any potential threat to U.S. assets and interests. Forth, a strong navy would be necessary to insure against the unlikely probability of an amphibious invasion from abroad. Finally, special operations forces would be necessary to deal directly with threats against U.S. assets abroad (Posen 1997, 7-14).
The second candidate for U.S. grand strategy is selective engagement (Posen 1997, 15). The selective engagement strategy proposes to maintain international security by preventing great power war. The basic premise is that great power wars cause the most destruction, and since America has limited resources and isn’t that interested in policing the world, the prevention of great power war is a great boundary to U.S. involvement. This boundary may be breached however under circumstances deemed sufficient by American policy makers and politicians. Selective engagement follows generally the instrumentality of neo-isolationism. Nuclear deterrent and homeland defense of a certainty necessary, but beyond that, selective engagement requires the conventional forces necessary to dissuade aggression by great powers, and ideally, to carry on military engagement and achieve victory in at least one foreign theater (Posen 1997, 15-21).
The third candidate for U.S. grand strategy is cooperative security (Posen 1997, 21). Cooperative security assumes democratic altruism on the part of the great powers. Its objective, although its adherents admit cooperative security is a “work in progress” (Posen 1997, 25), is an international framework of security treaties which demands international cooperation and assistance in any and all international security dilemmas. The primary responsibility for enforcement of international security falls upon the great powers, with minor support from the multitude of lesser powers. Competition among great powers is assumed minimal. The media, at least according to Posen and Ross, seems to be a key component of cooperative security. The media’s role is to enlighten the otherwise apathetic public regarding the horrifying realities of the world and stimulate it into action. Without the support of the public, cooperative security would be impotent. Other key components cooperative security implementation are a strong homeland defense but also a very capable power of deployment and force projection so as to enable great power military intervention whenever and wherever necessary to successfully police the globe (Posen 1997, 21-30).
The fourth and final candidate for U.S. grand strategy is primacy. Primacy is based on the premise that U.S. supremacy in each aspect of international relations is the best means of insuring peace and security in the world. America’s potential challengers will have neither the means nor the will to make a legitimate contest for power both because America’s might is so vastly superior to everyone else’s and because America is content to provide sufficiently for its allies’ interests that they really have no need to vie for power. Military power is a critical instrument of primacy success. Primacy recommends a modernized military which is equal to or larger than its next (at least) two competitors combined, and the more the better.
Posen, Barry R. and Andrew L. Ross. “Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy.” In America’s Strategic Choices: Revised Edition, edited by Michael E. Brown, Owen R. Cote, Jr., Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, 3-51. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2000.
Choosing America's Grand Strategy
When considering the priority of national security decisions through the scope of various national security strategies, the U.S. considers four basic elements. Those elements in order of importance seem to be; first, feasibility; second, need; third, cost; forth, value. A final element, which seems to be overarching of all these elements, and yet, not particularly belonging to the group is that of sovereignty. These elements don’t necessarily pertain to the level of threat under consideration as much as they pertain to selection of strategy, and in turn, implementation of policy. Each element plays its own critical role in how American national security strategy is identified.
Of the several national security strategies discussed by U.S. policy makers, no single policy tends to have a certain probability of success in all policy dilemmas. Determining the feasibility of each strategy is critical when debating and shaping U.S. national security grand strategy. As stated by Robert J. Art, some strategies are simply not feasible, while others tend to be feasible only under certain circumstances, still others tend to make sense under a great many circumstances (Art 2003, 84). The strategy of dominion for example is prohibitive in many ways. Dominion is extremely costly in monetary terms as well as in resources, too costly to be rational; it is extremely provocative to allies, enemies, and neutral states alike; and it is extremely irrational in a modern world where nuclear weapons are such a major consideration in international politics (states with nuclear weapons are not easily manipulated) (Art 2003, 89). Selective engagement, on the other hand, is extremely feasible in many instances because it encourages multilateralism which dissipates the costs and international consequences of action. Determining feasibility is important in determining which strategies will work with which potential set of circumstance.
Policy makers must consider needs in American national security strategy in terms of specific problems with which the nation is faced, as well as the general objectives and interests of those policy makers. Some strategies, when localized, can have a better effect on specific problems than other strategies. In the early 1990s, Saddam Hussein posed a specific problem for the United States. A viable and feasible strategy in this circumstance was to implement a containment strategy to prevent Hussein from further threatening his neighbors and undermining regional stability. In this case, the need was specifically addressed by a strategy not particularly suited to other areas of international conflict such as regional confrontation or inner-state humanitarian scenarios. Another clear example is the containment of the Soviet Union in the cold war when the U.S. government opted to establish road blocks to Soviet domination and communist expansion. I each case a need was identified and an adequate strategy matched to that need.
Of course no assessment of national security strategy can be made without a thorough analysis of the costs. As mentioned, the strategy of dominion is very costly, while the strategy of isolationism is relatively inexpensive. This aspect must be considered on the basis of cost/benefit analysis. Isolationism could prove more costly over the long term than other strategies but clearly has a cost advantage in the short term, as inaction is usually less costly than containment or engagement of any kind. Long term however, it may be more cost effective to engage rather than to sit out. In the case of Afghanistan in 2001/2002, a clear threat existed which may have been more costly to ignore than to engage. Although the costs have been extensive, over the long term it is likely to be more cost effective to confront the threat in Afghanistan now than to remain isolated. However, to engage in the present conflict between Congo and Rwanda and the multiple facets of insurgency, ethnic strife, and interstate confrontation going on in that region would likely be much more costly for America in both short and long term than just remaining aloof and letting the thing run its course.
Value works in conjunction with cost. If an engagement has limited value but tremendous cost, such as the conflict in Congo/Rwanda, engagement by America would be irrational. However, engagement in Afghanistan to prevent the proliferation of Islamic extremism may be quite costly but have tremendous value to American national security, the American people, and America's allies. The value of a strategy is of great importance to policy makers when considering potential strategy options.
Although it doesn't pertain directly to strategies such as dominion and isolationism, primarily because those are unilateral in nature, the issue of sovereignty is quite important when considering plausible strategy options. Especially in the cases of collective and cooperative security, a nation's sovereignty may be at stake if it is limited in either its self defense options or its ability to act in its own best interests as the result of its incorporation into an international security agreement. In the case of great powers more specifically, such involvement would be detrimental to a state's own self preservation.
Art, Robert J. A Grand Strategy for America. Ithica, New York: Cornell University Press. 2003.
Of the several national security strategies discussed by U.S. policy makers, no single policy tends to have a certain probability of success in all policy dilemmas. Determining the feasibility of each strategy is critical when debating and shaping U.S. national security grand strategy. As stated by Robert J. Art, some strategies are simply not feasible, while others tend to be feasible only under certain circumstances, still others tend to make sense under a great many circumstances (Art 2003, 84). The strategy of dominion for example is prohibitive in many ways. Dominion is extremely costly in monetary terms as well as in resources, too costly to be rational; it is extremely provocative to allies, enemies, and neutral states alike; and it is extremely irrational in a modern world where nuclear weapons are such a major consideration in international politics (states with nuclear weapons are not easily manipulated) (Art 2003, 89). Selective engagement, on the other hand, is extremely feasible in many instances because it encourages multilateralism which dissipates the costs and international consequences of action. Determining feasibility is important in determining which strategies will work with which potential set of circumstance.
Policy makers must consider needs in American national security strategy in terms of specific problems with which the nation is faced, as well as the general objectives and interests of those policy makers. Some strategies, when localized, can have a better effect on specific problems than other strategies. In the early 1990s, Saddam Hussein posed a specific problem for the United States. A viable and feasible strategy in this circumstance was to implement a containment strategy to prevent Hussein from further threatening his neighbors and undermining regional stability. In this case, the need was specifically addressed by a strategy not particularly suited to other areas of international conflict such as regional confrontation or inner-state humanitarian scenarios. Another clear example is the containment of the Soviet Union in the cold war when the U.S. government opted to establish road blocks to Soviet domination and communist expansion. I each case a need was identified and an adequate strategy matched to that need.
Of course no assessment of national security strategy can be made without a thorough analysis of the costs. As mentioned, the strategy of dominion is very costly, while the strategy of isolationism is relatively inexpensive. This aspect must be considered on the basis of cost/benefit analysis. Isolationism could prove more costly over the long term than other strategies but clearly has a cost advantage in the short term, as inaction is usually less costly than containment or engagement of any kind. Long term however, it may be more cost effective to engage rather than to sit out. In the case of Afghanistan in 2001/2002, a clear threat existed which may have been more costly to ignore than to engage. Although the costs have been extensive, over the long term it is likely to be more cost effective to confront the threat in Afghanistan now than to remain isolated. However, to engage in the present conflict between Congo and Rwanda and the multiple facets of insurgency, ethnic strife, and interstate confrontation going on in that region would likely be much more costly for America in both short and long term than just remaining aloof and letting the thing run its course.
Value works in conjunction with cost. If an engagement has limited value but tremendous cost, such as the conflict in Congo/Rwanda, engagement by America would be irrational. However, engagement in Afghanistan to prevent the proliferation of Islamic extremism may be quite costly but have tremendous value to American national security, the American people, and America's allies. The value of a strategy is of great importance to policy makers when considering potential strategy options.
Although it doesn't pertain directly to strategies such as dominion and isolationism, primarily because those are unilateral in nature, the issue of sovereignty is quite important when considering plausible strategy options. Especially in the cases of collective and cooperative security, a nation's sovereignty may be at stake if it is limited in either its self defense options or its ability to act in its own best interests as the result of its incorporation into an international security agreement. In the case of great powers more specifically, such involvement would be detrimental to a state's own self preservation.
Art, Robert J. A Grand Strategy for America. Ithica, New York: Cornell University Press. 2003.
Saturday, February 6, 2010
Longevity of Power
History suggests that no matter the scenario, every nation will fall eventually. Who knows the reasons but nothing lasts forever. I believe the best scenario is to establish a grand strategy which leads us into the future with the assumption that eventually the United States will no longer be the powerhouse it is now. The best thing would be to establish lasting relationships with other great powers, starting with the EU, to insure just causes prevail long after America’s power begins to decline.
The EU is already rising. The economic power of the EU is impressive, and its political clout is quickly developing. Although the EU isn’t quite there yet militarily and the organization is relatively youthful, the EU is in a good position to “challenge” American primacy in the not-too-distant future. The EU and the US have a great deal of common ground between them and the EU shouldn’t be perceived as a threat, but more as a strong and healthy partner in accomplishing the future stability and security of the international community.
With an American/European partnership, the power to do good would expand exponentially. The EU must get on its feet before anything impressive can happen and the two entities must get on the same page in short order. It will help things along if America would begin a draw-down of US forces in Europe so the Europeans can begin to stand up in that regard. As they do so, the combined might of the two would be insurmountable, even by the rising China.
The EU is already rising. The economic power of the EU is impressive, and its political clout is quickly developing. Although the EU isn’t quite there yet militarily and the organization is relatively youthful, the EU is in a good position to “challenge” American primacy in the not-too-distant future. The EU and the US have a great deal of common ground between them and the EU shouldn’t be perceived as a threat, but more as a strong and healthy partner in accomplishing the future stability and security of the international community.
With an American/European partnership, the power to do good would expand exponentially. The EU must get on its feet before anything impressive can happen and the two entities must get on the same page in short order. It will help things along if America would begin a draw-down of US forces in Europe so the Europeans can begin to stand up in that regard. As they do so, the combined might of the two would be insurmountable, even by the rising China.
Stability in a Unipolar World
Arguably the most important national security interest of the United States is to preserve the continuity of the homeland. Preservation of this element alone is probably sufficient to sustain the existence of the United States as an entity indefinitely. The importance of a unipolar American influence on this aspect of U.S. national security is minimal. Assuming the United States doesn't lose so much of its political, military, and economic might that it overnight disintegrates into oblivion, this element alone will likely be sufficient to preserve the United States as a nation for decades to come. The greatest threat to this aspect of its national security would come from within before any outside overt threats were able to materialize against it enough to rock it from its foundation. The polarity of the world will likely have little effect on America's perseverance as a nation.
Other various interests of American national security are not as clear-cut but a few aspects of American power and the polarity of the world will relate directly to them. The first is America's ability to prosper economically. As the world currently exists, America is prosperous in some part because it has been able to access foreign markets for its goods and services. The unipolarity of the world has a direct impact on how readily American goods and services transit across international borders. It is clearly in America's business interests to enable the exportation of its goods and services. As a monolith in the world, American influence can be used to expand present markets and to introduce American goods to new markets. NAFTA is a good example of the result of this influence. Other states typically desire access to American markets as much as American businesses desire access to foreign markets. This interconnectivity is tied to American unipolar influence.
A second aspect of American national security which may be directly affected by America’s unipolar stature is access to energy. America's economy is highly energy dependent. Without cheap and accessible energy supplies, America's economy would at best slow dramatically. Interruption of just a small percentage of America's foreign energy supply could have a terrible impact on America's quality of life and the functionality as a whole of the entire economy. In one popular present day scenario, if Iran was to impede shipping by laying maritime mines across the strait of Hormuz, a detrimental shift in the cost of living could occur which could potentially cripple the American economy. America's unparalleled military might could have an impact on the prevention or mitigation of such a scenario.
On the other hand, as the world's largest economy, the world's most powerful military, the world's most influential single state actor, enmity and animosity could easily be drawn simply as a cost of doing business. America is the most visible global influence and is easily targeted as the culprit and scapegoat of many problems in the world, even though it may not have anything to do with those problems. It is often easier to cast blame on someone else than to accept blame one's self and America is a very large target in this regard. America will also draw animosity just as a result of being big. The grandiosity of America's place in the world, simply as a consequence of its stature, will draw animosity where there might otherwise have been none.
The stability of the unipolar world will have an impact on all those aspects of national security mentioned above, but certainly isn’t limited to those. The stature of America in the world will ultimately have an impact on every aspect of American national security, no matter its significance. The only possible way to avert the impact, whether positive or negative, of America’s unipolar stature, would be to cease from being what it is. This clearly is not in the interests of America nor its people.
Wohlforth, William C. “The Stability of a Unipolar World.” In America’s Strategic Choices: Revised Edition, edited by Michael E. Brown, Owen R. Cote, Jr., Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, 273-309. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2000.
Mastanduno, Michael. “Preserving the Unipolar Moment: Realist Theories and U.S. Grand Strategy after the Cold War.” In America’s Strategic Choices: Revised Edition, edited by Michael E. Brown, Owen R. Cote, Jr., Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, 310-350. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2000.
Other various interests of American national security are not as clear-cut but a few aspects of American power and the polarity of the world will relate directly to them. The first is America's ability to prosper economically. As the world currently exists, America is prosperous in some part because it has been able to access foreign markets for its goods and services. The unipolarity of the world has a direct impact on how readily American goods and services transit across international borders. It is clearly in America's business interests to enable the exportation of its goods and services. As a monolith in the world, American influence can be used to expand present markets and to introduce American goods to new markets. NAFTA is a good example of the result of this influence. Other states typically desire access to American markets as much as American businesses desire access to foreign markets. This interconnectivity is tied to American unipolar influence.
A second aspect of American national security which may be directly affected by America’s unipolar stature is access to energy. America's economy is highly energy dependent. Without cheap and accessible energy supplies, America's economy would at best slow dramatically. Interruption of just a small percentage of America's foreign energy supply could have a terrible impact on America's quality of life and the functionality as a whole of the entire economy. In one popular present day scenario, if Iran was to impede shipping by laying maritime mines across the strait of Hormuz, a detrimental shift in the cost of living could occur which could potentially cripple the American economy. America's unparalleled military might could have an impact on the prevention or mitigation of such a scenario.
On the other hand, as the world's largest economy, the world's most powerful military, the world's most influential single state actor, enmity and animosity could easily be drawn simply as a cost of doing business. America is the most visible global influence and is easily targeted as the culprit and scapegoat of many problems in the world, even though it may not have anything to do with those problems. It is often easier to cast blame on someone else than to accept blame one's self and America is a very large target in this regard. America will also draw animosity just as a result of being big. The grandiosity of America's place in the world, simply as a consequence of its stature, will draw animosity where there might otherwise have been none.
The stability of the unipolar world will have an impact on all those aspects of national security mentioned above, but certainly isn’t limited to those. The stature of America in the world will ultimately have an impact on every aspect of American national security, no matter its significance. The only possible way to avert the impact, whether positive or negative, of America’s unipolar stature, would be to cease from being what it is. This clearly is not in the interests of America nor its people.
Wohlforth, William C. “The Stability of a Unipolar World.” In America’s Strategic Choices: Revised Edition, edited by Michael E. Brown, Owen R. Cote, Jr., Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, 273-309. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2000.
Mastanduno, Michael. “Preserving the Unipolar Moment: Realist Theories and U.S. Grand Strategy after the Cold War.” In America’s Strategic Choices: Revised Edition, edited by Michael E. Brown, Owen R. Cote, Jr., Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, 310-350. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2000.
Cooperative, Collective, and Concert Security
Collective security entails a theory of everyone against the aggressor. It comes into play when there is an aggressive action on the part of a state against another state and includes action by all other states to mitigate the aggression of the aggressor. The theory of collective security covers a range of potential options along the continuum ranging from a true collective security arrangement to a concert of collectivity. It is founded on the principle of preponderance of force which suggests that no state would act aggressively if the certain result would be its own demise. The preponderance of force promises ultimate superiority of the force responding to the aggressor. Only in the case of a suicidal state would the preponderance of force be insufficient to dissuade an aggressor state from acting malevolently.
A true collective security arrangement is the true “everyone against the aggressor” philosophy and includes an official agreement on the part of “all” the states. The agreement includes language which would legally bind all the states to react decisively to a show of aggression by any other state. This philosophy runs counter to the balance of power philosophy which is founded on state to state defense competition to dissuade aggression. Each state is responsible to produce sufficient defense deterrent to convince its neighbors that aggression would be self-destructive. A collective security arrangement insures that the aggressor will fail in his aggression, assuming that the collective in total is stronger than the aggressor.
A concert is a case in which a league of great power states contrive a treaty (not necessarily a legally binding one) to insure the stability and security of the whole. The great power states agree amongst themselves to come to the aid of a victimized state, but only after deliberation, or as the result of some predetermined arrangement. A concert is not necessarily binding on the great power states and each stated could choose to act or remain neutral. The combined power of the great power states would ideally be sufficient to counter the potential for an aggressor state to act aggressively. If the great power states, however, had insufficient grounds to react to aggression, said aggression would likely not be deterred. Therefore, only in cases in which the great power states had skin in the game would they be inclined to act on behalf of a weaker state.
Cooperation, in contrast to collective security, chooses a less formal means of reacting to aggressive states. It opts for a process of selectively engaging rogue states based on broad multilateral, recognition of the threat, multilateral planning, and multilateral execution. Each case is individually considered based on cost-benefit analysis. This is the process used in engaging Saddam Hussein following his 1990 invasion of Kuwait. The international community came together, considered the costs and benefits, and chose to act decisively to expel Saddam Hussein’s minions from the weaker state. As with collective security, reaction ideally includes a preponderance of force which enables a quick and decisive victory. Cooperation seeks the legitimacy of a broad coalition of international approval but is not based necessarily on a preconceived written agreement. It relies essentially on the cooperation of states to achieve universally beneficial results. Universality is the key in this sense. If universal benefit is not readily perceived, cooperation among nations is difficult. Cooperation assumes the willing participation of numerous states, without which, the proposed endeavor is likely to lose its credibility.
The aforementioned theories of national and international security fall into the realm of multilateralism. Each implies the necessity of states to seek international backing to one degree or another. Each recognizes the importance and strength of a coalition by which to accomplish stability and strength in the international community, and each seems to recognize the potential danger in unilateralism.
Nolan, Janne E. “Cooperative Security in the United States.” In America’s Strategic Choices: Revised Edition, edited by Michael E. Brown, Owen R. Cote, Jr., Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, 179-217. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2000.
Kupchan, Charles A., and Clifford A. Kupchan. “Concerts, Collective Security, and the Future of Europe.” In America’s Strategic Choices: Revised Edition, edited by Michael E. Brown, Owen R. Cote, Jr., Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, 218-265. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2000.
Kupchan, Charles A., and Clifford A. Kupchan. “Concerts, Collective Security, and the Future of Europe: A Retrospective.” In America’s Strategic Choices: Revised Edition, edited by Michael E. Brown, Owen R. Cote, Jr., Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, 266-272. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2000.
A true collective security arrangement is the true “everyone against the aggressor” philosophy and includes an official agreement on the part of “all” the states. The agreement includes language which would legally bind all the states to react decisively to a show of aggression by any other state. This philosophy runs counter to the balance of power philosophy which is founded on state to state defense competition to dissuade aggression. Each state is responsible to produce sufficient defense deterrent to convince its neighbors that aggression would be self-destructive. A collective security arrangement insures that the aggressor will fail in his aggression, assuming that the collective in total is stronger than the aggressor.
A concert is a case in which a league of great power states contrive a treaty (not necessarily a legally binding one) to insure the stability and security of the whole. The great power states agree amongst themselves to come to the aid of a victimized state, but only after deliberation, or as the result of some predetermined arrangement. A concert is not necessarily binding on the great power states and each stated could choose to act or remain neutral. The combined power of the great power states would ideally be sufficient to counter the potential for an aggressor state to act aggressively. If the great power states, however, had insufficient grounds to react to aggression, said aggression would likely not be deterred. Therefore, only in cases in which the great power states had skin in the game would they be inclined to act on behalf of a weaker state.
Cooperation, in contrast to collective security, chooses a less formal means of reacting to aggressive states. It opts for a process of selectively engaging rogue states based on broad multilateral, recognition of the threat, multilateral planning, and multilateral execution. Each case is individually considered based on cost-benefit analysis. This is the process used in engaging Saddam Hussein following his 1990 invasion of Kuwait. The international community came together, considered the costs and benefits, and chose to act decisively to expel Saddam Hussein’s minions from the weaker state. As with collective security, reaction ideally includes a preponderance of force which enables a quick and decisive victory. Cooperation seeks the legitimacy of a broad coalition of international approval but is not based necessarily on a preconceived written agreement. It relies essentially on the cooperation of states to achieve universally beneficial results. Universality is the key in this sense. If universal benefit is not readily perceived, cooperation among nations is difficult. Cooperation assumes the willing participation of numerous states, without which, the proposed endeavor is likely to lose its credibility.
The aforementioned theories of national and international security fall into the realm of multilateralism. Each implies the necessity of states to seek international backing to one degree or another. Each recognizes the importance and strength of a coalition by which to accomplish stability and strength in the international community, and each seems to recognize the potential danger in unilateralism.
Nolan, Janne E. “Cooperative Security in the United States.” In America’s Strategic Choices: Revised Edition, edited by Michael E. Brown, Owen R. Cote, Jr., Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, 179-217. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2000.
Kupchan, Charles A., and Clifford A. Kupchan. “Concerts, Collective Security, and the Future of Europe.” In America’s Strategic Choices: Revised Edition, edited by Michael E. Brown, Owen R. Cote, Jr., Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, 218-265. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2000.
Kupchan, Charles A., and Clifford A. Kupchan. “Concerts, Collective Security, and the Future of Europe: A Retrospective.” In America’s Strategic Choices: Revised Edition, edited by Michael E. Brown, Owen R. Cote, Jr., Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, 266-272. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2000.
Preponderance vs. [Offshore] Balancing
The national security strategy of Preponderance has been at play for the duration of the Cold War and has carried over as a remnant of the containment doctrine since the conclusion of the Cold War. Preponderance is the belief that American interests are best served by a unipolar world. Components of Preponderance include three major elements; first, American preeminence must be maintained; second, challenges to American preeminence must be prevented; third, international interdependence must be encouraged.
The strategy of offshore balancing is quite the opposite of preponderance. Offshore balancing accepts that rivals to American preeminence will arise and that those may eventually take the place of America as the world's hegemon. This is largely accepted and even to be anticipated. Interdependence in the Balancing sphere is not something to be sought after per se, but is more a byproduct of acceptable international exchange. Offshore balancing is a rather isolationist idea by which a large percentage of American overseas military assets would be redeployed to the continental United States.
The preponderance argument suggests that the world (America and her allies) has been made safe over the last six decades as a result of American preeminence. The argument points to Europe and states that numerous great power wars were waged prior to 1950, but once America was permanently engaged there, there has been relative peace on that continent. Therefore, a continued strategy which seeks American hegemony in the world would continue to assure peace in the world. The insistence is that the one is the result of the other. Offshore balancing states that there is nothing to prove this correlation, and that by America continuing to engage in Europe, East Asia, and the Middle East the same way it has for the last six decades, it perpetuates a national security doctrine which is outdated and in need of revision.
The balancing argument states that America wastes resources by continuing to assert its unipolar pipe-dream, and that ultimately it will have to face the fact that great powers come and go and its glory is fleeting. This argument insists that although America won't always be the one great power in the world, it will be a great power in the world for a long time to come, and this is where the balancing aspect comes into play. Balancing reasonably asserts that although the world will not always be unipolar, and that other powers will eventually have great sway in world politics, America will always be a power of great authority, and will always be able to influence world politics in a direction which will be beneficial for American national security.
Preponderance insists that the most effective way to insure continued peace and stability, and the prosperity that results, is to insure economic and security interdependence among every possible nation. This notion is based on the belief that nations will not go to war against other nations with which they have heavy economic ties. There is also an element of interdependence based on America's overarching strategy of defending its close allies. Those allies are dependent on America for defense and, in most cases, are perfectly willing to continue to allow America to shoulder that burden. As long as nations are interdependent, they will be much less likely to go to war with each other. The argument also suggests that as long as America stays engaged in this passive role, though quite costly, it will prevent the much more costly result of having to intervene from the outside in the event of a great power war.
The cost of this strategy is the greatest element of contention to offshore balancing. The costs of insuring good behavior amongst America's allies overseas could be better spend domestically. The balancing argument insists that those nations should be able to get along without the American monolith standing between them. If they are still unable, as they always had been until 1950, the balancing strategy would allow them to fight their wars at their own expense with the ever present condition that when those wars become detrimental to American national security, America will intervene to tip the balance in its own favor.
Layne, Christopher. “From Preponderance to Offshore Balancing: America’s Future Grand Strategy.” In America’s Strategic Choices: Revised Edition, edited by Michael E. Brown, Owen R. Cote, Jr., Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, 99-140. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2000.
The strategy of offshore balancing is quite the opposite of preponderance. Offshore balancing accepts that rivals to American preeminence will arise and that those may eventually take the place of America as the world's hegemon. This is largely accepted and even to be anticipated. Interdependence in the Balancing sphere is not something to be sought after per se, but is more a byproduct of acceptable international exchange. Offshore balancing is a rather isolationist idea by which a large percentage of American overseas military assets would be redeployed to the continental United States.
The preponderance argument suggests that the world (America and her allies) has been made safe over the last six decades as a result of American preeminence. The argument points to Europe and states that numerous great power wars were waged prior to 1950, but once America was permanently engaged there, there has been relative peace on that continent. Therefore, a continued strategy which seeks American hegemony in the world would continue to assure peace in the world. The insistence is that the one is the result of the other. Offshore balancing states that there is nothing to prove this correlation, and that by America continuing to engage in Europe, East Asia, and the Middle East the same way it has for the last six decades, it perpetuates a national security doctrine which is outdated and in need of revision.
The balancing argument states that America wastes resources by continuing to assert its unipolar pipe-dream, and that ultimately it will have to face the fact that great powers come and go and its glory is fleeting. This argument insists that although America won't always be the one great power in the world, it will be a great power in the world for a long time to come, and this is where the balancing aspect comes into play. Balancing reasonably asserts that although the world will not always be unipolar, and that other powers will eventually have great sway in world politics, America will always be a power of great authority, and will always be able to influence world politics in a direction which will be beneficial for American national security.
Preponderance insists that the most effective way to insure continued peace and stability, and the prosperity that results, is to insure economic and security interdependence among every possible nation. This notion is based on the belief that nations will not go to war against other nations with which they have heavy economic ties. There is also an element of interdependence based on America's overarching strategy of defending its close allies. Those allies are dependent on America for defense and, in most cases, are perfectly willing to continue to allow America to shoulder that burden. As long as nations are interdependent, they will be much less likely to go to war with each other. The argument also suggests that as long as America stays engaged in this passive role, though quite costly, it will prevent the much more costly result of having to intervene from the outside in the event of a great power war.
The cost of this strategy is the greatest element of contention to offshore balancing. The costs of insuring good behavior amongst America's allies overseas could be better spend domestically. The balancing argument insists that those nations should be able to get along without the American monolith standing between them. If they are still unable, as they always had been until 1950, the balancing strategy would allow them to fight their wars at their own expense with the ever present condition that when those wars become detrimental to American national security, America will intervene to tip the balance in its own favor.
Layne, Christopher. “From Preponderance to Offshore Balancing: America’s Future Grand Strategy.” In America’s Strategic Choices: Revised Edition, edited by Michael E. Brown, Owen R. Cote, Jr., Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, 99-140. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2000.
Restraint & Selective Engagement
In terms of National Security Strategy, restraint and selective engagement are by no means polar opposites. On a scale between total isolationism and total engagement, each has found a means of moderation. On the one hand, restraint considers itself a rational means of taking advantage of the benefits of isolationism, yet without the irrationality of it. On the other hand, engagement is just that, selective. It suggests the educated selection of the battles to be fought, rather than fighting them all.
Each strategy has basic glaring similarities; they both consider the foremost objective of American national security to be protection of the American homeland and general protection of American constitutional democracy, freedoms, assets, economy, and so forth. They diverge, however, in terms of how best to accomplish that objective.
The restraint argument focuses largely on the allocation of finite resources. There is a certain end to American resources and those resources are better spent at home than abroad. The argument suggests that American resources sent abroad are resources which, first, are being used to subsidize the defense of America's allies, allies which in most instances can afford to subsidize their own defense; second are enabling America's allies to divert their own defense spending to other avenues; and third, are causing an unfair competition scenario for American companies overseas. Every dollar America spends to protect Europe or East Asia, is a dollar those places don't have to spend to protect themselves, enabling them to allocate their own resources to other endeavors, such as subsidizing automobile and electronics manufacturers which directly compete with American firms for the same consumer spending.
The selective engagement strategy seems to circumvent this argument by countering that if Europe and East Asia were left to vie for their own defense, regional arms races may ensue. Perhaps Germany would compete with France for regional military dominance, the UK with Germany, etc. If left to their own devices, those areas could digress into their old habits of old world politicking, jostling for power, dirty dealing, war making etc. With the United States playing the major power broker in these regions, the lesser powers are left to focus their energies, and their resources, on other, less lethal endeavors.
The restraint strategy asserts that the U.S. spends many times what its nearest competitor does on defense expenditures and that a good share of those dollars would be better spent on domestic issues such as infrastructure, education, and social programs (America's nearest competitor in terms of gross defense spending is China. In 2008 the U.S. spent $607 Billion while China spent $84.9 Billion (CIA World Factbook)). The assertion is that America's defense edge is significant and that once a certain threshold is reached, America's return on its defense investment is minimal. After all, for what purpose should a superpower have need to spend seven times what its nearest competitor spends to insure its security? Especially when that competitor can't even dream of matching the technological edge of the American defense apparatus, and America has a unique and distinct advantage in terms of its geography, being surrounded on two sides by water and the other two by relatively benign, yet friendly neighbors.
Selective engagement counters this argument by stating that security comes at a cost, and economic productivity, both American and otherwise, requires security. The maintenance of U.S. military presence overseas insures the status quo. Peace prevails because everyone is happy to let the Americans maintain the defenses. If America withdraws, a power vacuum follows and arms races and power struggles ensue.
The national security strategies of restraint and selective engagement are moderate forms of their extreme selves; total isolationism and total engagement. Each has rational arguments in its favor, and each has flaws.
Gholz, Eugene, Daryl G. Press, and Harvey M. Sapolsky. “Come Home, America: The Strategy of Restraint in the Face of Temptation.” In America’s Strategic Choices: Revised Edition, edited by Michael E. Brown, Owen R. Cote, Jr., Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, 55-98. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2000.
Art, Robert J. “Geopolitics Updated: The Strategy of Selective Engagement.” In America’s Strategic Choices: Revised Edition, edited by Michael E. Brown, Owen R. Cote, Jr., Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, 141-178. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2000.
U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. CIA World Factbook. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/ (accessed December 18, 2009).
Each strategy has basic glaring similarities; they both consider the foremost objective of American national security to be protection of the American homeland and general protection of American constitutional democracy, freedoms, assets, economy, and so forth. They diverge, however, in terms of how best to accomplish that objective.
The restraint argument focuses largely on the allocation of finite resources. There is a certain end to American resources and those resources are better spent at home than abroad. The argument suggests that American resources sent abroad are resources which, first, are being used to subsidize the defense of America's allies, allies which in most instances can afford to subsidize their own defense; second are enabling America's allies to divert their own defense spending to other avenues; and third, are causing an unfair competition scenario for American companies overseas. Every dollar America spends to protect Europe or East Asia, is a dollar those places don't have to spend to protect themselves, enabling them to allocate their own resources to other endeavors, such as subsidizing automobile and electronics manufacturers which directly compete with American firms for the same consumer spending.
The selective engagement strategy seems to circumvent this argument by countering that if Europe and East Asia were left to vie for their own defense, regional arms races may ensue. Perhaps Germany would compete with France for regional military dominance, the UK with Germany, etc. If left to their own devices, those areas could digress into their old habits of old world politicking, jostling for power, dirty dealing, war making etc. With the United States playing the major power broker in these regions, the lesser powers are left to focus their energies, and their resources, on other, less lethal endeavors.
The restraint strategy asserts that the U.S. spends many times what its nearest competitor does on defense expenditures and that a good share of those dollars would be better spent on domestic issues such as infrastructure, education, and social programs (America's nearest competitor in terms of gross defense spending is China. In 2008 the U.S. spent $607 Billion while China spent $84.9 Billion (CIA World Factbook)). The assertion is that America's defense edge is significant and that once a certain threshold is reached, America's return on its defense investment is minimal. After all, for what purpose should a superpower have need to spend seven times what its nearest competitor spends to insure its security? Especially when that competitor can't even dream of matching the technological edge of the American defense apparatus, and America has a unique and distinct advantage in terms of its geography, being surrounded on two sides by water and the other two by relatively benign, yet friendly neighbors.
Selective engagement counters this argument by stating that security comes at a cost, and economic productivity, both American and otherwise, requires security. The maintenance of U.S. military presence overseas insures the status quo. Peace prevails because everyone is happy to let the Americans maintain the defenses. If America withdraws, a power vacuum follows and arms races and power struggles ensue.
The national security strategies of restraint and selective engagement are moderate forms of their extreme selves; total isolationism and total engagement. Each has rational arguments in its favor, and each has flaws.
Gholz, Eugene, Daryl G. Press, and Harvey M. Sapolsky. “Come Home, America: The Strategy of Restraint in the Face of Temptation.” In America’s Strategic Choices: Revised Edition, edited by Michael E. Brown, Owen R. Cote, Jr., Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, 55-98. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2000.
Art, Robert J. “Geopolitics Updated: The Strategy of Selective Engagement.” In America’s Strategic Choices: Revised Edition, edited by Michael E. Brown, Owen R. Cote, Jr., Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, 141-178. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2000.
U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. CIA World Factbook. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/ (accessed December 18, 2009).
Thursday, February 4, 2010
Comparing the Threat of Communism to that of Terrorism
The difference between the two threats of communism and terrorism is largely a matter of perception. Communism appeared to the untrained eye to be a monstrous, evil, tyrannical machine capable of annihilating its opposition. Terrorism on the other hand is to the objective viewer a mere anathema, as already noted, a nuisance.
While it is impossible to know exactly what outcomes other strategies might have produced against the Soviet Union, the elevation of the level of interest the communist threat posed to the United States to that of Survival seems to have been a perfectly reasonable counteraction. Communism has largely been relegated to the trash heap of history although Socialism has replaced it and seems to be proving even deadlier than communism ever was. The communist threat was an overt, outside, bellicose enemy which was in-your-face and easily identifiable, and nearly as easily contested. The socialist threat seems to be more an invisible parasite which undermines free states from the inside out with promises of utopia.
Terrorism, as merely a “nuisance”, has the power to operate within, even benefit from free societies. It is not an overt bellicose enemy which is easily identified. Terrorism lurks in the shadows and behind closed doors, protected by the very ideals it seeks to destroy. The threat is well known but vaporous, and easily forgotten after lengthy periods of inactivity. The terrorist would be pleased to utterly destroy the United States and subjugate everyone therein, as would the communist before him. The communist regime in the Soviet Union would debate, negotiate, communicate, and deal with the United States. The Soviet Union had form and function. Terrorism however is an indefinable, elusive enigma, with no form or coherent function. Every terrorist entity operates differently, with different command and control structures, different ideologies, and different means to the ultimate end. They are as varied as the people within them.
Depending on the person’s world view, each individual would answer this question differently. However, communism was never in open war against the United States, something the common terrorist boasts about. If not so, he could hardly be called a terrorist. Terrorism is in open war with free societies around the world. The threat posed by terrorism is a definite one. To the United States, terrorism may be merely a vital level interest, but to Pakistan or Indonesia, terrorism is clearly an interest of survival. The threat of terrorism is real and the war terrorists wage against the United States is undeniable. Eventually, if not effectively countered, terrorism will overrun and destroy the United States. The threat is indeed dynamic, for this reason it is imperative that the United States combat terrorism on every viable front, in order to prevent its progression from a vital interest to a survival interest.
While it is impossible to know exactly what outcomes other strategies might have produced against the Soviet Union, the elevation of the level of interest the communist threat posed to the United States to that of Survival seems to have been a perfectly reasonable counteraction. Communism has largely been relegated to the trash heap of history although Socialism has replaced it and seems to be proving even deadlier than communism ever was. The communist threat was an overt, outside, bellicose enemy which was in-your-face and easily identifiable, and nearly as easily contested. The socialist threat seems to be more an invisible parasite which undermines free states from the inside out with promises of utopia.
Terrorism, as merely a “nuisance”, has the power to operate within, even benefit from free societies. It is not an overt bellicose enemy which is easily identified. Terrorism lurks in the shadows and behind closed doors, protected by the very ideals it seeks to destroy. The threat is well known but vaporous, and easily forgotten after lengthy periods of inactivity. The terrorist would be pleased to utterly destroy the United States and subjugate everyone therein, as would the communist before him. The communist regime in the Soviet Union would debate, negotiate, communicate, and deal with the United States. The Soviet Union had form and function. Terrorism however is an indefinable, elusive enigma, with no form or coherent function. Every terrorist entity operates differently, with different command and control structures, different ideologies, and different means to the ultimate end. They are as varied as the people within them.
Depending on the person’s world view, each individual would answer this question differently. However, communism was never in open war against the United States, something the common terrorist boasts about. If not so, he could hardly be called a terrorist. Terrorism is in open war with free societies around the world. The threat posed by terrorism is a definite one. To the United States, terrorism may be merely a vital level interest, but to Pakistan or Indonesia, terrorism is clearly an interest of survival. The threat of terrorism is real and the war terrorists wage against the United States is undeniable. Eventually, if not effectively countered, terrorism will overrun and destroy the United States. The threat is indeed dynamic, for this reason it is imperative that the United States combat terrorism on every viable front, in order to prevent its progression from a vital interest to a survival interest.
American Interest in Combating Terrorism
Islamic extremism constitutes a real and persistent threat to the national security of the United States, both at home and abroad. The level of the threat is debatable, however, and its interpretation will vary from one entity to another. For example, a liberal activist in San Francisco probably interprets the threat of Islamic extremism differently than does a Marine stationed in Kandahar, Afghanistan. The general threat posed by Islamic extremism has certain indisputable factors, however, by which it is relatively simple to categorize. Islamic extremism is a threat of vital interest to the United States.
As explained by Nuechterlein, the threshold of vital interest is breached when there exists a credible threat to the security of the United States and “the leadership refuses to compromise” on negotiations to determine the outcome (Nuechterlein 2001. 18). It is clear, at least insofar as the George W. Bush administration was concerned, that the leadership refused to compromise on the outcome of the conflict between the competing ideologies of Islamic extremism and Democracy. The Bush administration determined that military force was a rational and necessary means of defeating the ideologies of Islamic extremism.
The specific threats posed by Islamic extremism are debatable as well. The objectives of modern Islamic extremism are as varied as the groups which espouse it. An indisputable thread which weaves throughout these entities is the use of violence against civilians to accomplish the group’s objectives. This factor of violence in conjunction with the secretive and pervasive nature of Islamic extremist groups, presents a threat which, if not countered, could infiltrate and undermine the foundation of the United States of America in a way which no threat has heretofore been able to accomplish.
Assuming the general objective of Islamic extremism is to eliminate the threat to Islamic culture in the Middle East and elsewhere posed by western ideologies, one might reasonably assume that the ultimate victory for this extremism would be a defeated and deflated United States, it being the banner-bearer of western ideologies. The greater the defeat, the better for Islamic extremism. A defeated and deflated United States would be one where its government and people are unwilling and unable to project its values, power, and influence throughout the rest of the world. This extremism has demonstrated a desire and an ability to inflict serious, even catastrophic loss on the homeland of the United States. For this reason, the leadership of the United States can reasonably assume that Islamic extremism, willing to use violence, even extreme violence, to accomplish its objectives, poses real and credible threat to the national security of the United States.
The four tiers of national interest, as defined by Nuechterlein, include survival, vital, major, and peripheral. A survival interest is one by which the survival of the state is immediately and clearly at stake, of which Islamic extremism is obviously not one. A vital interest is one by which the survival of the state may be at stake and it is determined by the powers that be, that immediate action is necessary to defend the state to insure its survival. A major interest is one by which the interests of the state are or may be threatened either at home or abroad but not to the extent that the survival of the state is in jeopardy. A peripheral interest is one by which assets of the state or private citizens of the state may be in jeopardy but which will not impact the general operation of the state (Nuechterlein 2001. 18-19). Islamic extremism is clearly less than a survival interest, but greater than a major interest. Islamic extremism is a vital interest to the United States because of the demonstrated will and ability it has to inflict damage on the United States’ homeland.
Nuechterlein, Donald E. AMERICA RECOMMITTED: A Superpower Assesses its Role in a Turbulent World. Lexington Kentucky: The University Press of Kentucky. 2001.
As explained by Nuechterlein, the threshold of vital interest is breached when there exists a credible threat to the security of the United States and “the leadership refuses to compromise” on negotiations to determine the outcome (Nuechterlein 2001. 18). It is clear, at least insofar as the George W. Bush administration was concerned, that the leadership refused to compromise on the outcome of the conflict between the competing ideologies of Islamic extremism and Democracy. The Bush administration determined that military force was a rational and necessary means of defeating the ideologies of Islamic extremism.
The specific threats posed by Islamic extremism are debatable as well. The objectives of modern Islamic extremism are as varied as the groups which espouse it. An indisputable thread which weaves throughout these entities is the use of violence against civilians to accomplish the group’s objectives. This factor of violence in conjunction with the secretive and pervasive nature of Islamic extremist groups, presents a threat which, if not countered, could infiltrate and undermine the foundation of the United States of America in a way which no threat has heretofore been able to accomplish.
Assuming the general objective of Islamic extremism is to eliminate the threat to Islamic culture in the Middle East and elsewhere posed by western ideologies, one might reasonably assume that the ultimate victory for this extremism would be a defeated and deflated United States, it being the banner-bearer of western ideologies. The greater the defeat, the better for Islamic extremism. A defeated and deflated United States would be one where its government and people are unwilling and unable to project its values, power, and influence throughout the rest of the world. This extremism has demonstrated a desire and an ability to inflict serious, even catastrophic loss on the homeland of the United States. For this reason, the leadership of the United States can reasonably assume that Islamic extremism, willing to use violence, even extreme violence, to accomplish its objectives, poses real and credible threat to the national security of the United States.
The four tiers of national interest, as defined by Nuechterlein, include survival, vital, major, and peripheral. A survival interest is one by which the survival of the state is immediately and clearly at stake, of which Islamic extremism is obviously not one. A vital interest is one by which the survival of the state may be at stake and it is determined by the powers that be, that immediate action is necessary to defend the state to insure its survival. A major interest is one by which the interests of the state are or may be threatened either at home or abroad but not to the extent that the survival of the state is in jeopardy. A peripheral interest is one by which assets of the state or private citizens of the state may be in jeopardy but which will not impact the general operation of the state (Nuechterlein 2001. 18-19). Islamic extremism is clearly less than a survival interest, but greater than a major interest. Islamic extremism is a vital interest to the United States because of the demonstrated will and ability it has to inflict damage on the United States’ homeland.
Nuechterlein, Donald E. AMERICA RECOMMITTED: A Superpower Assesses its Role in a Turbulent World. Lexington Kentucky: The University Press of Kentucky. 2001.
International Use of Military Force
In current international law, the basis for use of military force by one state against another is found in article two and article 51 of the United Nations Charter. Although these articles reference state to state use of force the ultimate authority when it comes to an assessment of whether a state's use of force against another is justified is the UN Security Council. The Security Council is also the enforcing authority of international law regarding use of force on the international stage.
Article two of the UN Charter is fairly explicit regarding use of force issues. Article two states, “All members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means...” and further states, “All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state...” (UN Charter, Article 2). The use of force seems well enough defined in article two and seems to permit little variance from the standard of peace. Article 51, however, permits some exceptions: “Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations” (UN Charter, Article 51). This title is problematic to some extent in that it permits self defense but does not define the extent to which force may be used as a means of self defense. Article 51 further explains that when a state engages in the use of force as a means of self defense, it is required by the UN Charter to immediately report the incident to the Security Council which will then determine whether or not the force was justified.
This lack of clarity poses problems for states such as Israel when responding to the repeated assault on its civilians by Hamas insurgents. Relatively few Israelis may be injured or killed as a result of the assault, but Israel, based on article 51, may use “force” to defend itself. The level of force Israel may use is not specified, so Israel is free to use its own judgment in determining the best response. Of course, following the incident, Israel is at the mercy of the Security Council to determine whether or not the use of force was justified.
The Security Council is inconsistent when interpreting use of force issues. A great deal of politicking is involved and inasmuch as the issue of interpretation is solely in the hands of the Security Council, offending or defending entity may be justly or unjustly treated based on the members of the council at that time. The Council's five permanent members also have universal veto power. Any one of the five may veto a resolution unilaterally, making that specific issue moot, with nothing further to do on it. The result is a UN Security Council which is very much a barking dog with no teeth. Every action the council takes must have total unanimity among the five permanent members or whatever the issue, someone is bound to veto. This of course was built in as a means of protecting the five great powers of the post World War II world. Any one of the five could not very well have the UN Security Council passing resolutions which would be harmful to that member's constituency.
The use of force in international scenarios is regulated by the articles two and 51 of the UN Charter and largely limited to matters of self defense. The Security Council may vote to use force to enforce international law as it deems necessary. The UN Security Council is the enforcement apparatus of the UN and is responsible for maintenance of peace and security in international matters.
United Nations. Charter of the United Nations: Chapter I, Article 2. June 26, 1945. http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter1.shtml. (accessed November 14, 2009).
United Nations. Charter of the United Nations: Chapter VII, Article 51. June 26, 1945. http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter7.shtml. (accessed November 14, 2009).
Article two of the UN Charter is fairly explicit regarding use of force issues. Article two states, “All members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means...” and further states, “All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state...” (UN Charter, Article 2). The use of force seems well enough defined in article two and seems to permit little variance from the standard of peace. Article 51, however, permits some exceptions: “Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations” (UN Charter, Article 51). This title is problematic to some extent in that it permits self defense but does not define the extent to which force may be used as a means of self defense. Article 51 further explains that when a state engages in the use of force as a means of self defense, it is required by the UN Charter to immediately report the incident to the Security Council which will then determine whether or not the force was justified.
This lack of clarity poses problems for states such as Israel when responding to the repeated assault on its civilians by Hamas insurgents. Relatively few Israelis may be injured or killed as a result of the assault, but Israel, based on article 51, may use “force” to defend itself. The level of force Israel may use is not specified, so Israel is free to use its own judgment in determining the best response. Of course, following the incident, Israel is at the mercy of the Security Council to determine whether or not the use of force was justified.
The Security Council is inconsistent when interpreting use of force issues. A great deal of politicking is involved and inasmuch as the issue of interpretation is solely in the hands of the Security Council, offending or defending entity may be justly or unjustly treated based on the members of the council at that time. The Council's five permanent members also have universal veto power. Any one of the five may veto a resolution unilaterally, making that specific issue moot, with nothing further to do on it. The result is a UN Security Council which is very much a barking dog with no teeth. Every action the council takes must have total unanimity among the five permanent members or whatever the issue, someone is bound to veto. This of course was built in as a means of protecting the five great powers of the post World War II world. Any one of the five could not very well have the UN Security Council passing resolutions which would be harmful to that member's constituency.
The use of force in international scenarios is regulated by the articles two and 51 of the UN Charter and largely limited to matters of self defense. The Security Council may vote to use force to enforce international law as it deems necessary. The UN Security Council is the enforcement apparatus of the UN and is responsible for maintenance of peace and security in international matters.
United Nations. Charter of the United Nations: Chapter I, Article 2. June 26, 1945. http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter1.shtml. (accessed November 14, 2009).
United Nations. Charter of the United Nations: Chapter VII, Article 51. June 26, 1945. http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter7.shtml. (accessed November 14, 2009).
American Sense of Divine Destiny
America's style of national security policy is founded in the long entrenched philosophy that America itself is morally superior to its compatriot states. The style of American national security policy is one of assumed moral clarity and justification. It is understood that America's national security is a matter vital importance to the whole of the human race, not only to Americans, because the fundamental principles upon which the democracy operates will ultimately benefit the whole of the human family. The national security interests of the United States are defined in terms of good and evil, right and wrong. The fundamental assumption underlying American national security policy is that America's interests are inherently good, and any who would oppose those interests are inherently evil.(Hook 2008, 9)
The style is not confined to national security interests alone, but permeates American society as a whole. Its very foundation, as explained by Hook and Spanier, is defined in terms of the good people of the new world in conflict with the evil nature of the political old world (Hook 2008, 9). In this supposition, the people are believed to be peaceful in nature and will naturally go about minding their own business, making a living, raising families, and enjoying life, if only left alone by the state to do as they deem appropriate. It is the people who are endowed by their creator with certain unalienable rights. It is the people with whom the ultimate authority resides to determine appropriate courses of action. It is the people who will select leaders, make laws, define justice, declare and wage war.
The power ultimately resides with the people because the belief is that the people are inherently good. The state on the other hand, is inherently in need of “checks and balances” in order to counter its inherent tendency toward abuse of power. In this supposition, the state is inherently evil, hungry for ever more power, lustful of control, inhuman, uncaring, unempathetic, immoral, and untrustworthy. Indeed, far from being trustworthy, it takes the people's constant and careful watchful eye to ensure that the state serves the people, rather than the opposite. Again, it is the people who must ensure the continued righteousness of the government and stewardship of power.
This being the case in the new world, the American style of approaching national security policy assumes the consumption of the old world by inherently evil state entities. As such, the conflicts of the old world presuppose inherently evil origins; evil leaders with evil designs and evil objectives. With this in mind, it is easy to assume that the American democracy governed by inherently good people of the new world would have only the best and most moral of intentions, the least of which would be beneficial for all the human race; and any who would oppose those universally beneficial intentions can only have universally harmful intentions themselves.
The American style of national security policy is a symptom of a deeply rooted American sense of divine destiny. This destiny is the result of 400 years of Judeo-Christian permeation through the fabric of American society. It is neither a good thing nor a bad thing, but just the way it is. It is what has made America America. Without it, America would likely have been much more like the world from whence it came.
Hook, Steven W. & John Spanier. American Foreign Policy Since World War II. Washington D.C.: CQ Press. 2008.
The style is not confined to national security interests alone, but permeates American society as a whole. Its very foundation, as explained by Hook and Spanier, is defined in terms of the good people of the new world in conflict with the evil nature of the political old world (Hook 2008, 9). In this supposition, the people are believed to be peaceful in nature and will naturally go about minding their own business, making a living, raising families, and enjoying life, if only left alone by the state to do as they deem appropriate. It is the people who are endowed by their creator with certain unalienable rights. It is the people with whom the ultimate authority resides to determine appropriate courses of action. It is the people who will select leaders, make laws, define justice, declare and wage war.
The power ultimately resides with the people because the belief is that the people are inherently good. The state on the other hand, is inherently in need of “checks and balances” in order to counter its inherent tendency toward abuse of power. In this supposition, the state is inherently evil, hungry for ever more power, lustful of control, inhuman, uncaring, unempathetic, immoral, and untrustworthy. Indeed, far from being trustworthy, it takes the people's constant and careful watchful eye to ensure that the state serves the people, rather than the opposite. Again, it is the people who must ensure the continued righteousness of the government and stewardship of power.
This being the case in the new world, the American style of approaching national security policy assumes the consumption of the old world by inherently evil state entities. As such, the conflicts of the old world presuppose inherently evil origins; evil leaders with evil designs and evil objectives. With this in mind, it is easy to assume that the American democracy governed by inherently good people of the new world would have only the best and most moral of intentions, the least of which would be beneficial for all the human race; and any who would oppose those universally beneficial intentions can only have universally harmful intentions themselves.
The American style of national security policy is a symptom of a deeply rooted American sense of divine destiny. This destiny is the result of 400 years of Judeo-Christian permeation through the fabric of American society. It is neither a good thing nor a bad thing, but just the way it is. It is what has made America America. Without it, America would likely have been much more like the world from whence it came.
Hook, Steven W. & John Spanier. American Foreign Policy Since World War II. Washington D.C.: CQ Press. 2008.
Potential Challengers to American Primacy
The most obvious competitor presently capable of challenging U.S. primacy is the European Union. The E.U., although not hostile toward the U.S. or its interests, is capable on multiple levels of challenging the strength of the American monolith. More so than all other potential competitors, and possibly those competitors combined, the E.U. has wealth. Wealth is a necessity if a state or group of states wants to be strong in any worthy endeavor. Without sufficient capital, no other aspect of interstate relations can flourish. Insufficient capital will undermine any state's cross border relations but in a competition for the title of global hegemon, a state must be capable of competing monetarily with the one which holds that position.
Monetarily, the E.U. is really the only potential competitor which can come close to challenging the U.S. (Art 2003, 242). Although the E.U. boasted the world's largest GDP in 2008 at $14.94 trillion U.S. dollars (PPP) (the U.S. 2008 GDP was slightly less at $14.44 trillion) (CIA World Factbook), it is far from certain that the entity as a whole is capable of harnessing that GDP in order to make a credible challenge to American global dominance. Inasmuch as the E.U. is a work in progress and seems to be in the process of working out innumerable kinks in its overall existence, there is a great deal of unknown in terms of E.U. capability across the board. Indeed it seems a little premature to even calculate an E.U. GDP since many of its member states’ citizens have yet to identify themselves first as E.U. members rather than their own nationalities.
With the potential to rival the U.S. monetarily, the E.U. is on fertile ground to challenge the U.S. for military supremacy. According to Art, military equality requires little more than a comparable military; comparable in size, ground, sea, and air assets, technological advancement, etc. By this standard, according to Art, no other state actor has the potential to rival American military supremacy over the next few decades but the E.U. Presently the E.U. has 27 member states with 3 negotiating entry (Europa), and a population of 491.5 million (CIA World Factbook). In conjunction with its monetary capacity, the E.U. could probably produce a military to rival that of the U.S. However, the advantage the U.S. has in this regard is that it has been producing superior military capability for two full generations, whereas, other than a piece-meal, patchwork military with units thrown in from various states within the E.U., the E.U. would need many years to produce a uniquely European Union military capable of rivaling that of the U.S. on the battlefield. It is problematic in many ways to believe that the piece-meal strategy of military building would be an efficient and effective answer to American military hegemony (Art 2003, 243).
The other potential rivals for American hegemony would be China and Russia, likely in that order. These two states have unique problems in such an ambition. China's military infrastructure and tradition is seriously lacking in comparison to that of the U.S. China would rely almost entirely on a consistently increasing GDP at a rate of 7 percent per annum to match American might within three decades. Without said increase, China may never obtain parity with the U.S. Russia, on the other hand, has the infrastructure and tradition in place to potentially rival the U.S. as a global power, but that infrastructure and tradition is badly deteriorated and out of date, and it would likely take a few decades to upgrade and retrench that military prowess to enable a competent rivalry with the U.S. In either case, America seems firmly entrenched as the singular global power for at least two decades and probably three (Art 2003, 243-244).
The E.U. and the U.S. have a uniquely intertwined history and culture. As a result, it would be unlikely that the two would ever be at military odds with each other, but rather, should the E.U. develop a comparable military might to that of the U.S., the two would in all probability, dominate the world together in a co-equal partnership, with cooperation much like that seen in NATO. The strength of the E.U. is an asset to America and the strength of America is an asset to the E.U. It would be in America's best interests for the E.U. to develop into a formidable competitor in the modern world.
Art, Robert J. A Grand Strategy for America. Ithica, New York: Cornell University Press. 2003.
Europa: The EU at a Glance. http://europa.eu/abc/european_countries/candidate_countries/index_en.htm. (accessed December 13, 2009)
U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. CIA World Factbook. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ee.html (accessed December 14, 2009).
Europa: The EU at a Glance. http://europa.eu/abc/european_countries/eu_members/index_en.htm (accessed Decmeber 13, 2009).
Monetarily, the E.U. is really the only potential competitor which can come close to challenging the U.S. (Art 2003, 242). Although the E.U. boasted the world's largest GDP in 2008 at $14.94 trillion U.S. dollars (PPP) (the U.S. 2008 GDP was slightly less at $14.44 trillion) (CIA World Factbook), it is far from certain that the entity as a whole is capable of harnessing that GDP in order to make a credible challenge to American global dominance. Inasmuch as the E.U. is a work in progress and seems to be in the process of working out innumerable kinks in its overall existence, there is a great deal of unknown in terms of E.U. capability across the board. Indeed it seems a little premature to even calculate an E.U. GDP since many of its member states’ citizens have yet to identify themselves first as E.U. members rather than their own nationalities.
With the potential to rival the U.S. monetarily, the E.U. is on fertile ground to challenge the U.S. for military supremacy. According to Art, military equality requires little more than a comparable military; comparable in size, ground, sea, and air assets, technological advancement, etc. By this standard, according to Art, no other state actor has the potential to rival American military supremacy over the next few decades but the E.U. Presently the E.U. has 27 member states with 3 negotiating entry (Europa), and a population of 491.5 million (CIA World Factbook). In conjunction with its monetary capacity, the E.U. could probably produce a military to rival that of the U.S. However, the advantage the U.S. has in this regard is that it has been producing superior military capability for two full generations, whereas, other than a piece-meal, patchwork military with units thrown in from various states within the E.U., the E.U. would need many years to produce a uniquely European Union military capable of rivaling that of the U.S. on the battlefield. It is problematic in many ways to believe that the piece-meal strategy of military building would be an efficient and effective answer to American military hegemony (Art 2003, 243).
The other potential rivals for American hegemony would be China and Russia, likely in that order. These two states have unique problems in such an ambition. China's military infrastructure and tradition is seriously lacking in comparison to that of the U.S. China would rely almost entirely on a consistently increasing GDP at a rate of 7 percent per annum to match American might within three decades. Without said increase, China may never obtain parity with the U.S. Russia, on the other hand, has the infrastructure and tradition in place to potentially rival the U.S. as a global power, but that infrastructure and tradition is badly deteriorated and out of date, and it would likely take a few decades to upgrade and retrench that military prowess to enable a competent rivalry with the U.S. In either case, America seems firmly entrenched as the singular global power for at least two decades and probably three (Art 2003, 243-244).
The E.U. and the U.S. have a uniquely intertwined history and culture. As a result, it would be unlikely that the two would ever be at military odds with each other, but rather, should the E.U. develop a comparable military might to that of the U.S., the two would in all probability, dominate the world together in a co-equal partnership, with cooperation much like that seen in NATO. The strength of the E.U. is an asset to America and the strength of America is an asset to the E.U. It would be in America's best interests for the E.U. to develop into a formidable competitor in the modern world.
Art, Robert J. A Grand Strategy for America. Ithica, New York: Cornell University Press. 2003.
Europa: The EU at a Glance. http://europa.eu/abc/european_countries/candidate_countries/index_en.htm. (accessed December 13, 2009)
U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. CIA World Factbook. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ee.html (accessed December 14, 2009).
Europa: The EU at a Glance. http://europa.eu/abc/european_countries/eu_members/index_en.htm (accessed Decmeber 13, 2009).
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