Congressional Oversight in Intelligence Affairs

Congress maintains oversight of the intelligence community by the means of congressional committees. The intelligence oversight committee in the House of Representatives is the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the corresponding committee in the Senate is the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (Sarkesian 2008, 145-146).

Through these committees, Congress has the ability to exercise oversight authorized through two primary public laws, the Hughes-Ryan Amendment and the Boland Amendments (Sarkesian 2008, 158). The Hughes-Ryan Amendment, named for Senator Harold Hughes of Iowa (US Congress, Biographical…) and Representative Leo Ryan of California (US House, Historical…), was passed in 1974 and required the Executive to keep the Legislative Branch informed regarding covert operations undertaken by the American intelligence apparatus. The Executive was thereafter required to inform congress in advance of any planned covert operations which were not deemed time sensitive and critical to the interests of the Untied States. As always, Congress exercised authority – oversight – over the intelligence community by tugging on the purse strings. For instance, Congress disapproved of a disclosed covert operation in Angola in 1975 and so, simply cut the funding for it (US House, Congressional…).

The three Boland Amendments, so called for Edward Boland, a Representative from Massachusetts, and enacted in 1982-1984, progressively attempted to eliminate American funding for the Contras in Nicaragua. The final installment read: “During fiscal year 1985, no funds available to the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense, or any other agency or entity of the United States involved in intelligence activities may be obligated or expended for the purpose or which would have the effect of supporting, directly or indirectly, military or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua by any nation, group, organization, movement, or individual.” (Federation).

The September 11 Report states: “Of all our recommendations, strengthening congressional oversight may be among the most difficult and important. So long as oversight is governed by current congressional rules and resolutions, we believe the American people will not get the security they want and need. The United States needs a strong, stable, and capable congressional committee structure to give America’s national intelligence agencies oversight, support, and leadership” (9/11, 419). The commission clearly viewed the current structure of Congressional Intelligence Oversight as lacking. Too disjointed, too confused, too fragmented. The commission believed the oversight of intelligence was in need of restructuring. To that end, they recommended one of two possible resolutions: first that a Joint Committee be formed which would oversee all intelligence activity, from appropriations to activities; second, that a single committee in each house of congress oversee intelligence operations, permanent and with standing membership and nonpartisan staff. It also recommends improvement in transition from one administration to another. (9/11, 422)

It seems to me the disconnect between the US Congress and the American intelligence community is a disaster in the making. Congress should have “oversight” in order to insure proper adherence to American standards of morality and ethics, and to insure the natural variance between a strong intelligence community and a vibrant democracy doesn’t develop into something more problematic. Congress’ role is not to exert authority and control, and incessantly undermine basic standards of confidentiality in order to achieve some political end. The intelligence community must be allowed to perform its intended function without fear of political reprisal every time one administration is replaced by another of a differing political persuasion. The CIA specifically seems to have become the congressional whipping boy, taking heat from Congress every time it needs to deflect blame or distract the public. Starting with the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, when the intelligence community took unending criticism for failing to stop the attacks before they happened, to the recent denigration of its efforts to insure 9/11 doesn’t happen again, the intelligence community continues to be smeared and castigated for political purposes. Congress is not adept at running the CIA, nor is it intended to. In my view, Congress should back off of the intelligence community, recognizing the difference between oversight and micromanagement , and let those professionals do their jobs.

Federation of American Scientists. Iran Contra: The Undrelying Facts. http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/walsh/part_i.htm (accessed October 28, 2009)

Sarkesian, Sam C., John Allen Williams, and Stephen J. Cimbala. 2008. US National Security: Policymakers, Processes & Politics. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc.

The 9/11 Commission Report. http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report.pdf (accessed October 28, 2009) US Congress. Biographical Directory of the United States Congress. http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=H000922 (accessed October 28, 2009)

US House of Representatives. Congressional Precedents and Powers. http://www.rules.house.gov/Archives/jcoc2ar.htm (accessed October 28, 2009)

US House of Representatives. Historical Highlights. http://clerk.house.gov/art_history/highlights.html?action=view&intID=222 (accessed October 28, 2009)