Thursday, February 4, 2010

American Interest in Combating Terrorism

Islamic extremism constitutes a real and persistent threat to the national security of the United States, both at home and abroad. The level of the threat is debatable, however, and its interpretation will vary from one entity to another. For example, a liberal activist in San Francisco probably interprets the threat of Islamic extremism differently than does a Marine stationed in Kandahar, Afghanistan. The general threat posed by Islamic extremism has certain indisputable factors, however, by which it is relatively simple to categorize. Islamic extremism is a threat of vital interest to the United States.

As explained by Nuechterlein, the threshold of vital interest is breached when there exists a credible threat to the security of the United States and “the leadership refuses to compromise” on negotiations to determine the outcome (Nuechterlein 2001. 18). It is clear, at least insofar as the George W. Bush administration was concerned, that the leadership refused to compromise on the outcome of the conflict between the competing ideologies of Islamic extremism and Democracy. The Bush administration determined that military force was a rational and necessary means of defeating the ideologies of Islamic extremism.

The specific threats posed by Islamic extremism are debatable as well. The objectives of modern Islamic extremism are as varied as the groups which espouse it. An indisputable thread which weaves throughout these entities is the use of violence against civilians to accomplish the group’s objectives. This factor of violence in conjunction with the secretive and pervasive nature of Islamic extremist groups, presents a threat which, if not countered, could infiltrate and undermine the foundation of the United States of America in a way which no threat has heretofore been able to accomplish.

Assuming the general objective of Islamic extremism is to eliminate the threat to Islamic culture in the Middle East and elsewhere posed by western ideologies, one might reasonably assume that the ultimate victory for this extremism would be a defeated and deflated United States, it being the banner-bearer of western ideologies. The greater the defeat, the better for Islamic extremism. A defeated and deflated United States would be one where its government and people are unwilling and unable to project its values, power, and influence throughout the rest of the world. This extremism has demonstrated a desire and an ability to inflict serious, even catastrophic loss on the homeland of the United States. For this reason, the leadership of the United States can reasonably assume that Islamic extremism, willing to use violence, even extreme violence, to accomplish its objectives, poses real and credible threat to the national security of the United States.

The four tiers of national interest, as defined by Nuechterlein, include survival, vital, major, and peripheral. A survival interest is one by which the survival of the state is immediately and clearly at stake, of which Islamic extremism is obviously not one. A vital interest is one by which the survival of the state may be at stake and it is determined by the powers that be, that immediate action is necessary to defend the state to insure its survival. A major interest is one by which the interests of the state are or may be threatened either at home or abroad but not to the extent that the survival of the state is in jeopardy. A peripheral interest is one by which assets of the state or private citizens of the state may be in jeopardy but which will not impact the general operation of the state (Nuechterlein 2001. 18-19). Islamic extremism is clearly less than a survival interest, but greater than a major interest. Islamic extremism is a vital interest to the United States because of the demonstrated will and ability it has to inflict damage on the United States’ homeland.


Nuechterlein, Donald E. AMERICA RECOMMITTED: A Superpower Assesses its Role in a Turbulent World. Lexington Kentucky: The University Press of Kentucky. 2001.

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