To try to define terrorism as either strictly a law enforcement or a military issue seems to me to be an unwise attempt to make black and white a very grey issue. Terrorism has no widely accepted definition and, as the recent shooting at Fort Hood, Texas, demonstrated, isn’t likely to get one anytime soon. For this reason I believe it important to answer this question based on the specifics of each case.
Not only is it problematic to try to define terrorism, it defies reason to try to lump responsibility and jurisdiction for such vastly different instances as (just as mere examples) the Murrah Federal Building bombing in Oklahoma City and the attack on the USS Cole in the Port of Aden, both of which were obvious cases of terrorism, under the same entity. For the same reason, it is difficult to grant explicit jurisdiction to fight terrorism to either the military or to law enforcement. Terrorism is such a general term, with meaning differing from person to person, that doing so would be utterly foolish.
In many instances, the military has no jurisdiction, nor place, in dealing with terrorism. The Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building bombing is a prime example. I would be appalled to find military investigators or intelligence units investigating such an incident within the bounds of the United States. In this and other like instances, terrorism is clearly under the purview of law enforcement, either local or federal.
On the other hand, the military has similar jurisdiction when dealing with battlefield components of terrorism or terrorist acts perpetrated by or against its own personnel, such as the USS Cole or the Fort Hood example.
The question has only been muddled by the conflict between right and left leaning politicians with specific agendas within the United States. It was begun by the Bush administration’s declaration of war on terrorism, defining the conflict between democracy and totalitarianism as a war. It might more accurately be called an ideological struggle, a struggle between conflicting, mutually exclusive ideologies. If the whole “war” thing had never been introduced, it might have simplified things. Ironically, I don’t recall any real quandary when it came to dealing with “prisoners” of the cold war, once again a conflict between ideologies.
The conflict then is what to do with “terrorists” once our military has taken them captive in a foreign combat zone. I don’t believe the issue has ever been what to do with American citizens, or even foreign nationals, arrested on US soil, by US law enforcement, for either planning or executing a terrorist attack. This is where it gets fuzzy in regard to US national security. If there is insufficient evidence to convict a “terrorist” for criminal activity, and yet, the person was picked up fighting alongside terrorists and against US military personnel, is it rational and reasonable to just send the person back to where he’s from, knowing that he may just take up arms again against US military personnel?
I believe the answer is, if it is indeed a “war”, the international laws regarding the conduct of war, ought to be applied. If the “war” is still ongoing, the person ought to be held as a prisoner of that war until its conclusion. If it is something short of war, the person ought to be sent back to where he’s from. My critics will say, “If you send him back, he’ll just kill again.” They’ll also argue that by being held indefinitely, he may have developed animosity toward America where there was none, and so, he may be dangerous now when he wasn’t before. To my critics I would cite the Declaration of Independence, “We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.” The critics will then say, “those rights are reserved for American citizens.” To that I would say, “ALL MEN…..” not just American citizens. It is contrary to the moral standard of America to hold individuals indefinitely, without giving them the right to apply for their liberty, or being able to prove their innocence. That's what Joseph Stalin and Saddam Hussein would do.
The American Intelligence Community is among the best in the world, if not THE best. There ought to be a very rational, and legal, means of monitoring these individuals, and using them, once tossed back into the population, to further develop America’s knowledge of Islamic extremist networks. Perhaps it seems simplistic, after all, I’m not an expert in such things, but biologists do this sort of thing all the time. They tag birds, animals, and even fish, then monitor their movements once back in the wild. There ought to be a great way of taking advantage of the situation and the people America has in its custody.
Saturday, December 5, 2009
Wednesday, December 2, 2009
Humanitarian Intervention
Approval of any major action taken by the United Nations must be given by the UN Security Council. Unfortunately, any of the five permanent members of the Security Council have the ability to veto any course of action voted upon by the council. As a result, the bureaucracy within the council virtually neuters its ability to take quick, decisive action. Article II basically states that no member state can take any action within or against any other state without the approval of the UN.
In some cases, member states have been compelled to circumvent the UN and its bureaucracy laden structure in order to accomplish meaningful humanitarian missions. A perfect example is the war in Kosovo in 1999. The UN Security Council (Russia and China) blocked any attempt by the other powers to prevent a repetition of the 1995 Bosnia genocide. Once again, the Christian Serbs were setting out to cleanse the former Yugoslavia by getting rid of the Muslim Albanian Kosovars. Following the botched attempt by the UN at “Peacekeeping” in Bosnia, the western powers on the UN Security Council flanked the UN by engaging in Kosovo by way of NATO, the consequential trans-Atlantic military alliance.
The gamut of problems which fall under the umbrella of humanitarian crisis is extensive, ranging from mere food aid for disaster relief, to military intervention to prevent or halt genocide. The military end of the gamut is the more controversial within the UN and has a tendency to cause strife between member states.
The moral dilemma between engaging in a humanitarian crisis and ignoring it is more complex than could be covered in multiple volumes. However, the west, due to its adherence to a “superior moral compass”, has typically engaged or considered engaging in various types of humanitarian crises in order to prevent or lessen the damage caused thereby. The totalitarian history of the west’s Asian counterparts seems to lean Russia and China away from humanitarian causes.
In democratic societies, the danger of intervening is that the citizenry is typically not very keen on seeing body bags come home in exchange for humanitarian benefit in some far off land. Inasmuch as the people hold the ultimate power in a democracy, elected officials are likely more willing to listen to popular opinion and therefore less likely to take risks which would have little political value.
The dilemma lies in the moral compass. It’s obvious that it would be morally commendable to intervene in some humanitarian crisis if the cost was zero, and most Americans would probably agree. But when the perceived costs of that intervention exceed its perceived value to the public, even if the costs might be well worth the outcome to a benefitted group, officials are likely to steer away from committing to it. The advantage to elected officials in a UN intervention, rather than a unilateral one, is that they can take credit if it goes well, but shrug it off on the UN if it doesn’t. If things had gone badly wrong in Kosovo, President Clinton would have heard about it in a bad way.
A major complication with circumventing the UN, as in the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, is that other states, member and non-member alike, may then use that action as justification and precedent in performing their own unilateral action. Russia may easily have used that very case when it invaded Georgia in 2008. This principle applies to humanitarian intervention as easily as military endeavors. China could easily invade a neighbor on humanitarian grounds using the precedent established by NATO in Kosovo. The advantage NATO has in this instance is that NATO is a broad coalition of numerous nations. The problem is that unilateral action undermines the international order established within the UN. If states rampantly disregard the principles of the UN, it might as well not exist.
In some cases, member states have been compelled to circumvent the UN and its bureaucracy laden structure in order to accomplish meaningful humanitarian missions. A perfect example is the war in Kosovo in 1999. The UN Security Council (Russia and China) blocked any attempt by the other powers to prevent a repetition of the 1995 Bosnia genocide. Once again, the Christian Serbs were setting out to cleanse the former Yugoslavia by getting rid of the Muslim Albanian Kosovars. Following the botched attempt by the UN at “Peacekeeping” in Bosnia, the western powers on the UN Security Council flanked the UN by engaging in Kosovo by way of NATO, the consequential trans-Atlantic military alliance.
The gamut of problems which fall under the umbrella of humanitarian crisis is extensive, ranging from mere food aid for disaster relief, to military intervention to prevent or halt genocide. The military end of the gamut is the more controversial within the UN and has a tendency to cause strife between member states.
The moral dilemma between engaging in a humanitarian crisis and ignoring it is more complex than could be covered in multiple volumes. However, the west, due to its adherence to a “superior moral compass”, has typically engaged or considered engaging in various types of humanitarian crises in order to prevent or lessen the damage caused thereby. The totalitarian history of the west’s Asian counterparts seems to lean Russia and China away from humanitarian causes.
In democratic societies, the danger of intervening is that the citizenry is typically not very keen on seeing body bags come home in exchange for humanitarian benefit in some far off land. Inasmuch as the people hold the ultimate power in a democracy, elected officials are likely more willing to listen to popular opinion and therefore less likely to take risks which would have little political value.
The dilemma lies in the moral compass. It’s obvious that it would be morally commendable to intervene in some humanitarian crisis if the cost was zero, and most Americans would probably agree. But when the perceived costs of that intervention exceed its perceived value to the public, even if the costs might be well worth the outcome to a benefitted group, officials are likely to steer away from committing to it. The advantage to elected officials in a UN intervention, rather than a unilateral one, is that they can take credit if it goes well, but shrug it off on the UN if it doesn’t. If things had gone badly wrong in Kosovo, President Clinton would have heard about it in a bad way.
A major complication with circumventing the UN, as in the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, is that other states, member and non-member alike, may then use that action as justification and precedent in performing their own unilateral action. Russia may easily have used that very case when it invaded Georgia in 2008. This principle applies to humanitarian intervention as easily as military endeavors. China could easily invade a neighbor on humanitarian grounds using the precedent established by NATO in Kosovo. The advantage NATO has in this instance is that NATO is a broad coalition of numerous nations. The problem is that unilateral action undermines the international order established within the UN. If states rampantly disregard the principles of the UN, it might as well not exist.
US Sovereignty vs. the UN
As a nation which prides itself on the “rule of law” in the social fabric of society; and one which supposedly respects and admires morality, justice, equality under the law, ethics – in short “traditional Judeo-Christian values” – in that society; and as a nation which ultimately values peace in order that one may freely go about life without the interference of war or crime, the United States of America must inherently appreciate the existence of the United Nations and the order it provides in the international arena. However, the UN Charter explicitly guarantees the sovereignty of nations, in other words, the UN is not the government of the world.
The United States of America, as an independent sovereign nation, whether guaranteed by the UN Charter or not, implicitly reserves the right to govern its own affairs in a way which best accomplishes the needs and protection of its people, its territory, and its existence. As a sovereign nation, if the interests of the United States of America come in conflict with the UN or any of its member states, if there is no middle ground to be compromised, the United States must act adamantly on behalf of its people out of obligation to them to insure their interests. The allegiance of the governing bodies of the United States is to its own people, first and foremost, and only secondarily to the betterment of the human condition across the globe, or to whatever other cause may arise.
As it pertains to the issue of national security, the UN is an excellent means to a better end, not the end itself. The UN is not the government of the world. As demonstrated by President George W. Bush in 2003 with his invasion of Iraq, whether one is in agreement or not with the act, the United States reserves the right to act for itself even it is if in conflict with the United Nations and its set of governing principles, or in disagreement with its member states. The governing principles of the United Nations do not, and cannot supersede the law of the United States of America in America. The wishes and demands of UN member states cannot supersede the needs and interests of the citizens of the United States of America when the latter's governing bodies are called upon to act on behalf of its citizens. The UN certainly must be respected in the international order, its customs and practices adhered to insofar as any sovereign nation is reasonably able, but each sovereign nation must retain the right to act unilaterally on behalf of its citizens, if or when the UN is unable or unwilling to do so. Until the world as a whole is willing and wanting to forfeit its sovereignty to the United Nations, the nations of the world must continue with the traditional role of sovereign governments. This must remain the case with the United States of America until that time. The UN is still not the government of the world.
The United States of America, as an independent sovereign nation, whether guaranteed by the UN Charter or not, implicitly reserves the right to govern its own affairs in a way which best accomplishes the needs and protection of its people, its territory, and its existence. As a sovereign nation, if the interests of the United States of America come in conflict with the UN or any of its member states, if there is no middle ground to be compromised, the United States must act adamantly on behalf of its people out of obligation to them to insure their interests. The allegiance of the governing bodies of the United States is to its own people, first and foremost, and only secondarily to the betterment of the human condition across the globe, or to whatever other cause may arise.
As it pertains to the issue of national security, the UN is an excellent means to a better end, not the end itself. The UN is not the government of the world. As demonstrated by President George W. Bush in 2003 with his invasion of Iraq, whether one is in agreement or not with the act, the United States reserves the right to act for itself even it is if in conflict with the United Nations and its set of governing principles, or in disagreement with its member states. The governing principles of the United Nations do not, and cannot supersede the law of the United States of America in America. The wishes and demands of UN member states cannot supersede the needs and interests of the citizens of the United States of America when the latter's governing bodies are called upon to act on behalf of its citizens. The UN certainly must be respected in the international order, its customs and practices adhered to insofar as any sovereign nation is reasonably able, but each sovereign nation must retain the right to act unilaterally on behalf of its citizens, if or when the UN is unable or unwilling to do so. Until the world as a whole is willing and wanting to forfeit its sovereignty to the United Nations, the nations of the world must continue with the traditional role of sovereign governments. This must remain the case with the United States of America until that time. The UN is still not the government of the world.
Public Opinion and the Military
Use of American military forces abroad has always been a contentious issue. In question more broadly has been the conflict between two ideologies, Isolationism and Globalism (or internationalism; or interventionism). The debate between the two in America goes back to its genesis; the debate over whether America should keep to its own borders, or if its interests require, that it exert its influence abroad.
At the outset of the Second World War in Europe, American public opinion was largely opposed to the committal of US forces to that theater. The opinion was largely, “Let the Europeans deal with their own mess!” After all, America had intervened in World War One and the Europeans clearly hadn’t learned their lesson. Roosevelt had wanted to commit American forces to the European theater long before the Japanese Attack on Pearl Harbor and it was American public opinion that prevented him. He needed the Japanese awakening to persuade the American public that American intervention in Europe was necessary. It was public opinion, ultimately, that brought the United States of America into the Second World War.
America’s engagement in Vietnam largely ended as a result of tremendous public pressure, or negative public opinion. Over the decade long war, the Vietnam conflict garnered increasing public criticism. In this instance, Isolationism had grown in the arena of foreign policy as a result of the Second World War and the Korean conflict. As Vietnam dragged on, American public opinion grew until finally, under U.S. President Gerald Ford, American troops were completely withdrawn from Vietnam in 1975. The conflict rested upon the premise that democracy’s mortal enemy was communism, and that democracy, in order to prevail on the global stage, needed to stem the tide of communist expansionism. The American public didn’t see things quite in that light. In large part because of the media, American public opinion turned so strongly against Vietnam that Washington finally conceded and removed the last remaining American troops in April, 1975.
In 1993, American forces had been committed to Somalia as part of a UN aid program to protect and distribute relief aid to starving Somalis. The country was run largely by warlords and was in basic anarchy. The American commander in that theater authorized a raid aimed at abducting Mohamed Farrah Aidid, a leading warlord and strongman in Mogadishu, along with several of his top lieutenants. The raid succeeded in part, but failed to net Aidid, and resulted in the deaths of several American soldiers. The media, as in Vietnam, couldn’t get enough of the carnage of war, and succeeded in driving public opinion in opposition to the American presence in Somalia. Many Americans saw Somalia as a lawless, godless region and believed American troops had no place in such a god-forsaken part of the world. It didn’t take long for President Bill Clinton to withdraw American forces.
More recently, with waning public support for “Operation Iraqi Freedom”, President Barack Obama promised in his election campaign that he would withdraw American troops from Iraq. The American public, at least in some part, had begun to desert the Iraq war and see it as another Vietnam. Obama viewed his election, as do all American presidents, as a “referendum” on the former president’s policies, and immediately set out to withdraw American troops from Iraq. Although public opinion is in no way as galvanized against the Iraq war as it was against Vietnam, the people have spoken, and public opinion has again been a part in shaping American policy.
Public opinion will always shape the ebb and flow of the use of military force as well as American policy generally. The nature of a democracy demands it. If public opinion ceased to be a factor in such aspects of government, America would cease to be a democracy.
At the outset of the Second World War in Europe, American public opinion was largely opposed to the committal of US forces to that theater. The opinion was largely, “Let the Europeans deal with their own mess!” After all, America had intervened in World War One and the Europeans clearly hadn’t learned their lesson. Roosevelt had wanted to commit American forces to the European theater long before the Japanese Attack on Pearl Harbor and it was American public opinion that prevented him. He needed the Japanese awakening to persuade the American public that American intervention in Europe was necessary. It was public opinion, ultimately, that brought the United States of America into the Second World War.
America’s engagement in Vietnam largely ended as a result of tremendous public pressure, or negative public opinion. Over the decade long war, the Vietnam conflict garnered increasing public criticism. In this instance, Isolationism had grown in the arena of foreign policy as a result of the Second World War and the Korean conflict. As Vietnam dragged on, American public opinion grew until finally, under U.S. President Gerald Ford, American troops were completely withdrawn from Vietnam in 1975. The conflict rested upon the premise that democracy’s mortal enemy was communism, and that democracy, in order to prevail on the global stage, needed to stem the tide of communist expansionism. The American public didn’t see things quite in that light. In large part because of the media, American public opinion turned so strongly against Vietnam that Washington finally conceded and removed the last remaining American troops in April, 1975.
In 1993, American forces had been committed to Somalia as part of a UN aid program to protect and distribute relief aid to starving Somalis. The country was run largely by warlords and was in basic anarchy. The American commander in that theater authorized a raid aimed at abducting Mohamed Farrah Aidid, a leading warlord and strongman in Mogadishu, along with several of his top lieutenants. The raid succeeded in part, but failed to net Aidid, and resulted in the deaths of several American soldiers. The media, as in Vietnam, couldn’t get enough of the carnage of war, and succeeded in driving public opinion in opposition to the American presence in Somalia. Many Americans saw Somalia as a lawless, godless region and believed American troops had no place in such a god-forsaken part of the world. It didn’t take long for President Bill Clinton to withdraw American forces.
More recently, with waning public support for “Operation Iraqi Freedom”, President Barack Obama promised in his election campaign that he would withdraw American troops from Iraq. The American public, at least in some part, had begun to desert the Iraq war and see it as another Vietnam. Obama viewed his election, as do all American presidents, as a “referendum” on the former president’s policies, and immediately set out to withdraw American troops from Iraq. Although public opinion is in no way as galvanized against the Iraq war as it was against Vietnam, the people have spoken, and public opinion has again been a part in shaping American policy.
Public opinion will always shape the ebb and flow of the use of military force as well as American policy generally. The nature of a democracy demands it. If public opinion ceased to be a factor in such aspects of government, America would cease to be a democracy.
Tuesday, December 1, 2009
Congressional Oversight in Intelligence Affairs
Congress maintains oversight of the intelligence community by the means of congressional committees. The intelligence oversight committee in the House of Representatives is the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the corresponding committee in the Senate is the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (Sarkesian 2008, 145-146).
Through these committees, Congress has the ability to exercise oversight authorized through two primary public laws, the Hughes-Ryan Amendment and the Boland Amendments (Sarkesian 2008, 158). The Hughes-Ryan Amendment, named for Senator Harold Hughes of Iowa (US Congress, Biographical…) and Representative Leo Ryan of California (US House, Historical…), was passed in 1974 and required the Executive to keep the Legislative Branch informed regarding covert operations undertaken by the American intelligence apparatus. The Executive was thereafter required to inform congress in advance of any planned covert operations which were not deemed time sensitive and critical to the interests of the Untied States. As always, Congress exercised authority – oversight – over the intelligence community by tugging on the purse strings. For instance, Congress disapproved of a disclosed covert operation in Angola in 1975 and so, simply cut the funding for it (US House, Congressional…).
The three Boland Amendments, so called for Edward Boland, a Representative from Massachusetts, and enacted in 1982-1984, progressively attempted to eliminate American funding for the Contras in Nicaragua. The final installment read: “During fiscal year 1985, no funds available to the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense, or any other agency or entity of the United States involved in intelligence activities may be obligated or expended for the purpose or which would have the effect of supporting, directly or indirectly, military or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua by any nation, group, organization, movement, or individual.” (Federation).
The September 11 Report states: “Of all our recommendations, strengthening congressional oversight may be among the most difficult and important. So long as oversight is governed by current congressional rules and resolutions, we believe the American people will not get the security they want and need. The United States needs a strong, stable, and capable congressional committee structure to give America’s national intelligence agencies oversight, support, and leadership” (9/11, 419). The commission clearly viewed the current structure of Congressional Intelligence Oversight as lacking. Too disjointed, too confused, too fragmented. The commission believed the oversight of intelligence was in need of restructuring. To that end, they recommended one of two possible resolutions: first that a Joint Committee be formed which would oversee all intelligence activity, from appropriations to activities; second, that a single committee in each house of congress oversee intelligence operations, permanent and with standing membership and nonpartisan staff. It also recommends improvement in transition from one administration to another. (9/11, 422)
It seems to me the disconnect between the US Congress and the American intelligence community is a disaster in the making. Congress should have “oversight” in order to insure proper adherence to American standards of morality and ethics, and to insure the natural variance between a strong intelligence community and a vibrant democracy doesn’t develop into something more problematic. Congress’ role is not to exert authority and control, and incessantly undermine basic standards of confidentiality in order to achieve some political end. The intelligence community must be allowed to perform its intended function without fear of political reprisal every time one administration is replaced by another of a differing political persuasion. The CIA specifically seems to have become the congressional whipping boy, taking heat from Congress every time it needs to deflect blame or distract the public. Starting with the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, when the intelligence community took unending criticism for failing to stop the attacks before they happened, to the recent denigration of its efforts to insure 9/11 doesn’t happen again, the intelligence community continues to be smeared and castigated for political purposes. Congress is not adept at running the CIA, nor is it intended to. In my view, Congress should back off of the intelligence community, recognizing the difference between oversight and micromanagement , and let those professionals do their jobs.
Federation of American Scientists. Iran Contra: The Undrelying Facts. http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/walsh/part_i.htm (accessed October 28, 2009)
Sarkesian, Sam C., John Allen Williams, and Stephen J. Cimbala. 2008. US National Security: Policymakers, Processes & Politics. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc.
The 9/11 Commission Report. http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report.pdf (accessed October 28, 2009) US Congress. Biographical Directory of the United States Congress. http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=H000922 (accessed October 28, 2009)
US House of Representatives. Congressional Precedents and Powers. http://www.rules.house.gov/Archives/jcoc2ar.htm (accessed October 28, 2009)
US House of Representatives. Historical Highlights. http://clerk.house.gov/art_history/highlights.html?action=view&intID=222 (accessed October 28, 2009)
Through these committees, Congress has the ability to exercise oversight authorized through two primary public laws, the Hughes-Ryan Amendment and the Boland Amendments (Sarkesian 2008, 158). The Hughes-Ryan Amendment, named for Senator Harold Hughes of Iowa (US Congress, Biographical…) and Representative Leo Ryan of California (US House, Historical…), was passed in 1974 and required the Executive to keep the Legislative Branch informed regarding covert operations undertaken by the American intelligence apparatus. The Executive was thereafter required to inform congress in advance of any planned covert operations which were not deemed time sensitive and critical to the interests of the Untied States. As always, Congress exercised authority – oversight – over the intelligence community by tugging on the purse strings. For instance, Congress disapproved of a disclosed covert operation in Angola in 1975 and so, simply cut the funding for it (US House, Congressional…).
The three Boland Amendments, so called for Edward Boland, a Representative from Massachusetts, and enacted in 1982-1984, progressively attempted to eliminate American funding for the Contras in Nicaragua. The final installment read: “During fiscal year 1985, no funds available to the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense, or any other agency or entity of the United States involved in intelligence activities may be obligated or expended for the purpose or which would have the effect of supporting, directly or indirectly, military or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua by any nation, group, organization, movement, or individual.” (Federation).
The September 11 Report states: “Of all our recommendations, strengthening congressional oversight may be among the most difficult and important. So long as oversight is governed by current congressional rules and resolutions, we believe the American people will not get the security they want and need. The United States needs a strong, stable, and capable congressional committee structure to give America’s national intelligence agencies oversight, support, and leadership” (9/11, 419). The commission clearly viewed the current structure of Congressional Intelligence Oversight as lacking. Too disjointed, too confused, too fragmented. The commission believed the oversight of intelligence was in need of restructuring. To that end, they recommended one of two possible resolutions: first that a Joint Committee be formed which would oversee all intelligence activity, from appropriations to activities; second, that a single committee in each house of congress oversee intelligence operations, permanent and with standing membership and nonpartisan staff. It also recommends improvement in transition from one administration to another. (9/11, 422)
It seems to me the disconnect between the US Congress and the American intelligence community is a disaster in the making. Congress should have “oversight” in order to insure proper adherence to American standards of morality and ethics, and to insure the natural variance between a strong intelligence community and a vibrant democracy doesn’t develop into something more problematic. Congress’ role is not to exert authority and control, and incessantly undermine basic standards of confidentiality in order to achieve some political end. The intelligence community must be allowed to perform its intended function without fear of political reprisal every time one administration is replaced by another of a differing political persuasion. The CIA specifically seems to have become the congressional whipping boy, taking heat from Congress every time it needs to deflect blame or distract the public. Starting with the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, when the intelligence community took unending criticism for failing to stop the attacks before they happened, to the recent denigration of its efforts to insure 9/11 doesn’t happen again, the intelligence community continues to be smeared and castigated for political purposes. Congress is not adept at running the CIA, nor is it intended to. In my view, Congress should back off of the intelligence community, recognizing the difference between oversight and micromanagement , and let those professionals do their jobs.
Federation of American Scientists. Iran Contra: The Undrelying Facts. http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/walsh/part_i.htm (accessed October 28, 2009)
Sarkesian, Sam C., John Allen Williams, and Stephen J. Cimbala. 2008. US National Security: Policymakers, Processes & Politics. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc.
The 9/11 Commission Report. http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report.pdf (accessed October 28, 2009) US Congress. Biographical Directory of the United States Congress. http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=H000922 (accessed October 28, 2009)
US House of Representatives. Congressional Precedents and Powers. http://www.rules.house.gov/Archives/jcoc2ar.htm (accessed October 28, 2009)
US House of Representatives. Historical Highlights. http://clerk.house.gov/art_history/highlights.html?action=view&intID=222 (accessed October 28, 2009)
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