Sunday, June 12, 2011
Saturday, June 11, 2011
Six Party Talks
DPRK – The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) desires “Reward for Action” in its negotiations with the U.S. on nuclear non-proliferation. It seeks the lifting of sanctions and blockade of its territory as well as substantial energy subsidies and no doubt other benefits directly from the U.S. if it is to halt its nuclear program (DPRK). It has persistently pursued bilateral negotiations with the U.S. and it seems fairly obvious its objective in this regard is twofold, first that the U.S. provide significant aid to the DPRK, second to demonstrate to the world that the DPRK is worth something. Kim Jong-il seems to carry an inferiority complex and feels that bilateral talks with the U.S. would be an admission on its part that the DPRK is of some degree of worth.
ROK – The Republic Of Korea (ROK) has carried a softer line approach to the DPRK in its desires for a nuclear free Korean Peninsula. The reason for the ROk’s softer line approach is likely that it shares a common border and common ethnic background with the north. It has made significant concessions including to offer 2 gigawatts of power to the DPRK in direct exchange for the north dismantling its nuclear program (Hayes).
PRC – The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is interested in its own security more than it is concerned with whether or not the DPRK obtains nuclear weapons. The DPRK creates a buffer zone between the democratic ROC (and hence the United States) and itself. That buffer zone is therefore critical to the PRC’s sense of domestic isolation from the democratic powers of the world. As a result, the PRC will sustain the DPRK as long as the DPRK doesn’t cross the PRC, and the PRC will permit a DPRK nuclear program as long as the DPRK continues to do the PRC’s bidding. The PRC would also be dramatically and detrimentally affected by another war on the Korean peninsula. It therefore would prefer to insure peace between the Koreas and if that means permitting a nuclear armed DPRK, then so be it (Horowitz).
Russian Federation – The Russian Federation is nearly as concerned with a second war on the Korean Peninsula as is the PRC. Such a war would be detrimental to all of East Asia. The acquisition of nuclear weapons by the DPRK is a significant security concern to Russia as well and Russia has stated its intention to prevent said acquisition due to these security implications. Despite the security implications to the Russian Federation, it has strongly emphasized its rejection of any forcible measures to either prevent the DPRK’s acquisition of nuclear weapons or for regime change. It stresses the necessity for a diplomatic resolution to the nuclear problem. Ultimately, Russia would like the DPRK to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty from which it absconded in 2002 (Toloraya).
Japan – Japan’s primary objective in the context of the six-party talks is to insure a stable East Asia/Asia Pacific region. Although this is the case, Japan has some critical reasons to maintain the status quo in the region. Japan clearly sees the DPRK as a significant security threat and it is the existence of this threat that Japan can fully justify its own defensive military buildup. Japan also appreciates the focus the DPRK takes from the PRC. Without the constant vigilance of the PRC being drawn toward the DPRK, China and Japan could easily develop into adversarial neighbors. The drawn out process of negotiation with all the attention being focused on the DPRK is a benefit to Japan that allows it to pursue its own ends without much interference from China (Okano).
United States – The United States has several objectives in its participation in the six-party talks. Its first and primary objective is the nuclear disarmament of the DPRK and a nuclear free Korean Peninsula. This clear objective is really the central reason the United States is even involved in the six-party talks. The second is that any concessions must be one hundred percent verifiable, otherwise the DPRK will continue on the same course it has always been on in bluffing during negotiations, then proceeding to do whatever it wants regardless of the outcome of the most recent round of negotiations. The United States would also like to insist on continued negotiations with the six-party platform once the issue of DPRK nuclear development has been resolved (Spring). It is doubtful however that any American analyst would be willing to put their money on the DPRK doing anything it says it will do.
One of the main problems in negotiations among the six parties seems to be a misunderstanding and an imbalance surrounding geographic issues between those parties with near term interests at stake and those with more long term interests in the process. For example, it seems that the PRC and the ROK have different near term objectives than does the United States. The two aforementioned states are geographically bound to the DPRK and as a result must be more concerned with the DPRK issue in its entirety, that is, economically, politically, demographically, militarily, etc. Their concerns over the DPRK must necessarily consider the whole of the problem rather than simply the possible emergent threats posed by exclusively military issues, whereas the United States, in consequence of its distant geographic location, has only distant direct threats to its domestic security to be concerned about. The United States has allies in the region in the ROK and Japan, and more distantly Australia and New Zealand, but there is little in the way of direct threats in the near future to America’s homeland that it has need to be concerned about. Instability in the DPRK, however, be it the result of economic pressure, military discord, or innumerable other issues, directly affect those states which geographically border the DPRK (Yun, 12).
The problem has been discussed extensively in the past, but the United States also has a problem with playing the bully. As the world’s sole superpower, it appears easy for the United States to shove smaller states around in order to insure favorable circumstances for itself and its allies. In some ways, the United States may have lost an edge diplomatically because it has relied so heavily on “hard power” to solve its problems. In his article The Logic of Positive Engagement, Miroslav Nincic discusses the pros and cons of overuse of “the stick” at the expense of “the carrot” (Nincic). Like a bull in a china shop, the United States has a tendency to barge into a sensitive situation with very bellicose assumptions that its will should be done simply as a result of its comprehensive might. While, “the carrot” approach may be significantly lacking on its own merits, the United States could take some lessons from the old fable of the sun, the wind, and the man in the coat. The wind boasted to the sun of the ease with which he could remove the man’s coat. The wind blew, and blew, and blew, and all he succeeded in doing was encouraging the man to wrap ever tighter his coat around himself. When the wind had exhausted himself and admitted defeat, the sun came out and of course by the warmth of his glow, the man voluntarily removed his coat. Although “the carrot” approach may not be the answer in the case of the DPRK, especially given the results of past experience, it may be in the interests of the United States and its allies if the United States was to take a step back and allow the ROK and Japan to do the bulk of the negotiating, with the backing of the United States.
“DPRK Foreign Ministry Spokesman on Six-Party Talks.” Pyongyang, June 28, 2004. http://www.vuw.ac.nz/~caplabtb/dprk/SPT0406.htm.
Hayes, Peter, et al. “South Korea’s Power Play at the Six-Party Talks.” Nautilus.org, July 21, 2005. http://www.nautilus.org/napsnet/sr/2005/0560ROK_Energy_Aid.pdf (accessed March 31, 2010).
Horowitz, Shale and Min Ye. “China’s Grand Strategy and the Six-Party Talks.” University of Wisconsin, September 2006. http://www.allacademic.com//meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/1/5/3/3/8/pages153388/p153388-1.php (accessed April 5, 2010).
Nincic, Miroslav. “The Logic of Positive Engagement: Dealing with Renegade Regimes.” International Studies Perspectives, 2006.
Okano-Heijmans, Maaike. “Japan as Spoiler in the Six-Party Talks: Single-Issue Politics and Economic Diplomacy towards North Korea.” Asia Pacific Journal: Japan Focus, October 21, 2008. http://www.japanfocus.org/-Maaike-Okano_Heijmans/2929 (accessed April 5, 2010).
Spring, Baker and Balbina Hwang. “U.S. Strategy For the Six-Party Talks.” The Heritage Foundation, July 22, 2005. http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2005/07/US-Strategy-For-the-Six-Party-Talks (accessed April 5, 2010).
Toloraya, Georgy. “The Six Party Talks: A Russian Perspective.” Asian Perspective, Vol. 32, No. 4, 2008. http://www.asianperspective.org/articles/v32n4-d.pdf (accessed April 5, 2010).
Yun, Philip W. and Gi-Wook Shin. “North Korea: 2005 and Beyond.” The Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, 2006. http://iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/21024/1_Introduction_NK2005_FI.pdf (accessed March 31, 2010).
ROK – The Republic Of Korea (ROK) has carried a softer line approach to the DPRK in its desires for a nuclear free Korean Peninsula. The reason for the ROk’s softer line approach is likely that it shares a common border and common ethnic background with the north. It has made significant concessions including to offer 2 gigawatts of power to the DPRK in direct exchange for the north dismantling its nuclear program (Hayes).
PRC – The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is interested in its own security more than it is concerned with whether or not the DPRK obtains nuclear weapons. The DPRK creates a buffer zone between the democratic ROC (and hence the United States) and itself. That buffer zone is therefore critical to the PRC’s sense of domestic isolation from the democratic powers of the world. As a result, the PRC will sustain the DPRK as long as the DPRK doesn’t cross the PRC, and the PRC will permit a DPRK nuclear program as long as the DPRK continues to do the PRC’s bidding. The PRC would also be dramatically and detrimentally affected by another war on the Korean peninsula. It therefore would prefer to insure peace between the Koreas and if that means permitting a nuclear armed DPRK, then so be it (Horowitz).
Russian Federation – The Russian Federation is nearly as concerned with a second war on the Korean Peninsula as is the PRC. Such a war would be detrimental to all of East Asia. The acquisition of nuclear weapons by the DPRK is a significant security concern to Russia as well and Russia has stated its intention to prevent said acquisition due to these security implications. Despite the security implications to the Russian Federation, it has strongly emphasized its rejection of any forcible measures to either prevent the DPRK’s acquisition of nuclear weapons or for regime change. It stresses the necessity for a diplomatic resolution to the nuclear problem. Ultimately, Russia would like the DPRK to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty from which it absconded in 2002 (Toloraya).
Japan – Japan’s primary objective in the context of the six-party talks is to insure a stable East Asia/Asia Pacific region. Although this is the case, Japan has some critical reasons to maintain the status quo in the region. Japan clearly sees the DPRK as a significant security threat and it is the existence of this threat that Japan can fully justify its own defensive military buildup. Japan also appreciates the focus the DPRK takes from the PRC. Without the constant vigilance of the PRC being drawn toward the DPRK, China and Japan could easily develop into adversarial neighbors. The drawn out process of negotiation with all the attention being focused on the DPRK is a benefit to Japan that allows it to pursue its own ends without much interference from China (Okano).
United States – The United States has several objectives in its participation in the six-party talks. Its first and primary objective is the nuclear disarmament of the DPRK and a nuclear free Korean Peninsula. This clear objective is really the central reason the United States is even involved in the six-party talks. The second is that any concessions must be one hundred percent verifiable, otherwise the DPRK will continue on the same course it has always been on in bluffing during negotiations, then proceeding to do whatever it wants regardless of the outcome of the most recent round of negotiations. The United States would also like to insist on continued negotiations with the six-party platform once the issue of DPRK nuclear development has been resolved (Spring). It is doubtful however that any American analyst would be willing to put their money on the DPRK doing anything it says it will do.
One of the main problems in negotiations among the six parties seems to be a misunderstanding and an imbalance surrounding geographic issues between those parties with near term interests at stake and those with more long term interests in the process. For example, it seems that the PRC and the ROK have different near term objectives than does the United States. The two aforementioned states are geographically bound to the DPRK and as a result must be more concerned with the DPRK issue in its entirety, that is, economically, politically, demographically, militarily, etc. Their concerns over the DPRK must necessarily consider the whole of the problem rather than simply the possible emergent threats posed by exclusively military issues, whereas the United States, in consequence of its distant geographic location, has only distant direct threats to its domestic security to be concerned about. The United States has allies in the region in the ROK and Japan, and more distantly Australia and New Zealand, but there is little in the way of direct threats in the near future to America’s homeland that it has need to be concerned about. Instability in the DPRK, however, be it the result of economic pressure, military discord, or innumerable other issues, directly affect those states which geographically border the DPRK (Yun, 12).
The problem has been discussed extensively in the past, but the United States also has a problem with playing the bully. As the world’s sole superpower, it appears easy for the United States to shove smaller states around in order to insure favorable circumstances for itself and its allies. In some ways, the United States may have lost an edge diplomatically because it has relied so heavily on “hard power” to solve its problems. In his article The Logic of Positive Engagement, Miroslav Nincic discusses the pros and cons of overuse of “the stick” at the expense of “the carrot” (Nincic). Like a bull in a china shop, the United States has a tendency to barge into a sensitive situation with very bellicose assumptions that its will should be done simply as a result of its comprehensive might. While, “the carrot” approach may be significantly lacking on its own merits, the United States could take some lessons from the old fable of the sun, the wind, and the man in the coat. The wind boasted to the sun of the ease with which he could remove the man’s coat. The wind blew, and blew, and blew, and all he succeeded in doing was encouraging the man to wrap ever tighter his coat around himself. When the wind had exhausted himself and admitted defeat, the sun came out and of course by the warmth of his glow, the man voluntarily removed his coat. Although “the carrot” approach may not be the answer in the case of the DPRK, especially given the results of past experience, it may be in the interests of the United States and its allies if the United States was to take a step back and allow the ROK and Japan to do the bulk of the negotiating, with the backing of the United States.
“DPRK Foreign Ministry Spokesman on Six-Party Talks.” Pyongyang, June 28, 2004. http://www.vuw.ac.nz/~caplabtb/dprk/SPT0406.htm.
Hayes, Peter, et al. “South Korea’s Power Play at the Six-Party Talks.” Nautilus.org, July 21, 2005. http://www.nautilus.org/napsnet/sr/2005/0560ROK_Energy_Aid.pdf (accessed March 31, 2010).
Horowitz, Shale and Min Ye. “China’s Grand Strategy and the Six-Party Talks.” University of Wisconsin, September 2006. http://www.allacademic.com//meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/1/5/3/3/8/pages153388/p153388-1.php (accessed April 5, 2010).
Nincic, Miroslav. “The Logic of Positive Engagement: Dealing with Renegade Regimes.” International Studies Perspectives, 2006.
Okano-Heijmans, Maaike. “Japan as Spoiler in the Six-Party Talks: Single-Issue Politics and Economic Diplomacy towards North Korea.” Asia Pacific Journal: Japan Focus, October 21, 2008. http://www.japanfocus.org/-Maaike-Okano_Heijmans/2929 (accessed April 5, 2010).
Spring, Baker and Balbina Hwang. “U.S. Strategy For the Six-Party Talks.” The Heritage Foundation, July 22, 2005. http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2005/07/US-Strategy-For-the-Six-Party-Talks (accessed April 5, 2010).
Toloraya, Georgy. “The Six Party Talks: A Russian Perspective.” Asian Perspective, Vol. 32, No. 4, 2008. http://www.asianperspective.org/articles/v32n4-d.pdf (accessed April 5, 2010).
Yun, Philip W. and Gi-Wook Shin. “North Korea: 2005 and Beyond.” The Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, 2006. http://iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/21024/1_Introduction_NK2005_FI.pdf (accessed March 31, 2010).
Rational Actor Model
The rational actor model is largely based on assumptions about uncertainties. In the realm of international relations and how states relate to one another, there are few certainties. The very nature of uncertainties makes it somewhat irrational to make assumptions about them. Therefore, the rational actor model, while making assumptions about said uncertainties, is irrational by nature. There are too many uncertainties in international relations to safely and accurately assume a specific outcome based on a given set of circumstances (Green, 11).
While the rational actor model makes rational assumptions about the way rational people make decisions, i.e. (1) identifying an objective or desired outcome, (2) establishing a set of potential courses of action to achieve that outcome, (3) determining possible benefits and consequences for each potential course of action, and (4) choosing that option which is most likely to provide the best potential outcome based on costs and benefits (essence of decision doc, 2), it is quite irrational to assume one’s assumptions based on a certain set of fluid circumstances will remain the best of all possible options once the set of circumstances has been acted upon. In other words, once the rational actor has chosen his/her course of action, the circumstances change based on the results of that action and his/her opponent’s perception of that action. Once the action has been taken, the circumstances used to conclude that the action was the best of all possible actions change, making the action nothing more than a gamble in the first place. No set of circumstances is consistently static, especially once they have been acted upon. Circumstances are entirely dynamic and to assume otherwise would lead one to make irrational assumptions, and therefore irrational decisions.
Rational actor model assumes the rationality of the actors and that all actors are equally rational. It also assumes that equally rational actors will come to the same conclusions if given identical circumstances. This is clearly not the case. An obvious current example of the fallacy of this assumption is found in the national debate over health care reform. Clearly there are a lot of very rational people on both sides of the debate, and yet polar opposite opinions as to which outcome would be best for America given the same set of circumstances. When President Kennedy was provided a set of circumstances by which to make a decision in the Cuban Missile Crisis, he could easily do so but to do so with a reasonable assumption that the Soviets would respond in a certain way was irrational because President Kennedy’s and Premier Khrushchev’s experiences and understandings about life were very different. Culturally, politically, socially, the two were very different men, and as a result could likely make very different seemingly rational decisions if given the identical set of circumstances.
Rational actor model is based largely on assumptions about many components of the circumstances and the players. In order to make decisions, one must of necessity take risks in determining the best decision to reach the best possible outcome. Winston Churchill said, “It has been said that democracy is the worst form of government except all the others that have been tried” (Green, 2). I believe this is the case with rational actor model. Although there are plethora of other behavioral models out there, and although it certainly has its flaws, it seems to be as effective at its purpose as any other.
Allison, Graham T. and Philip Zelikow. “Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis.” 1999, Chapters 1 and 2.
Green, Steven L. “Rational Choice Theory: An Overview.” Baylor University Faculty Development Seminar on Rational Choice Theory, May 2002. http://business.baylor.edu/steve_green/green1.doc (accessed March 3, 2010).
While the rational actor model makes rational assumptions about the way rational people make decisions, i.e. (1) identifying an objective or desired outcome, (2) establishing a set of potential courses of action to achieve that outcome, (3) determining possible benefits and consequences for each potential course of action, and (4) choosing that option which is most likely to provide the best potential outcome based on costs and benefits (essence of decision doc, 2), it is quite irrational to assume one’s assumptions based on a certain set of fluid circumstances will remain the best of all possible options once the set of circumstances has been acted upon. In other words, once the rational actor has chosen his/her course of action, the circumstances change based on the results of that action and his/her opponent’s perception of that action. Once the action has been taken, the circumstances used to conclude that the action was the best of all possible actions change, making the action nothing more than a gamble in the first place. No set of circumstances is consistently static, especially once they have been acted upon. Circumstances are entirely dynamic and to assume otherwise would lead one to make irrational assumptions, and therefore irrational decisions.
Rational actor model assumes the rationality of the actors and that all actors are equally rational. It also assumes that equally rational actors will come to the same conclusions if given identical circumstances. This is clearly not the case. An obvious current example of the fallacy of this assumption is found in the national debate over health care reform. Clearly there are a lot of very rational people on both sides of the debate, and yet polar opposite opinions as to which outcome would be best for America given the same set of circumstances. When President Kennedy was provided a set of circumstances by which to make a decision in the Cuban Missile Crisis, he could easily do so but to do so with a reasonable assumption that the Soviets would respond in a certain way was irrational because President Kennedy’s and Premier Khrushchev’s experiences and understandings about life were very different. Culturally, politically, socially, the two were very different men, and as a result could likely make very different seemingly rational decisions if given the identical set of circumstances.
Rational actor model is based largely on assumptions about many components of the circumstances and the players. In order to make decisions, one must of necessity take risks in determining the best decision to reach the best possible outcome. Winston Churchill said, “It has been said that democracy is the worst form of government except all the others that have been tried” (Green, 2). I believe this is the case with rational actor model. Although there are plethora of other behavioral models out there, and although it certainly has its flaws, it seems to be as effective at its purpose as any other.
Allison, Graham T. and Philip Zelikow. “Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis.” 1999, Chapters 1 and 2.
Green, Steven L. “Rational Choice Theory: An Overview.” Baylor University Faculty Development Seminar on Rational Choice Theory, May 2002. http://business.baylor.edu/steve_green/green1.doc (accessed March 3, 2010).
Friday, June 10, 2011
PEACE ON EARTH: Maybe Not Such A Good Thing
Introduction
Opposition, resistance, and specifically in recent times (the past few thousand years) warfare, have produced tremendous capability and innovation in the human race, and a necessary drive to develop further and faster. This state of perpetual opposition is vital element in the ability of mankind to progress and without which it would have utterly failed to survive. War is a crucial component of that state of perpetual opposition which effectively and efficiently motivates the human race to advance. In modern times, warfare is a necessary part of human progression. In the absence of war, the world would suffer significant unintended consequences.
The Need to Survive
Mankind is habitually hostile. His hostility stems from his most basic instinct to survive. In many senses his survivalist instinct rivals the most voracious of the animal kingdom. To survive is his utmost quest and he will often, when more rational means have been exhausted, go to the most dire of extremes, including filial cannibalism, in order to assure its accomplishment.
Maslow’s hierarchy of needs explains that the basest needs of mankind, those needs which are most needful for survival such as air, water, and food, are the most critical needs to mankind(1). Clearly, without those needs being met, a living being would quickly die. In order to assure his own survival, it is his basest instinct to insure his access to those needs. No matter the circumstance, disregarding any potential obstacle or any other of the needs within Maslow’s hierarchy whether it be shelter, societal acceptance, or any other, regardless of dangers, discomforts, or physical or psychological pain, a man in severe want of one of those basic needs, facing his own demise if that need is not met, will go to extreme lengths to obtain it, or die in his attempt.
In his theory of evolution, Charles Darwin proposed that the system of natural selection in the natural world forces organisms into a cycle of relentless strife for life (2). Those which survive the strife were deemed by him to be fit for life and the propagation of that species. Those which did not survive of course were relegated to the fossil beds. Those species which survived perpetually gained in strength, cunning, subterfuge, and deceit, until they eventually reigned over other species in their ecosystems or developed survival mechanisms by which they could evade the stronger species. Ultimately nature, by its own infinite and universal understanding, selected only the strongest for survival. Only the strongest of those species would eventually reign supreme over all other life.
It is the inherent nature of mankind to strive and struggle, by strength or by cunning, to overcome his surroundings. When the environment was too cold to survive, he built a fire and took the furs of other animals to keep warm. When he was hungry, he made tools for hunting to feed himself. When the hunters and gatherers were doomed by far more physically superior predators, they banded together and destroyed that predator. When the tribe was threatened by another tribe, they built fortifications. When a civilization was threatened by another civilization, they developed more destructive and sophisticated weaponry and contrived strategies to defeat that enemy. Throughout his comparatively short history, mankind has survived because of its struggle to survive rather than merely continuing to exist. Surprisingly, mankind has progressed in his short existence farther and faster than any of his Darwinian kin in the animal kingdom. Not only has he progressed farther and faster, but he has subdued all those and become master over all other forms of life on Earth. It is the struggle that has made him strong.
Struggle Against Opposition
In his book “War of the Worlds,” H. G. Wells wrote, “By the toll of a billion deaths man has bought his birthright of the earth, and it is his against all comers; it would still be his were [they] ten times as mighty as they are. For neither do men live nor die in vain” (3). The one reason by which “man has bought his birthright of the earth” is that through struggle against insatiable opposition throughout his minuscule existence in time and eternity he has confronted and defeated by his inherent nature those forces which would have overthrown him. His comparatively puny stature would have forfeit his existence to a physically superior predator, but his cunning enabled him to survive. His relatively exposed exterior would have made him defenseless against all manner of environmental dangers, including physical obstacles, weather, infection, and more, but his superior ingenuity and unconquerable genesis made him subjugator and dominator of even nature itself. Mankind has earned his place in the world.
Opposition is of paramount importance in man’s march through time. Not only does his progress depend on opposition, but his ultimate survival. Mankind, in his modern “Homo Sapiens” state of being, has struggled for his survival since his beginning – some experts suggest – 150,000 years ago (4). In that 150,000 years of existence, very liberally speaking, only in the most recent 10,000 years has he made any significant gains in terms of his intellectual progress (5). Perhaps by reason of his progress, it has been within that most recent 10,000 years that cities and civilizations of any significant might have developed. In fact, as recently as 5,500 years ago, it is estimated that only a handful of cities even existed in which there lived more than 10,000 inhabitants (6).
Innovation Through Opposition
In the millions of years of the Earth’s existence, and the 150,000 years of the life of mankind, it seems too coincidental that only when cities and kingdoms of upright man began to develop, did mankind really begin to progress beyond meager subsistence; mass trade ensued and expendable, disposable wealth emerged to empower men over their neighbors; innovations began to develop at a much faster pace than ever before, further enabling man through every conceivable technology; conflict and warfare advanced to complexities never before seen in all of the Earth’s species enabling territorial expansion and material enrichment of kingdoms and subjugation and enslavement of neighboring civilizations. The instinctive nature of mankind to desire power over his fellows, perhaps subconsciously as a means of security, has driven modern man to engage in battle and in warfare, and warfare inherently drives innovation.
Innovation, derived necessarily from a need to either kill or be killed on a civilizational scale, produced in conflict with a real and tangible enemy, rather unlike disease, famine, flood or other naturally induced misfortune, is what has driven technological advancement in the most recent five hundred years and propelled without doubt the most intensive period of innovation in man’s short tenure on Earth. In his book International Security, Patrick Morgan states, “In the study of international politics some analysts contend that it was the insecurity and frequent warfare of international politics from 1500 into the twentieth century that drove Western states to develop so much faster and more powerfully than other states and societies, so that the West came to dominate nearly the entire world and continues to do so” (7). It was the constant state of war and warfare in Europe that induced its human inhabitants to develop newer and better means of defending themselves and of defeating their enemies. These innovations often translated into the civilian world in various ways such as transportation, communication, production and mechanical operations, chemistry, physics, navigation, and more.
Warfare Driven Innovation
One example of warfare driving innovation is the telegraph in the American Civil War. Prior to the war, the telegraph had existed but was of very limited use. During the war, as armies were in ever increasing need of reliable communication methods, the government subsidized the expansion of telegraph lines. Throughout the course of the war, the federal government constructed more than 15,000 miles of telegraph lines. Although the telegraph had existed for many years by that time, it only became an integral part of day to day operations for governmental and military organizations during the Civil War. During the war, various command and control elements, including the war department, had begun to utilize the technology for in depth real-time communication. President Lincoln, as commander-in-chief of the armed forces, regularly and in person communicated with his generals in the field via the telegraph lines from the war department (8). The unprecedented federally derived expansion of this new electronic communication technology propelled the development and innovation of electronic communication into the future.
Another more recent yet key example of innovation being driven by war is the development of the first atomic weapon. The idea that one could create a nuclear chain reaction powerful enough to cause a catastrophic explosion using radioactive material had been around for some time prior to the establishment of “The Manhattan Project.” It had largely been a civilian endeavor with research and experimentation conducted in universities until the onset of the Second World War. Through academic circles it was known by several scientists in America that the Nazis in Germany were vigorously pursuing such a weapon. A letter was written and endorsed by Leo Szilard, signed by Albert Einstein and sent to President Roosevelt. The contents of the letter explained the tremendous consequences of nuclear weaponry and that the Nazis were aggressively seeking such technology. President Roosevelt soon thereafter established the means by which America would seek and obtain in very short order atomic weapons, of which The Manhattan Project was one (9).
Without this government sponsorship it is highly unlikely that America would have been the first to obtain nuclear weapons. The scientific knowledge which has been developed as a direct result of The Manhattan Project and other related government sponsored nuclear development programs has directly contributed to the nuclear technologies enjoyed today in many fields such as medical research, electrical engineering, naval propulsion, astronomy, physics, and many more. In this example, it was clearly the presence of overwhelming need as a result of war that drove the development of atomic weaponry. It was again the survivalist instinct that compelled this arm of the human race to seek out and develop such innovative and advanced technology.
Many more examples of need driven by war to systematically and rapidly develop new technologies exist. Some of the more obvious examples include, explosives, the man portable musket and subsequently the rifle, various forms of communication technology including the present means of satellite communication and GPS navigation, transportation innovations such as the locomotive, the four wheel drive vehicle, the main battle tank, and more, naval innovations such as the iron clad ship and the submarine, rocketry, optics including an array of developments from telescopes to night vision devices, aeronautic advancements, and many more. Whether by governmental stimulation or by sheer happenstance, innovations of this kind have a way of rapidly advancing the technologies available to man for improving his standard of living and for perpetuating that advancement; for with technological advancement inherently comes further technological advancement.
The Human Being’s Need for Resistance
As H. G. Wells implied, it is the struggle against opposition that makes mankind stronger, smarter, and more capable of victory over that inevitable opposition. It was his many thousand year history of succumbing and eventually overcoming disease, plague, and his natural surroundings that eventually made mankind capable of ultimate survival. Many apparent examples exist of the need for opposition to make one stronger, smarter, and more capable, but none is more illustrative than that of an athlete. A stellar athlete must submit him/herself to opposition and resistance in order to improve. One must arduously train to prepare one’s body for athletic competition. Striving against resistance is critical; a runner must push him/herself to run ever harder and faster; a weight lifter must strive to exert his maximum strength against ever increasing weight; a boxer must push him/herself to the extremes of conditioning and physical pain in order to be completely prepared for each successive bout; without the constant and arduous struggle against resistance, athletes specifically would fail to excel and would eventually digress into mediocrity.
It has been very well documented that the force of gravity on Earth is a necessary and beneficial opposition to the human body in its physical development and overall health. The human body has been documented to react adversarially to the force of gravity by strengthening the muscular and skeletal systems. Astronauts on prolonged missions beyond Earth’s gravitational pull experience muscular and skeletal atrophy. It has been proven that even an astronaut’s bone density will be diminished by as much as one percent per month by extended stays in space (10). The persistent resistance provided by the Earth’s gravitational pull keeps the human body in a perpetual struggle for good health and fitness. The more one exerts against that resistance, the stronger one becomes.
The absolute need for opposition is as applicable to mankind as a race as it is to the single individual. Without persistent and unending resistance and opposition, the human race would atrophy to the point of total stagnation. Like a stream flowing down a hill, it is mankind’s nature to take the path of least resistance. Two hundred years ago, if a father didn’t physically work hard (generally speaking of course) pulling rocks from his field, plowing, sowing, reaping, milking, hauling, harvesting, etc., he and his family would starve. Often avoiding starvation meant every able member of a family had to work hard. Today it is quite different, working hard means sitting long hours in front of a computer, then going home “exhausted” to plop down on the sofa to watch TV; that in conjunction with the readily available supply of high calorie foods means (generally speaking of course) people are much less physically active and are able to eat many more calories in a day than two hundred years ago. As stated, Americans have begun to physically atrophy, to stagnate, because exercise and physical activity for most is voluntary. The skyrocketing rates of obesity demonstrate the point that the human race is prone to take the path of least resistance. There is no immediate and pressing need to commit to physical activity and it is much easier to sit in front of the TV than to walk on a treadmill in front of the TV (11).
The Human Race’s Need for Resistance
In much the same way that Americans have begun to physically atrophy causing an obesity epidemic, if the human race was to experience a prolonged period of peace, all the stimuli for innovation which are consequences of conflict would disappear. Mankind would trend toward the path of least resistance, the easiest means accomplishing his existence, life would become easy and he would therefore prefer the readily available life of ease rather than the completely voluntary life of struggle in order to exercise his ingenuity. If the world was to experience total peace, a total state of utopia, a great many overwhelming needs for new ideas and new technologies would simply disappear, leaving the human race with a choice between a readily available state of atrophy, or a completely voluntary and more difficult state of progress by innovation. If there is no need driving innovation or compelling him to advance, why would mankind, who is so demonstrably prone to taking the path of least resistance, even to desire atrophy over physical exertion, do anything else? He wouldn’t.
Other Means of Opposition
Several other prominent forms of opposition exist including disease and general medical maladies, drought and resultant famine, natural disasters of all kinds, and economic woes to name a few. In the absence of war, these would likely not disappear. Such other resistance to the progress of the human race and potential drivers of innovation and technology, while problematic in their own right, will likely never produce the compulsion in the human race to innovate and advance quite like war has. The reason is basic and simple: When two states go to war against one another, the consequences of that war penetrate the deepest reaches of every corner of both societies; every individual in those states is effected and driven to somehow contribute to the survival of their state, whether the survival is from extinction, or subjugation, or something more basic like access to fresh water or natural resources, ultimately everyone in that society is affected. When the world is at war, as was the case twice in the last century, the same is true; everyone is affected in some adverse way as a result of the war.
In those cases outside of war which may necessarily drive innovation, they are limited to small segments of the respective populations. The presence of medical maladies may propel innovations in the medical world, which like military technological innovations, will trickle into the civilian sector, but medical maladies will likely never drive innovation the way war has because those maladies are by and large limited to small sections of the population. The population as a whole will never feel the need to come together to combat cancer, or diabetes, or schizophrenia. Those ailments are restricted to small numbers of people as compared to the whole. In the case of droughts and famines, the same is true. Droughts and famines may afflict a small geographic area, to which the remaining whole may respond with relief aid, but such an unfortunate incident will never drive innovation; first, because it is localized to a small geographic area; and second, the need for technology and massive innovation in such a scenario is just not present. Other potential cases for the need for voluminous innovation are much the same as these, all significantly lacking the ability to compel the whole of a society to innovate.
Conclusion
Patrick Morgan, in his book International Security, stated, “people frequently feel that up to a point insecurity is good for them. Risk of failure and unemployment keeps companies, businesses, and workers on their toes, to be more alert and more productive. Having to take chances through competition keeps schools, firms and political parties vigorous and efficient” (12). The risk of insecurity and occasional war are productive and necessary aspects of human progression. The need for stimulation to persuade the human race from inactivity and inaction is great, and to a large extent, war is the best motivator in that regard. Morgan further stated, “A part of being human is a willingness to sometimes be unsafe for a while if that is a necessary part of striving hard to achieve something deeply desired” (13). The freedom to act for one’s self in America has produced many (although proportionately quite few) individuals who are willing to risk insecurity to advance their chances of a better future. The risk factor, the potential insecurity, is what has made great individuals out of mediocre ones. Opposition, resistance, and specifically warfare are those components for the human race. Without them, it is quite likely mankind would never have evolved out of the primordial soup from whence many claim he sprang.
Bibliography
Aeragon. “The U.S. Civil War, the First Modern War: The Beginnings of Modern Military Technology and the Sources of Design.” http://www.aeragon.com/03/ (accessed March 15, 2010).
Cell Press. "DNA Evidence Tells 'Global Story' of Human History." Science Daily, 24 February 2010. http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2010/02/100222121618.htm (accessed March 12, 2010).
Darwin, Charles. “On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection or the Preservation of Favoured Races in the Struggle for Life.” Fifth Edition. London: John Murray, 1869. http://darwin-online.org.uk/content/frameset?viewtype=side&itemID=F387&pageseq=101 (accessed March 11, 2010).
Fergusson, Mark. “Obesity Epidemic: Overeating is to Blame.” Down to Earth, May 16, 2009. http://www.downtoearth.org/blogs/2009-05/health/obesity-epidemic-overeating-to-blame (accessed March 20, 2010).
Modelski, George. “Cities of the Ancient World: An Inventory.” Seattle: University of Washington, July 10, 1997. https://faculty.washington.edu/modelski/WCITI2.html (accessed March 13, 2010).
Morgan, Patrick M. “International Security: Problems and Solutions.” Washington DC: CQ Press, 2006.
National Aeronautics and Space Administration. “Weak in the Knees: The Quest for a Cure.” http://weboflife.nasa.gov/currentResearch/currentResearchGeneralArchives/weakKnees.htm (accessed March 20, 2010).
Oakridge Convention and Visitor’s Bureau. “Important Faces of the Manhattan Project.” 2007. http://oakridgevisitor.com/history/pdf/importantfaces.pdf (accessed March 16, 2010).
O’Neil, Dennis. “Early Modern Homo Sapiens.” Palomar College, June 29, 2009. http://anthro.palomar.edu/homo2/mod_homo_4.htm (accessed March 13, 2010).
Poston, Bob. “An Exercise in Personal Exploration: Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs.” Association of Surgical Technologists, August 8, 2009. http://www.astd2007.ast.org/publications/Journal%20Archive/2009/8_August_2009/CE.pdf (accessed March 12, 2010).
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[1] Poston, Bob, “An Exercise in Personal Exploration: Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs,” Association of Surgical Technologists, August 8, 2009, http://www.astd2007.ast.org/publications/Journal%20Archive/2009/8_August_2009/CE.pdf (accessed March 12, 2010).
[2] Darwin, Charles, “On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection or the Preservation of Favoured Races in the Struggle for Life,” Fifth Edition, London: John Murray, 1869, http://darwin-online.org.uk/content/frameset?viewtype=side&itemID=F387&pageseq=101 (accessed March 11, 2010).
[3] Wells, H. G., “War of the Worlds,” Originally published in book form: London: William Heinemann, 1898, ch. 25, http://www.online-literature.com/wellshg/warworlds/25/ (accessed March 16, 2010).
[4] Cell Press, "DNA Evidence Tells 'Global Story' of Human History," Science Daily, 24 February 2010, http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2010/02/100222121618.htm (accessed March 12, 2010).
[5] O’Neil, Dennis, “Early Modern Homo Sapiens,” Palomar College, June 29, 2009, http://anthro.palomar.edu/homo2/mod_homo_4.htm (accessed March 13, 2010).
[6] Modelski, George, “Cities of the Ancient World: An Inventory,” Seattle: University of Washington, July 10, 1997, https://faculty.washington.edu/modelski/WCITI2.html (accessed March 13, 2010).
[7] Morgan, Patrick M, “International Security: Problems and Solutions,” Washington DC: CQ Press, 2006, p. 14.
[8] Aeragon, “The U.S. Civil War, the First Modern War: The Beginnings of Modern Military Technology and the Sources of Design,” http://www.aeragon.com/03/ (accessed March 15, 2010).
[9] Oakridge Convention and Visitor’s Bureau, “Important Faces of the Manhattan Project,” 2007, http://oakridgevisitor.com/history/pdf/importantfaces.pdf (accessed March 16, 2010).
[10] National Aeronautics and Space Administration, “Weak in the Knees: The Quest for a Cure,” http://weboflife.nasa.gov/currentResearch/currentResearchGeneralArchives/weakKnees.htm (accessed March 20, 2010).
[11] Fergusson, Mark, “Obesity Epidemic: Overeating is to Blame,” Down to Earth, May 16, 2009, http://www.downtoearth.org/blogs/2009-05/health/obesity-epidemic-overeating-to-blame (accessed March 20, 2010).
[12] Morgan, Patrick M, “International Security: Problems and Solutions,” Washington DC: CQ Press, 2006, p. 14.
[13] Morgan, Patrick M, “International Security: Problems and Solutions,” Washington DC: CQ Press, 2006, p. 14.
Mexico's Gun Supply and the 90 Percent Myth
February 10, 2011 0951 GMT
By Scott Stewart
For several years now, STRATFOR has been closely watching developments in Mexico that relate to what we consider the three wars being waged there. Those three wars are the war between the various drug cartels, the war between the government and the cartels and the war being waged against citizens and businesses by criminals.
In addition to watching tactical developments of the cartel wars on the ground and studying the dynamics of the conflict among the various warring factions, we have also been paying close attention to the ways that both the Mexican and U.S. governments have reacted to these developments. Perhaps one of the most interesting aspects to watch has been the way in which the Mexican government has tried to deflect responsibility for the cartel wars away from itself and onto the United States. According to the Mexican government, the cartel wars are not a result of corruption in Mexico or of economic and societal dynamics that leave many Mexicans marginalized and desperate to find a way to make a living. Instead, the cartel wars are due to the insatiable American appetite for narcotics and the endless stream of guns that flows from the United States into Mexico and that results in Mexican violence.
Interestingly, the part of this argument pertaining to guns has been adopted by many politicians and government officials in the United States in recent years. It has now become quite common to hear U.S. officials confidently assert that 90 percent of the weapons used by the Mexican drug cartels come from the United States. However, a close examination of the dynamics of the cartel wars in Mexico — and of how the oft-echoed 90 percent number was reached — clearly demonstrates that the number is more political rhetoric than empirical fact.
By the Numbers
As we discussed in a previous analysis, the 90 percent number was derived from a June 2009 U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) report to Congress on U.S. efforts to combat arms trafficking to Mexico.
According to the GAO report, some 30,000 firearms were seized from criminals by Mexican authorities in 2008. Of these 30,000 firearms, information pertaining to 7,200 of them (24 percent) was submitted to the U.S. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) for tracing. Of these 7,200 guns, only about 4,000 could be traced by the ATF, and of these 4,000, some 3,480 (87 percent) were shown to have come from the United States.
This means that the 87 percent figure relates to the number of weapons submitted by the Mexican government to the ATF that could be successfully traced and not from the total number of weapons seized by Mexican authorities or even from the total number of weapons submitted to the ATF for tracing. In fact, the 3,480 guns positively traced to the United States equals less than 12 percent of the total arms seized in Mexico in 2008 and less than 48 percent of all those submitted by the Mexican government to the ATF for tracing. This means that almost 90 percent of the guns seized in Mexico in 2008 were not traced back to the United States.
The remaining 22,800 firearms seized by Mexican authorities in 2008 were not traced for a variety of reasons. In addition to factors such as bureaucratic barriers and negligence, many of the weapons seized by Mexican authorities either do not bear serial numbers or have had their serial numbers altered or obliterated. It is also important to understand that the Mexican authorities simply don’t bother to submit some classes of weapons to the ATF for tracing. Such weapons include firearms they identify as coming from their own military or police forces, or guns that they can trace back themselves as being sold through the Mexican Defense Department’s Arms and Ammunition Marketing Division (UCAM). Likewise, they do not ask ATF to trace military ordnance from third countries like the South Korean fragmentation grenades commonly used in cartel attacks.
Of course, some or even many of the 22,800 firearms the Mexicans did not submit to ATF for tracing may have originated in the United States. But according to the figures presented by the GAO, there is no evidence to support the assertion that 90 percent of the guns used by the Mexican cartels come from the United States — especially when not even 50 percent of those that were submitted for tracing were ultimately found to be of U.S. origin.
This point leads us to consider the types of weapons being used by the Mexican cartels and where they come from.
Types and Sources of Guns
To gain an understanding of the dynamics of the gun flow inside Mexico, it helps if one divides the guns seized by Mexican authorities from criminals into three broad categories — which, incidentally, just happen to represent three different sources.
Type 1: Guns Legally Available in Mexico
The first category of weapons encountered in Mexico is weapons available legally for sale in Mexico through UCAM. These include handguns smaller than a .357 magnum such as .380 and .38 Special.
A large portion of this first type of guns used by criminals is purchased in Mexico, or stolen from their legitimate owners. While UCAM does have very strict regulations for civilians to purchase guns, criminals will use straw purchasers to obtain firearms from UCAM or obtain them from corrupt officials. Cartel hit men in Mexico commonly use .380 pistols equipped with sound suppressors in their assassinations. In many cases, these pistols are purchased in Mexico, the suppressors are locally manufactured and the guns are adapted to receive the suppressors by Mexican gunsmiths.
It must be noted, though, that because of the cost and hassle of purchasing guns in Mexico, many of the guns in this category are purchased in the United States and smuggled into the country.
There are a lot of cheap guns available on the U.S. market, and they can be sold at a premium in Mexico. Indeed, guns in this category, such as .380 pistols and .22-caliber rifles and pistols, are among the guns most commonly traced back to the United States. Still, the numbers do not indicate that 90 percent of guns in this category come from the United States.
Additionally, most of the explosives the cartels have been using in improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in Mexico over the past year have used commercially available Tovex, so we consider these explosives to fall in this first category. Mexican IEDs are another area where the rhetoric has been interesting to analyze, but we will explore this topic another time.
Type 2: Guns Legally Available in the U.S. but Not in Mexico
Many popular handgun calibers, such as 9 mm, .45 and .40, are reserved for the military and police and are not available for sale to civilians in Mexico. These guns, which are legally sold and very popular in the United States, comprise our second category, which also includes .50- caliber rifles, semiautomatic versions of assault rifles like the AK-47 and M16 and the FN Five- Seven pistol.
When we consider this second type of guns, a large number of them encountered in Mexico are likely purchased in the United States. Indeed, the GAO report notes that many of the guns most commonly traced back to the United States fall into this category. There are also many .45- caliber and 9 mm semiautomatic pistols and .357 revolvers obtained from deserters from the Mexican military and police, purchased from corrupt Mexican authorities or even brought in from South America (guns made by manufacturers such as Taurus and Bersa). This category also includes semiautomatic variants of assault rifles and main battle rifles, which are often converted by Mexican gunsmiths to be capable of fully automatic fire.
One can buy these types of weapons on the international arms market, but one pays a premium for such guns and it is cheaper and easier to simply buy them in the United States or South America and smuggle them into Mexico. In fact, there is an entire cottage industry that has developed to smuggle such weapons, and not all the customers are cartel hit men. There are many Mexican citizens who own guns in calibers such as .45, 9 mm, .40 and .44 magnum for self-defense — even though such guns are illegal in Mexico.
Type 3: Guns Not Available for Civilian Purchase in Mexico or the U.S.
The third category of weapons encountered in Mexico is military grade ordnance not generally available for sale in the United States or Mexico. This category includes hand grenades, 40 mm grenades, rocket-propelled grenades, automatic assault rifles and main battle rifles and light machine guns.
This third type of weapon is fairly difficult and very expensive to obtain in the United States (especially in the large numbers in which the cartels are employing them). They are also dangerous to obtain in the United States due to heavy law-enforcement scrutiny. Therefore, most of the military ordnance used by the Mexican cartels comes from other sources, such as the international arms market (increasingly from China via the same networks that furnish precursor chemicals for narcotics manufacturing), or from corrupt elements in the Mexican military or even deserters who take their weapons with them. Besides, items such as South Korean fragmentation grenades and RPG-7s, often used by the cartels, simply are not in the U.S. arsenal. This means that very few of the weapons in this category come from the United States.
In recent years the cartels (especially their enforcer groups such as Los Zetas, Gente Nueva and La Linea) have been increasingly using military weaponry instead of sporting arms. A close examination of the arms seized from the enforcer groups and their training camps clearly demonstrates this trend toward military ordnance, including many weapons not readily available in the United States. Some of these seizures have included M60 machine guns and hundreds of 40 mm grenades obtained from the military arsenals of countries like Guatemala.
But Guatemala is not the only source of such weapons. Latin America is awash in weapons that were shipped there over the past several decades to supply the various insurgencies and counterinsurgencies in the region. When these military-grade weapons are combined with the rampant corruption in the region, they quickly find their way into the black arms market. The Mexican cartels have supply-chain contacts that help move narcotics to Mexico from South America and they are able to use this same network to obtain guns from the black market in South and Central America and then smuggle them into Mexico. While there are many weapons in this category that were manufactured in the United States, the overwhelming majority of the U.S.-manufactured weapons of this third type encountered in Mexico — like LAW rockets and M60 machine guns — come into Mexico from third countries and not directly from the United States.
There are also some cases of overlap between classes of weapons. For example, the FN Five- Seven pistol is available for commercial purchase in the United States, but the 5.7x28 armor-piercing ammunition for the pistol favored by the cartels is not — it is a restricted item.
However, some of the special operations forces units in the Mexican military are issued the Five- Seven as well as the FN P90 personal defense weapon, which also shoots the 5.7x28 round, and the cartels are obtaining some of these weapons and the armor-piercing ammunition from them and not from the United States. Conversely, we see bulk 5.56 mm and 7.62 mm ammunition bought in the United States and smuggled into Mexico, where it is used in fully-automatic AK- 47s and M16s purchased elsewhere. As noted above, China has become an increasingly common source for military weapons like grenades and fully automatic assault rifles in recent years.
To really understand Mexico’s gun problem, however, it is necessary to recognize that the same economic law of supply and demand that fuels drug smuggling into the United States also fuels gun smuggling into Mexico. Black-market guns in Mexico can fetch up to 300 percent of their normal purchase price — a profit margin rivaling the narcotics the cartels sell. Even if it were somehow possible to hermetically seal the U.S.-Mexico border and shut off all the guns coming from the United States, the cartels would still be able to obtain weapons elsewhere — just as narcotics would continue to flow into the United States from other places. The United States does provide cheap and easy access to certain types of weapons and ammunition, but as demonstrated by groups such as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, weapons can be easily obtained from other sources via the black arms market — albeit at a higher price.
There has clearly been a long and well-documented history of arms smuggling across the U.S.- Mexico border, but it is important to recognize that, while the United States is a significant source of certain classes of weapons and ammunition, it is by no means the source of 90 percent of the weapons used by the Mexican cartels, as is commonly asserted.
http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20110209-mexicos-gun-supply-and-90-percent-myth
SR: This post is directly from the following link from STRATFOR:
http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20110209-mexicos-gun-supply-and-90-percent-myth
STRATFOR provides very high quality information long before much of it hits the main-stream-media. In fact I've seen many "News" outlets get their information directly from STRATFOR.
Mexico's" Gun Supply and the 90 Percent Myth is republished with permission of STRATFOR.
By Scott Stewart
For several years now, STRATFOR has been closely watching developments in Mexico that relate to what we consider the three wars being waged there. Those three wars are the war between the various drug cartels, the war between the government and the cartels and the war being waged against citizens and businesses by criminals.
In addition to watching tactical developments of the cartel wars on the ground and studying the dynamics of the conflict among the various warring factions, we have also been paying close attention to the ways that both the Mexican and U.S. governments have reacted to these developments. Perhaps one of the most interesting aspects to watch has been the way in which the Mexican government has tried to deflect responsibility for the cartel wars away from itself and onto the United States. According to the Mexican government, the cartel wars are not a result of corruption in Mexico or of economic and societal dynamics that leave many Mexicans marginalized and desperate to find a way to make a living. Instead, the cartel wars are due to the insatiable American appetite for narcotics and the endless stream of guns that flows from the United States into Mexico and that results in Mexican violence.
Interestingly, the part of this argument pertaining to guns has been adopted by many politicians and government officials in the United States in recent years. It has now become quite common to hear U.S. officials confidently assert that 90 percent of the weapons used by the Mexican drug cartels come from the United States. However, a close examination of the dynamics of the cartel wars in Mexico — and of how the oft-echoed 90 percent number was reached — clearly demonstrates that the number is more political rhetoric than empirical fact.
By the Numbers
As we discussed in a previous analysis, the 90 percent number was derived from a June 2009 U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) report to Congress on U.S. efforts to combat arms trafficking to Mexico.
According to the GAO report, some 30,000 firearms were seized from criminals by Mexican authorities in 2008. Of these 30,000 firearms, information pertaining to 7,200 of them (24 percent) was submitted to the U.S. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) for tracing. Of these 7,200 guns, only about 4,000 could be traced by the ATF, and of these 4,000, some 3,480 (87 percent) were shown to have come from the United States.
This means that the 87 percent figure relates to the number of weapons submitted by the Mexican government to the ATF that could be successfully traced and not from the total number of weapons seized by Mexican authorities or even from the total number of weapons submitted to the ATF for tracing. In fact, the 3,480 guns positively traced to the United States equals less than 12 percent of the total arms seized in Mexico in 2008 and less than 48 percent of all those submitted by the Mexican government to the ATF for tracing. This means that almost 90 percent of the guns seized in Mexico in 2008 were not traced back to the United States.
The remaining 22,800 firearms seized by Mexican authorities in 2008 were not traced for a variety of reasons. In addition to factors such as bureaucratic barriers and negligence, many of the weapons seized by Mexican authorities either do not bear serial numbers or have had their serial numbers altered or obliterated. It is also important to understand that the Mexican authorities simply don’t bother to submit some classes of weapons to the ATF for tracing. Such weapons include firearms they identify as coming from their own military or police forces, or guns that they can trace back themselves as being sold through the Mexican Defense Department’s Arms and Ammunition Marketing Division (UCAM). Likewise, they do not ask ATF to trace military ordnance from third countries like the South Korean fragmentation grenades commonly used in cartel attacks.
Of course, some or even many of the 22,800 firearms the Mexicans did not submit to ATF for tracing may have originated in the United States. But according to the figures presented by the GAO, there is no evidence to support the assertion that 90 percent of the guns used by the Mexican cartels come from the United States — especially when not even 50 percent of those that were submitted for tracing were ultimately found to be of U.S. origin.
This point leads us to consider the types of weapons being used by the Mexican cartels and where they come from.
Types and Sources of Guns
To gain an understanding of the dynamics of the gun flow inside Mexico, it helps if one divides the guns seized by Mexican authorities from criminals into three broad categories — which, incidentally, just happen to represent three different sources.
Type 1: Guns Legally Available in Mexico
The first category of weapons encountered in Mexico is weapons available legally for sale in Mexico through UCAM. These include handguns smaller than a .357 magnum such as .380 and .38 Special.
A large portion of this first type of guns used by criminals is purchased in Mexico, or stolen from their legitimate owners. While UCAM does have very strict regulations for civilians to purchase guns, criminals will use straw purchasers to obtain firearms from UCAM or obtain them from corrupt officials. Cartel hit men in Mexico commonly use .380 pistols equipped with sound suppressors in their assassinations. In many cases, these pistols are purchased in Mexico, the suppressors are locally manufactured and the guns are adapted to receive the suppressors by Mexican gunsmiths.
It must be noted, though, that because of the cost and hassle of purchasing guns in Mexico, many of the guns in this category are purchased in the United States and smuggled into the country.
There are a lot of cheap guns available on the U.S. market, and they can be sold at a premium in Mexico. Indeed, guns in this category, such as .380 pistols and .22-caliber rifles and pistols, are among the guns most commonly traced back to the United States. Still, the numbers do not indicate that 90 percent of guns in this category come from the United States.
Additionally, most of the explosives the cartels have been using in improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in Mexico over the past year have used commercially available Tovex, so we consider these explosives to fall in this first category. Mexican IEDs are another area where the rhetoric has been interesting to analyze, but we will explore this topic another time.
Type 2: Guns Legally Available in the U.S. but Not in Mexico
Many popular handgun calibers, such as 9 mm, .45 and .40, are reserved for the military and police and are not available for sale to civilians in Mexico. These guns, which are legally sold and very popular in the United States, comprise our second category, which also includes .50- caliber rifles, semiautomatic versions of assault rifles like the AK-47 and M16 and the FN Five- Seven pistol.
When we consider this second type of guns, a large number of them encountered in Mexico are likely purchased in the United States. Indeed, the GAO report notes that many of the guns most commonly traced back to the United States fall into this category. There are also many .45- caliber and 9 mm semiautomatic pistols and .357 revolvers obtained from deserters from the Mexican military and police, purchased from corrupt Mexican authorities or even brought in from South America (guns made by manufacturers such as Taurus and Bersa). This category also includes semiautomatic variants of assault rifles and main battle rifles, which are often converted by Mexican gunsmiths to be capable of fully automatic fire.
One can buy these types of weapons on the international arms market, but one pays a premium for such guns and it is cheaper and easier to simply buy them in the United States or South America and smuggle them into Mexico. In fact, there is an entire cottage industry that has developed to smuggle such weapons, and not all the customers are cartel hit men. There are many Mexican citizens who own guns in calibers such as .45, 9 mm, .40 and .44 magnum for self-defense — even though such guns are illegal in Mexico.
Type 3: Guns Not Available for Civilian Purchase in Mexico or the U.S.
The third category of weapons encountered in Mexico is military grade ordnance not generally available for sale in the United States or Mexico. This category includes hand grenades, 40 mm grenades, rocket-propelled grenades, automatic assault rifles and main battle rifles and light machine guns.
This third type of weapon is fairly difficult and very expensive to obtain in the United States (especially in the large numbers in which the cartels are employing them). They are also dangerous to obtain in the United States due to heavy law-enforcement scrutiny. Therefore, most of the military ordnance used by the Mexican cartels comes from other sources, such as the international arms market (increasingly from China via the same networks that furnish precursor chemicals for narcotics manufacturing), or from corrupt elements in the Mexican military or even deserters who take their weapons with them. Besides, items such as South Korean fragmentation grenades and RPG-7s, often used by the cartels, simply are not in the U.S. arsenal. This means that very few of the weapons in this category come from the United States.
In recent years the cartels (especially their enforcer groups such as Los Zetas, Gente Nueva and La Linea) have been increasingly using military weaponry instead of sporting arms. A close examination of the arms seized from the enforcer groups and their training camps clearly demonstrates this trend toward military ordnance, including many weapons not readily available in the United States. Some of these seizures have included M60 machine guns and hundreds of 40 mm grenades obtained from the military arsenals of countries like Guatemala.
But Guatemala is not the only source of such weapons. Latin America is awash in weapons that were shipped there over the past several decades to supply the various insurgencies and counterinsurgencies in the region. When these military-grade weapons are combined with the rampant corruption in the region, they quickly find their way into the black arms market. The Mexican cartels have supply-chain contacts that help move narcotics to Mexico from South America and they are able to use this same network to obtain guns from the black market in South and Central America and then smuggle them into Mexico. While there are many weapons in this category that were manufactured in the United States, the overwhelming majority of the U.S.-manufactured weapons of this third type encountered in Mexico — like LAW rockets and M60 machine guns — come into Mexico from third countries and not directly from the United States.
There are also some cases of overlap between classes of weapons. For example, the FN Five- Seven pistol is available for commercial purchase in the United States, but the 5.7x28 armor-piercing ammunition for the pistol favored by the cartels is not — it is a restricted item.
However, some of the special operations forces units in the Mexican military are issued the Five- Seven as well as the FN P90 personal defense weapon, which also shoots the 5.7x28 round, and the cartels are obtaining some of these weapons and the armor-piercing ammunition from them and not from the United States. Conversely, we see bulk 5.56 mm and 7.62 mm ammunition bought in the United States and smuggled into Mexico, where it is used in fully-automatic AK- 47s and M16s purchased elsewhere. As noted above, China has become an increasingly common source for military weapons like grenades and fully automatic assault rifles in recent years.
To really understand Mexico’s gun problem, however, it is necessary to recognize that the same economic law of supply and demand that fuels drug smuggling into the United States also fuels gun smuggling into Mexico. Black-market guns in Mexico can fetch up to 300 percent of their normal purchase price — a profit margin rivaling the narcotics the cartels sell. Even if it were somehow possible to hermetically seal the U.S.-Mexico border and shut off all the guns coming from the United States, the cartels would still be able to obtain weapons elsewhere — just as narcotics would continue to flow into the United States from other places. The United States does provide cheap and easy access to certain types of weapons and ammunition, but as demonstrated by groups such as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, weapons can be easily obtained from other sources via the black arms market — albeit at a higher price.
There has clearly been a long and well-documented history of arms smuggling across the U.S.- Mexico border, but it is important to recognize that, while the United States is a significant source of certain classes of weapons and ammunition, it is by no means the source of 90 percent of the weapons used by the Mexican cartels, as is commonly asserted.
http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20110209-mexicos-gun-supply-and-90-percent-myth
SR: This post is directly from the following link from STRATFOR:
http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20110209-mexicos-gun-supply-and-90-percent-myth
STRATFOR provides very high quality information long before much of it hits the main-stream-media. In fact I've seen many "News" outlets get their information directly from STRATFOR.
Mexico's" Gun Supply and the 90 Percent Myth is republished with permission of STRATFOR.
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