Restraint & Selective Engagement

In terms of National Security Strategy, restraint and selective engagement are by no means polar opposites. On a scale between total isolationism and total engagement, each has found a means of moderation. On the one hand, restraint considers itself a rational means of taking advantage of the benefits of isolationism, yet without the irrationality of it. On the other hand, engagement is just that, selective. It suggests the educated selection of the battles to be fought, rather than fighting them all.

Each strategy has basic glaring similarities; they both consider the foremost objective of American national security to be protection of the American homeland and general protection of American constitutional democracy, freedoms, assets, economy, and so forth. They diverge, however, in terms of how best to accomplish that objective.

The restraint argument focuses largely on the allocation of finite resources. There is a certain end to American resources and those resources are better spent at home than abroad. The argument suggests that American resources sent abroad are resources which, first, are being used to subsidize the defense of America's allies, allies which in most instances can afford to subsidize their own defense; second are enabling America's allies to divert their own defense spending to other avenues; and third, are causing an unfair competition scenario for American companies overseas. Every dollar America spends to protect Europe or East Asia, is a dollar those places don't have to spend to protect themselves, enabling them to allocate their own resources to other endeavors, such as subsidizing automobile and electronics manufacturers which directly compete with American firms for the same consumer spending.

The selective engagement strategy seems to circumvent this argument by countering that if Europe and East Asia were left to vie for their own defense, regional arms races may ensue. Perhaps Germany would compete with France for regional military dominance, the UK with Germany, etc. If left to their own devices, those areas could digress into their old habits of old world politicking, jostling for power, dirty dealing, war making etc. With the United States playing the major power broker in these regions, the lesser powers are left to focus their energies, and their resources, on other, less lethal endeavors.

The restraint strategy asserts that the U.S. spends many times what its nearest competitor does on defense expenditures and that a good share of those dollars would be better spent on domestic issues such as infrastructure, education, and social programs (America's nearest competitor in terms of gross defense spending is China. In 2008 the U.S. spent $607 Billion while China spent $84.9 Billion (CIA World Factbook)). The assertion is that America's defense edge is significant and that once a certain threshold is reached, America's return on its defense investment is minimal. After all, for what purpose should a superpower have need to spend seven times what its nearest competitor spends to insure its security? Especially when that competitor can't even dream of matching the technological edge of the American defense apparatus, and America has a unique and distinct advantage in terms of its geography, being surrounded on two sides by water and the other two by relatively benign, yet friendly neighbors.

Selective engagement counters this argument by stating that security comes at a cost, and economic productivity, both American and otherwise, requires security. The maintenance of U.S. military presence overseas insures the status quo. Peace prevails because everyone is happy to let the Americans maintain the defenses. If America withdraws, a power vacuum follows and arms races and power struggles ensue.

The national security strategies of restraint and selective engagement are moderate forms of their extreme selves; total isolationism and total engagement. Each has rational arguments in its favor, and each has flaws.


Gholz, Eugene, Daryl G. Press, and Harvey M. Sapolsky. “Come Home, America: The Strategy of Restraint in the Face of Temptation.” In America’s Strategic Choices: Revised Edition, edited by Michael E. Brown, Owen R. Cote, Jr., Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, 55-98. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2000.

Art, Robert J. “Geopolitics Updated: The Strategy of Selective Engagement.” In America’s Strategic Choices: Revised Edition, edited by Michael E. Brown, Owen R. Cote, Jr., Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, 141-178. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2000.

U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. CIA World Factbook. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/ (accessed December 18, 2009).