In current international law, the basis for use of military force by one state against another is found in article two and article 51 of the United Nations Charter. Although these articles reference state to state use of force the ultimate authority when it comes to an assessment of whether a state's use of force against another is justified is the UN Security Council. The Security Council is also the enforcing authority of international law regarding use of force on the international stage.
Article two of the UN Charter is fairly explicit regarding use of force issues. Article two states, “All members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means...” and further states, “All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state...” (UN Charter, Article 2). The use of force seems well enough defined in article two and seems to permit little variance from the standard of peace. Article 51, however, permits some exceptions: “Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations” (UN Charter, Article 51). This title is problematic to some extent in that it permits self defense but does not define the extent to which force may be used as a means of self defense. Article 51 further explains that when a state engages in the use of force as a means of self defense, it is required by the UN Charter to immediately report the incident to the Security Council which will then determine whether or not the force was justified.
This lack of clarity poses problems for states such as Israel when responding to the repeated assault on its civilians by Hamas insurgents. Relatively few Israelis may be injured or killed as a result of the assault, but Israel, based on article 51, may use “force” to defend itself. The level of force Israel may use is not specified, so Israel is free to use its own judgment in determining the best response. Of course, following the incident, Israel is at the mercy of the Security Council to determine whether or not the use of force was justified.
The Security Council is inconsistent when interpreting use of force issues. A great deal of politicking is involved and inasmuch as the issue of interpretation is solely in the hands of the Security Council, offending or defending entity may be justly or unjustly treated based on the members of the council at that time. The Council's five permanent members also have universal veto power. Any one of the five may veto a resolution unilaterally, making that specific issue moot, with nothing further to do on it. The result is a UN Security Council which is very much a barking dog with no teeth. Every action the council takes must have total unanimity among the five permanent members or whatever the issue, someone is bound to veto. This of course was built in as a means of protecting the five great powers of the post World War II world. Any one of the five could not very well have the UN Security Council passing resolutions which would be harmful to that member's constituency.
The use of force in international scenarios is regulated by the articles two and 51 of the UN Charter and largely limited to matters of self defense. The Security Council may vote to use force to enforce international law as it deems necessary. The UN Security Council is the enforcement apparatus of the UN and is responsible for maintenance of peace and security in international matters.
United Nations. Charter of the United Nations: Chapter I, Article 2. June 26, 1945. http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter1.shtml. (accessed November 14, 2009).
United Nations. Charter of the United Nations: Chapter VII, Article 51. June 26, 1945. http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter7.shtml. (accessed November 14, 2009).
Showing posts with label UN Article II. Show all posts
Showing posts with label UN Article II. Show all posts
Thursday, February 4, 2010
Wednesday, December 2, 2009
Humanitarian Intervention
Approval of any major action taken by the United Nations must be given by the UN Security Council. Unfortunately, any of the five permanent members of the Security Council have the ability to veto any course of action voted upon by the council. As a result, the bureaucracy within the council virtually neuters its ability to take quick, decisive action. Article II basically states that no member state can take any action within or against any other state without the approval of the UN.
In some cases, member states have been compelled to circumvent the UN and its bureaucracy laden structure in order to accomplish meaningful humanitarian missions. A perfect example is the war in Kosovo in 1999. The UN Security Council (Russia and China) blocked any attempt by the other powers to prevent a repetition of the 1995 Bosnia genocide. Once again, the Christian Serbs were setting out to cleanse the former Yugoslavia by getting rid of the Muslim Albanian Kosovars. Following the botched attempt by the UN at “Peacekeeping” in Bosnia, the western powers on the UN Security Council flanked the UN by engaging in Kosovo by way of NATO, the consequential trans-Atlantic military alliance.
The gamut of problems which fall under the umbrella of humanitarian crisis is extensive, ranging from mere food aid for disaster relief, to military intervention to prevent or halt genocide. The military end of the gamut is the more controversial within the UN and has a tendency to cause strife between member states.
The moral dilemma between engaging in a humanitarian crisis and ignoring it is more complex than could be covered in multiple volumes. However, the west, due to its adherence to a “superior moral compass”, has typically engaged or considered engaging in various types of humanitarian crises in order to prevent or lessen the damage caused thereby. The totalitarian history of the west’s Asian counterparts seems to lean Russia and China away from humanitarian causes.
In democratic societies, the danger of intervening is that the citizenry is typically not very keen on seeing body bags come home in exchange for humanitarian benefit in some far off land. Inasmuch as the people hold the ultimate power in a democracy, elected officials are likely more willing to listen to popular opinion and therefore less likely to take risks which would have little political value.
The dilemma lies in the moral compass. It’s obvious that it would be morally commendable to intervene in some humanitarian crisis if the cost was zero, and most Americans would probably agree. But when the perceived costs of that intervention exceed its perceived value to the public, even if the costs might be well worth the outcome to a benefitted group, officials are likely to steer away from committing to it. The advantage to elected officials in a UN intervention, rather than a unilateral one, is that they can take credit if it goes well, but shrug it off on the UN if it doesn’t. If things had gone badly wrong in Kosovo, President Clinton would have heard about it in a bad way.
A major complication with circumventing the UN, as in the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, is that other states, member and non-member alike, may then use that action as justification and precedent in performing their own unilateral action. Russia may easily have used that very case when it invaded Georgia in 2008. This principle applies to humanitarian intervention as easily as military endeavors. China could easily invade a neighbor on humanitarian grounds using the precedent established by NATO in Kosovo. The advantage NATO has in this instance is that NATO is a broad coalition of numerous nations. The problem is that unilateral action undermines the international order established within the UN. If states rampantly disregard the principles of the UN, it might as well not exist.
In some cases, member states have been compelled to circumvent the UN and its bureaucracy laden structure in order to accomplish meaningful humanitarian missions. A perfect example is the war in Kosovo in 1999. The UN Security Council (Russia and China) blocked any attempt by the other powers to prevent a repetition of the 1995 Bosnia genocide. Once again, the Christian Serbs were setting out to cleanse the former Yugoslavia by getting rid of the Muslim Albanian Kosovars. Following the botched attempt by the UN at “Peacekeeping” in Bosnia, the western powers on the UN Security Council flanked the UN by engaging in Kosovo by way of NATO, the consequential trans-Atlantic military alliance.
The gamut of problems which fall under the umbrella of humanitarian crisis is extensive, ranging from mere food aid for disaster relief, to military intervention to prevent or halt genocide. The military end of the gamut is the more controversial within the UN and has a tendency to cause strife between member states.
The moral dilemma between engaging in a humanitarian crisis and ignoring it is more complex than could be covered in multiple volumes. However, the west, due to its adherence to a “superior moral compass”, has typically engaged or considered engaging in various types of humanitarian crises in order to prevent or lessen the damage caused thereby. The totalitarian history of the west’s Asian counterparts seems to lean Russia and China away from humanitarian causes.
In democratic societies, the danger of intervening is that the citizenry is typically not very keen on seeing body bags come home in exchange for humanitarian benefit in some far off land. Inasmuch as the people hold the ultimate power in a democracy, elected officials are likely more willing to listen to popular opinion and therefore less likely to take risks which would have little political value.
The dilemma lies in the moral compass. It’s obvious that it would be morally commendable to intervene in some humanitarian crisis if the cost was zero, and most Americans would probably agree. But when the perceived costs of that intervention exceed its perceived value to the public, even if the costs might be well worth the outcome to a benefitted group, officials are likely to steer away from committing to it. The advantage to elected officials in a UN intervention, rather than a unilateral one, is that they can take credit if it goes well, but shrug it off on the UN if it doesn’t. If things had gone badly wrong in Kosovo, President Clinton would have heard about it in a bad way.
A major complication with circumventing the UN, as in the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, is that other states, member and non-member alike, may then use that action as justification and precedent in performing their own unilateral action. Russia may easily have used that very case when it invaded Georgia in 2008. This principle applies to humanitarian intervention as easily as military endeavors. China could easily invade a neighbor on humanitarian grounds using the precedent established by NATO in Kosovo. The advantage NATO has in this instance is that NATO is a broad coalition of numerous nations. The problem is that unilateral action undermines the international order established within the UN. If states rampantly disregard the principles of the UN, it might as well not exist.
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