Cooperative, Collective, and Concert Security

Collective security entails a theory of everyone against the aggressor. It comes into play when there is an aggressive action on the part of a state against another state and includes action by all other states to mitigate the aggression of the aggressor. The theory of collective security covers a range of potential options along the continuum ranging from a true collective security arrangement to a concert of collectivity. It is founded on the principle of preponderance of force which suggests that no state would act aggressively if the certain result would be its own demise. The preponderance of force promises ultimate superiority of the force responding to the aggressor. Only in the case of a suicidal state would the preponderance of force be insufficient to dissuade an aggressor state from acting malevolently.

A true collective security arrangement is the true “everyone against the aggressor” philosophy and includes an official agreement on the part of “all” the states. The agreement includes language which would legally bind all the states to react decisively to a show of aggression by any other state. This philosophy runs counter to the balance of power philosophy which is founded on state to state defense competition to dissuade aggression. Each state is responsible to produce sufficient defense deterrent to convince its neighbors that aggression would be self-destructive. A collective security arrangement insures that the aggressor will fail in his aggression, assuming that the collective in total is stronger than the aggressor.

A concert is a case in which a league of great power states contrive a treaty (not necessarily a legally binding one) to insure the stability and security of the whole. The great power states agree amongst themselves to come to the aid of a victimized state, but only after deliberation, or as the result of some predetermined arrangement. A concert is not necessarily binding on the great power states and each stated could choose to act or remain neutral. The combined power of the great power states would ideally be sufficient to counter the potential for an aggressor state to act aggressively. If the great power states, however, had insufficient grounds to react to aggression, said aggression would likely not be deterred. Therefore, only in cases in which the great power states had skin in the game would they be inclined to act on behalf of a weaker state.

Cooperation, in contrast to collective security, chooses a less formal means of reacting to aggressive states. It opts for a process of selectively engaging rogue states based on broad multilateral, recognition of the threat, multilateral planning, and multilateral execution. Each case is individually considered based on cost-benefit analysis. This is the process used in engaging Saddam Hussein following his 1990 invasion of Kuwait. The international community came together, considered the costs and benefits, and chose to act decisively to expel Saddam Hussein’s minions from the weaker state. As with collective security, reaction ideally includes a preponderance of force which enables a quick and decisive victory. Cooperation seeks the legitimacy of a broad coalition of international approval but is not based necessarily on a preconceived written agreement. It relies essentially on the cooperation of states to achieve universally beneficial results. Universality is the key in this sense. If universal benefit is not readily perceived, cooperation among nations is difficult. Cooperation assumes the willing participation of numerous states, without which, the proposed endeavor is likely to lose its credibility.

The aforementioned theories of national and international security fall into the realm of multilateralism. Each implies the necessity of states to seek international backing to one degree or another. Each recognizes the importance and strength of a coalition by which to accomplish stability and strength in the international community, and each seems to recognize the potential danger in unilateralism.



Nolan, Janne E. “Cooperative Security in the United States.” In America’s Strategic Choices: Revised Edition, edited by Michael E. Brown, Owen R. Cote, Jr., Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, 179-217. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2000.

Kupchan, Charles A., and Clifford A. Kupchan. “Concerts, Collective Security, and the Future of Europe.” In America’s Strategic Choices: Revised Edition, edited by Michael E. Brown, Owen R. Cote, Jr., Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, 218-265. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2000.

Kupchan, Charles A., and Clifford A. Kupchan. “Concerts, Collective Security, and the Future of Europe: A Retrospective.” In America’s Strategic Choices: Revised Edition, edited by Michael E. Brown, Owen R. Cote, Jr., Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, 266-272. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2000.