America's style of national security policy is founded in the long entrenched philosophy that America itself is morally superior to its compatriot states. The style of American national security policy is one of assumed moral clarity and justification. It is understood that America's national security is a matter vital importance to the whole of the human race, not only to Americans, because the fundamental principles upon which the democracy operates will ultimately benefit the whole of the human family. The national security interests of the United States are defined in terms of good and evil, right and wrong. The fundamental assumption underlying American national security policy is that America's interests are inherently good, and any who would oppose those interests are inherently evil.(Hook 2008, 9)
The style is not confined to national security interests alone, but permeates American society as a whole. Its very foundation, as explained by Hook and Spanier, is defined in terms of the good people of the new world in conflict with the evil nature of the political old world (Hook 2008, 9). In this supposition, the people are believed to be peaceful in nature and will naturally go about minding their own business, making a living, raising families, and enjoying life, if only left alone by the state to do as they deem appropriate. It is the people who are endowed by their creator with certain unalienable rights. It is the people with whom the ultimate authority resides to determine appropriate courses of action. It is the people who will select leaders, make laws, define justice, declare and wage war.
The power ultimately resides with the people because the belief is that the people are inherently good. The state on the other hand, is inherently in need of “checks and balances” in order to counter its inherent tendency toward abuse of power. In this supposition, the state is inherently evil, hungry for ever more power, lustful of control, inhuman, uncaring, unempathetic, immoral, and untrustworthy. Indeed, far from being trustworthy, it takes the people's constant and careful watchful eye to ensure that the state serves the people, rather than the opposite. Again, it is the people who must ensure the continued righteousness of the government and stewardship of power.
This being the case in the new world, the American style of approaching national security policy assumes the consumption of the old world by inherently evil state entities. As such, the conflicts of the old world presuppose inherently evil origins; evil leaders with evil designs and evil objectives. With this in mind, it is easy to assume that the American democracy governed by inherently good people of the new world would have only the best and most moral of intentions, the least of which would be beneficial for all the human race; and any who would oppose those universally beneficial intentions can only have universally harmful intentions themselves.
The American style of national security policy is a symptom of a deeply rooted American sense of divine destiny. This destiny is the result of 400 years of Judeo-Christian permeation through the fabric of American society. It is neither a good thing nor a bad thing, but just the way it is. It is what has made America America. Without it, America would likely have been much more like the world from whence it came.
Hook, Steven W. & John Spanier. American Foreign Policy Since World War II. Washington D.C.: CQ Press. 2008.
Showing posts with label balance of power. Show all posts
Showing posts with label balance of power. Show all posts
Thursday, February 4, 2010
Potential Challengers to American Primacy
The most obvious competitor presently capable of challenging U.S. primacy is the European Union. The E.U., although not hostile toward the U.S. or its interests, is capable on multiple levels of challenging the strength of the American monolith. More so than all other potential competitors, and possibly those competitors combined, the E.U. has wealth. Wealth is a necessity if a state or group of states wants to be strong in any worthy endeavor. Without sufficient capital, no other aspect of interstate relations can flourish. Insufficient capital will undermine any state's cross border relations but in a competition for the title of global hegemon, a state must be capable of competing monetarily with the one which holds that position.
Monetarily, the E.U. is really the only potential competitor which can come close to challenging the U.S. (Art 2003, 242). Although the E.U. boasted the world's largest GDP in 2008 at $14.94 trillion U.S. dollars (PPP) (the U.S. 2008 GDP was slightly less at $14.44 trillion) (CIA World Factbook), it is far from certain that the entity as a whole is capable of harnessing that GDP in order to make a credible challenge to American global dominance. Inasmuch as the E.U. is a work in progress and seems to be in the process of working out innumerable kinks in its overall existence, there is a great deal of unknown in terms of E.U. capability across the board. Indeed it seems a little premature to even calculate an E.U. GDP since many of its member states’ citizens have yet to identify themselves first as E.U. members rather than their own nationalities.
With the potential to rival the U.S. monetarily, the E.U. is on fertile ground to challenge the U.S. for military supremacy. According to Art, military equality requires little more than a comparable military; comparable in size, ground, sea, and air assets, technological advancement, etc. By this standard, according to Art, no other state actor has the potential to rival American military supremacy over the next few decades but the E.U. Presently the E.U. has 27 member states with 3 negotiating entry (Europa), and a population of 491.5 million (CIA World Factbook). In conjunction with its monetary capacity, the E.U. could probably produce a military to rival that of the U.S. However, the advantage the U.S. has in this regard is that it has been producing superior military capability for two full generations, whereas, other than a piece-meal, patchwork military with units thrown in from various states within the E.U., the E.U. would need many years to produce a uniquely European Union military capable of rivaling that of the U.S. on the battlefield. It is problematic in many ways to believe that the piece-meal strategy of military building would be an efficient and effective answer to American military hegemony (Art 2003, 243).
The other potential rivals for American hegemony would be China and Russia, likely in that order. These two states have unique problems in such an ambition. China's military infrastructure and tradition is seriously lacking in comparison to that of the U.S. China would rely almost entirely on a consistently increasing GDP at a rate of 7 percent per annum to match American might within three decades. Without said increase, China may never obtain parity with the U.S. Russia, on the other hand, has the infrastructure and tradition in place to potentially rival the U.S. as a global power, but that infrastructure and tradition is badly deteriorated and out of date, and it would likely take a few decades to upgrade and retrench that military prowess to enable a competent rivalry with the U.S. In either case, America seems firmly entrenched as the singular global power for at least two decades and probably three (Art 2003, 243-244).
The E.U. and the U.S. have a uniquely intertwined history and culture. As a result, it would be unlikely that the two would ever be at military odds with each other, but rather, should the E.U. develop a comparable military might to that of the U.S., the two would in all probability, dominate the world together in a co-equal partnership, with cooperation much like that seen in NATO. The strength of the E.U. is an asset to America and the strength of America is an asset to the E.U. It would be in America's best interests for the E.U. to develop into a formidable competitor in the modern world.
Art, Robert J. A Grand Strategy for America. Ithica, New York: Cornell University Press. 2003.
Europa: The EU at a Glance. http://europa.eu/abc/european_countries/candidate_countries/index_en.htm. (accessed December 13, 2009)
U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. CIA World Factbook. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ee.html (accessed December 14, 2009).
Europa: The EU at a Glance. http://europa.eu/abc/european_countries/eu_members/index_en.htm (accessed Decmeber 13, 2009).
Monetarily, the E.U. is really the only potential competitor which can come close to challenging the U.S. (Art 2003, 242). Although the E.U. boasted the world's largest GDP in 2008 at $14.94 trillion U.S. dollars (PPP) (the U.S. 2008 GDP was slightly less at $14.44 trillion) (CIA World Factbook), it is far from certain that the entity as a whole is capable of harnessing that GDP in order to make a credible challenge to American global dominance. Inasmuch as the E.U. is a work in progress and seems to be in the process of working out innumerable kinks in its overall existence, there is a great deal of unknown in terms of E.U. capability across the board. Indeed it seems a little premature to even calculate an E.U. GDP since many of its member states’ citizens have yet to identify themselves first as E.U. members rather than their own nationalities.
With the potential to rival the U.S. monetarily, the E.U. is on fertile ground to challenge the U.S. for military supremacy. According to Art, military equality requires little more than a comparable military; comparable in size, ground, sea, and air assets, technological advancement, etc. By this standard, according to Art, no other state actor has the potential to rival American military supremacy over the next few decades but the E.U. Presently the E.U. has 27 member states with 3 negotiating entry (Europa), and a population of 491.5 million (CIA World Factbook). In conjunction with its monetary capacity, the E.U. could probably produce a military to rival that of the U.S. However, the advantage the U.S. has in this regard is that it has been producing superior military capability for two full generations, whereas, other than a piece-meal, patchwork military with units thrown in from various states within the E.U., the E.U. would need many years to produce a uniquely European Union military capable of rivaling that of the U.S. on the battlefield. It is problematic in many ways to believe that the piece-meal strategy of military building would be an efficient and effective answer to American military hegemony (Art 2003, 243).
The other potential rivals for American hegemony would be China and Russia, likely in that order. These two states have unique problems in such an ambition. China's military infrastructure and tradition is seriously lacking in comparison to that of the U.S. China would rely almost entirely on a consistently increasing GDP at a rate of 7 percent per annum to match American might within three decades. Without said increase, China may never obtain parity with the U.S. Russia, on the other hand, has the infrastructure and tradition in place to potentially rival the U.S. as a global power, but that infrastructure and tradition is badly deteriorated and out of date, and it would likely take a few decades to upgrade and retrench that military prowess to enable a competent rivalry with the U.S. In either case, America seems firmly entrenched as the singular global power for at least two decades and probably three (Art 2003, 243-244).
The E.U. and the U.S. have a uniquely intertwined history and culture. As a result, it would be unlikely that the two would ever be at military odds with each other, but rather, should the E.U. develop a comparable military might to that of the U.S., the two would in all probability, dominate the world together in a co-equal partnership, with cooperation much like that seen in NATO. The strength of the E.U. is an asset to America and the strength of America is an asset to the E.U. It would be in America's best interests for the E.U. to develop into a formidable competitor in the modern world.
Art, Robert J. A Grand Strategy for America. Ithica, New York: Cornell University Press. 2003.
Europa: The EU at a Glance. http://europa.eu/abc/european_countries/candidate_countries/index_en.htm. (accessed December 13, 2009)
U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. CIA World Factbook. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ee.html (accessed December 14, 2009).
Europa: The EU at a Glance. http://europa.eu/abc/european_countries/eu_members/index_en.htm (accessed Decmeber 13, 2009).
Labels:
balance of power,
China,
E.U.,
European Union,
hegemon,
hegemony,
military,
NATO,
Power,
primacy,
Russia,
supremacy
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