Congress maintains oversight of the intelligence community by the means of congressional committees. The intelligence oversight committee in the House of Representatives is the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the corresponding committee in the Senate is the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (Sarkesian 2008, 145-146).
Through these committees, Congress has the ability to exercise oversight authorized through two primary public laws, the Hughes-Ryan Amendment and the Boland Amendments (Sarkesian 2008, 158). The Hughes-Ryan Amendment, named for Senator Harold Hughes of Iowa (US Congress, Biographical…) and Representative Leo Ryan of California (US House, Historical…), was passed in 1974 and required the Executive to keep the Legislative Branch informed regarding covert operations undertaken by the American intelligence apparatus. The Executive was thereafter required to inform congress in advance of any planned covert operations which were not deemed time sensitive and critical to the interests of the Untied States. As always, Congress exercised authority – oversight – over the intelligence community by tugging on the purse strings. For instance, Congress disapproved of a disclosed covert operation in Angola in 1975 and so, simply cut the funding for it (US House, Congressional…).
The three Boland Amendments, so called for Edward Boland, a Representative from Massachusetts, and enacted in 1982-1984, progressively attempted to eliminate American funding for the Contras in Nicaragua. The final installment read: “During fiscal year 1985, no funds available to the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense, or any other agency or entity of the United States involved in intelligence activities may be obligated or expended for the purpose or which would have the effect of supporting, directly or indirectly, military or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua by any nation, group, organization, movement, or individual.” (Federation).
The September 11 Report states: “Of all our recommendations, strengthening congressional oversight may be among the most difficult and important. So long as oversight is governed by current congressional rules and resolutions, we believe the American people will not get the security they want and need. The United States needs a strong, stable, and capable congressional committee structure to give America’s national intelligence agencies oversight, support, and leadership” (9/11, 419). The commission clearly viewed the current structure of Congressional Intelligence Oversight as lacking. Too disjointed, too confused, too fragmented. The commission believed the oversight of intelligence was in need of restructuring. To that end, they recommended one of two possible resolutions: first that a Joint Committee be formed which would oversee all intelligence activity, from appropriations to activities; second, that a single committee in each house of congress oversee intelligence operations, permanent and with standing membership and nonpartisan staff. It also recommends improvement in transition from one administration to another. (9/11, 422)
It seems to me the disconnect between the US Congress and the American intelligence community is a disaster in the making. Congress should have “oversight” in order to insure proper adherence to American standards of morality and ethics, and to insure the natural variance between a strong intelligence community and a vibrant democracy doesn’t develop into something more problematic. Congress’ role is not to exert authority and control, and incessantly undermine basic standards of confidentiality in order to achieve some political end. The intelligence community must be allowed to perform its intended function without fear of political reprisal every time one administration is replaced by another of a differing political persuasion. The CIA specifically seems to have become the congressional whipping boy, taking heat from Congress every time it needs to deflect blame or distract the public. Starting with the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, when the intelligence community took unending criticism for failing to stop the attacks before they happened, to the recent denigration of its efforts to insure 9/11 doesn’t happen again, the intelligence community continues to be smeared and castigated for political purposes. Congress is not adept at running the CIA, nor is it intended to. In my view, Congress should back off of the intelligence community, recognizing the difference between oversight and micromanagement , and let those professionals do their jobs.
Federation of American Scientists. Iran Contra: The Undrelying Facts. http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/walsh/part_i.htm (accessed October 28, 2009)
Sarkesian, Sam C., John Allen Williams, and Stephen J. Cimbala. 2008. US National Security: Policymakers, Processes & Politics. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc.
The 9/11 Commission Report. http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report.pdf (accessed October 28, 2009) US Congress. Biographical Directory of the United States Congress. http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=H000922 (accessed October 28, 2009)
US House of Representatives. Congressional Precedents and Powers. http://www.rules.house.gov/Archives/jcoc2ar.htm (accessed October 28, 2009)
US House of Representatives. Historical Highlights. http://clerk.house.gov/art_history/highlights.html?action=view&intID=222 (accessed October 28, 2009)
Showing posts with label intelligence. Show all posts
Showing posts with label intelligence. Show all posts
Tuesday, December 1, 2009
Thursday, February 22, 2007
Russia's Briefcase Nuclear Weapons
In May and September 1997, Alexander Lebed, a former Soviet army general who served in the Soviet war in Afghanistan, made several statements regarding the loss of many, possibly more than 100, briefcase sized nuclear weapons. He said the nukes were built to be transported like a large briefcase or a suitcase and could be armed by a single individual given only thirty minutes time. The nukes purportedly had a thermodynamic work energy rating of about one kiloton, by comparison, the bomb dropped on Hiroshima, Japan in August 1945, had a rating of 13 kilotons.
While serving as Boris Yeltsin’s National Security Advisor Lebed began a search to account for these bombs. He claimed that an unknown number of these bombs had been produced under orders from the Soviet GRU several years prior to his 1997 disclosure, and were intended for use in guerrilla or terrorist warfare. They had been assigned to units of the GRU, and upon the dissolution of the Soviet Union, according to General Lebed, simply went missing. His search resulted in his belief that more than 100 of those nuclear weapons had disappeared and could not be accounted for.
[GRU is an anglicized acronym for the Russian translation of Main Intelligence Directorate – the Soviet Union’s main intelligence apparatus which was notorious for having a mind of its own. During the Soviet era the GRU supervised the KGB and had branches and units assigned to a large number of Soviet embassies and consulates around the world. The GRU was an international intelligence collection machine which operated covertly on a global scale. Its very existence was so secret that during the Soviet era, only people within intelligence circles even recognized it as a Soviet intelligence entity.]
Shortly after his assertion that these weapons were unaccounted for, the Russian government denied even the existence of such weapons. Their denial changed over time from utter revulsion at the claim, to a passive admission that the bombs did exist but that they were all fully accounted for. The Russian government then began to put Lebed’s credibility into question, suggesting he recently had been fired from his post as Yeltsin’s National Security Advisor (October 1996) and he had lost the presidential election not long before that.
The American State Department publicly announced that they “believed” the Russian officials which assured the State Department that all the nuclear arms in Russia’s arsenal were accounted for. The Soviet government, being the master of cloak and dagger, of deceit, and of misinformation, would obviously be a reliable source for such potentially lethal information. It would most certainly have admitted to the world that it had just up-n-lost 100 of the most deadly weapons ever known.
In October 1997, Lebed testified before the United States Congress about the existence of these devices and his testimony was corroborated by testimony and writings of several other notable Soviet defectors. Not long after this whole “briefcase nuke” affair blew over in the public eye, General Lebed came under investigation for revealing state secrets.
In January 2000, as well as in a book published in 1998, a recent defector by the name of Stanislav Lunev, a former colonel in the GRU made some claims substantiating what Lebed had reported. He stated, “Though most Americans don’t realize it, America is already penetrated by Russian military intelligence to the extent that arms caches lie in wait for use by Russian special forces – or Spetznatz. [These Russian special forces] troops are currently inside the United States. They regularly enter the country as foreign tourists, using fake passports and their knowledge of foreign languages to pass as Germans or Eastern Europeans. One of the GRUs major tasks is to find drop sites for their [weaponry] including …the so called “suitcase bombs.” Lunev further stated that the number of devises Lebed had claimed were “missing” was “almost identical to the number of ‘strategic targets’ upon which those bombs would be used. It is likely these weapons were deployed before Lebed looked into the matter.”
Soon after his initial defection and revelation of this information, Lunev went into the FBI’s witness protection program for fear of assassination. It is Ironic that Lebed, having returned to Russia following his testimony to the United States Congress, died in an “accidental” helicopter crash in the Krasnoyarsk region of Russia along with several of his staff members.
I am convinced that these nukes exist. To what ends they might be used is a Pandora’s box which I believe deserves careful consideration by our nation’s intelligence community (if there wasn’t a full investigation already under way into the location of these weapons by our American intelligence apparatus I would be utterly surprised and dismayed). That they may be deposited at strategically important locations throughout the United States is certainly debatable. A more believable conclusion would be that some Jihadist organization may have purchased or stolen one or more of these weapons and they are in the process of delivering it for future use. If they have already been delivered as Mr. Lunev suggests, it would be simple to sell the exact location to such a group rather than do a material swap of the weapon itself.
I would be hesitant to believe that America has been over-run by the Spetznatz, as suggested by Mr. Lunev but in the arena of national security one must always be prepared to expect the unexpected and believe the unbelievable in the name of protecting the American public, especially in the face of such a sophisticated and knowledgeable enemy. In any case, the suggestion that these briefcase nukes may be out there and unaccounted for is significant cause for concern, even alarm.
Read about Russia's Decaying & Vulnerable Nuclear Arsenal
While serving as Boris Yeltsin’s National Security Advisor Lebed began a search to account for these bombs. He claimed that an unknown number of these bombs had been produced under orders from the Soviet GRU several years prior to his 1997 disclosure, and were intended for use in guerrilla or terrorist warfare. They had been assigned to units of the GRU, and upon the dissolution of the Soviet Union, according to General Lebed, simply went missing. His search resulted in his belief that more than 100 of those nuclear weapons had disappeared and could not be accounted for.
[GRU is an anglicized acronym for the Russian translation of Main Intelligence Directorate – the Soviet Union’s main intelligence apparatus which was notorious for having a mind of its own. During the Soviet era the GRU supervised the KGB and had branches and units assigned to a large number of Soviet embassies and consulates around the world. The GRU was an international intelligence collection machine which operated covertly on a global scale. Its very existence was so secret that during the Soviet era, only people within intelligence circles even recognized it as a Soviet intelligence entity.]
Shortly after his assertion that these weapons were unaccounted for, the Russian government denied even the existence of such weapons. Their denial changed over time from utter revulsion at the claim, to a passive admission that the bombs did exist but that they were all fully accounted for. The Russian government then began to put Lebed’s credibility into question, suggesting he recently had been fired from his post as Yeltsin’s National Security Advisor (October 1996) and he had lost the presidential election not long before that.
The American State Department publicly announced that they “believed” the Russian officials which assured the State Department that all the nuclear arms in Russia’s arsenal were accounted for. The Soviet government, being the master of cloak and dagger, of deceit, and of misinformation, would obviously be a reliable source for such potentially lethal information. It would most certainly have admitted to the world that it had just up-n-lost 100 of the most deadly weapons ever known.
In October 1997, Lebed testified before the United States Congress about the existence of these devices and his testimony was corroborated by testimony and writings of several other notable Soviet defectors. Not long after this whole “briefcase nuke” affair blew over in the public eye, General Lebed came under investigation for revealing state secrets.
In January 2000, as well as in a book published in 1998, a recent defector by the name of Stanislav Lunev, a former colonel in the GRU made some claims substantiating what Lebed had reported. He stated, “Though most Americans don’t realize it, America is already penetrated by Russian military intelligence to the extent that arms caches lie in wait for use by Russian special forces – or Spetznatz. [These Russian special forces] troops are currently inside the United States. They regularly enter the country as foreign tourists, using fake passports and their knowledge of foreign languages to pass as Germans or Eastern Europeans. One of the GRUs major tasks is to find drop sites for their [weaponry] including …the so called “suitcase bombs.” Lunev further stated that the number of devises Lebed had claimed were “missing” was “almost identical to the number of ‘strategic targets’ upon which those bombs would be used. It is likely these weapons were deployed before Lebed looked into the matter.”
Soon after his initial defection and revelation of this information, Lunev went into the FBI’s witness protection program for fear of assassination. It is Ironic that Lebed, having returned to Russia following his testimony to the United States Congress, died in an “accidental” helicopter crash in the Krasnoyarsk region of Russia along with several of his staff members.
I am convinced that these nukes exist. To what ends they might be used is a Pandora’s box which I believe deserves careful consideration by our nation’s intelligence community (if there wasn’t a full investigation already under way into the location of these weapons by our American intelligence apparatus I would be utterly surprised and dismayed). That they may be deposited at strategically important locations throughout the United States is certainly debatable. A more believable conclusion would be that some Jihadist organization may have purchased or stolen one or more of these weapons and they are in the process of delivering it for future use. If they have already been delivered as Mr. Lunev suggests, it would be simple to sell the exact location to such a group rather than do a material swap of the weapon itself.
I would be hesitant to believe that America has been over-run by the Spetznatz, as suggested by Mr. Lunev but in the arena of national security one must always be prepared to expect the unexpected and believe the unbelievable in the name of protecting the American public, especially in the face of such a sophisticated and knowledgeable enemy. In any case, the suggestion that these briefcase nukes may be out there and unaccounted for is significant cause for concern, even alarm.
Read about Russia's Decaying & Vulnerable Nuclear Arsenal
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